4 | Studying Politics

Illustrations

3 | Citizenship, Identity, and Political Participation

This part focuses on considerations of such vexing questions as the contours of citizenship in a globalized world and the differences between identity politics and traditional interest politics. Issues concerning participation and political behavior are placed in the company of questions about identity and the social construction of behavior. In so doing, all the subfield lines are crossed, for the issues raised here are central to political theory; challenge American, comparative, and international politics; and invoke methods as diverse as behaviorism, rational choice, and constructivism.

In "Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World," Seyla Benhabib examines the development of Anglo-American political theory in the 1990s with a special focus on studies of citizenship. Under contemporary conditions of globalization, she argues, the modern nation-state system, characterized by the domestic world of territorially bounded politics and the external world of foreign, military, and diplomatic relations is undergoing profound structural transformations. The four main purposes of the modern state—territorial dominion, administrative control, cultural hegemony, and democratic legitimacy—have all been weakened by these changes. What, she then asks, are the appropriate principles of political membership defining access and entitlement to citizenship for liberal democracies under the current conditions of the "deterritorialization of politics"? Focusing on normative citizenship theories as well as key institutional developments, she claims that liberal democracies are built on an internal paradox: the right to self-determination, including the right to control and police one's borders and access to them, and universalist rights claims which individuals are entitled to in virtue of being moral persons, not as citizens of a particular polity. Immigration, naturalization, and asylum and refugee policies are caught between these contradictory demands.

Kay Schlozman's assessment in "Citizen Participation in the United

States: What Do We Know? Why Do We Care?" notes that because research on participation has been connected so tightly to the development of the sample survey, only in the last half-century has it emerged as a field of inquiry for American political science. The past decade has witnessed important intellectual advances from work that grounds empirical research in the fundamental concerns of democratic theory to ask questions such as why do people take part, why are aggregate rates of participation changing, and what difference does it make? One important focus is on individual differences in activity. Multivariate empirical analysis makes clear that the origins of political participation are complex. However, the importance of mobilization through political, nonpolitical, and personal channels shows that the characteristics of individuals intersect with contextual factors in generating participation. Researchers have investigated a variety of aspects of the political environment including electoral laws and regulations and the nature of campaigns and candidates along with such social factors as the nature of the community and the nonpolitical institutions with which individuals are affiliated.

Explaining the decline in political participation in recent decades, a different intellectual enterprise from accounting for participation itself, defines another important part of this research program. Not only have voting and other forms of political activity waned since the 1960s, but participation in community organizations and clubs and in religious, voluntary and charitable activities and informal socializing have ebbed as well. The decay in voluntary activity is surprising because the increase in educational attainment over the second half of the twentieth century would have led us to expect the reverse. To explain these important puzzles, we need longitudinal, preferably panel surveys containing a rich battery of items and samples large enough to include ample cases of individuals who engage in such rare political acts as attending a political protest or making a large contribution. Unfortunately, it now seems unlikely that the resources for such work will become available.

Nancy Burns attends to another issue of identity politics in "Gender: Public Opinion and Political Action," arguing that we are at a tremendous turning point. We have conceptualizations, methodological tools, cumulative knowledge, and a vast set of new questions to answer. And we have at hand one other immensely valuable resource, the theoretical and methodological work in other subfields and disciplines, work that can be reconfigured and combined to illuminate the role of gender. Burns examines critical issues concerning conceptual developments and method (studying categories in an individualistic discipline), issues that have often characterized the contributions gender scholars have made to political science (linking life spaces), and issues that will and should drive the future study of gender and politics (building truly comparative analyses). The core point of her examples is to encourage serious interdisciplinary borrowing wherever it offers theoretical or empirical guidance.

Michael Dawson and Cathy Cohen assay "Problems in the Study of the Politics of Race." Lamenting the unevenness of our knowledge and the fragmentation that afflicts the study of race and politics, they urge fresh attention be paid to specific processes that produce different patterns of racialization at different times and in different circumstances. In promoting attention to the theoretical foundations of empirical research in this area, Dawson and Cohen suggest the value of linking studies of race to other bases of ascription, such as gender and sexuality, and advance a program of research linking normative and positive dimensions. This large project, they insist, should not be limited by the tendency of political science to borrow heavily from economics but should also be informed by scholarship in sociology, psychology, gender studies, and history. Key themes in a reinvigorated approach to race would include the terms of relations among nonwhite groups, the role of ideology and attitudes, state-based racial categorization, and the changing dynamics of immigration. Their overall goal is to reduce the level of parochialism they believe to be a characteristic of current scholarship in the field within political science.

Morris Fiorina examines how old theories face new realities in "Parties, Participation, and Representation in the United States." By some familiar indicators U.S. democracy is in an unhealthy state. Trust in government has dropped precipitously since midcentury. Political participation in particular and civic engagement in general are down from midcentury levels. Yet according to two venerable lines of democratic theory—participatory theory and responsible parties theory—the operation of U.S. democracy today is superior to what it was at midcentury. Fiorina suggests that this puzzle can be explained by noting that American politics today is less representative of mainstream sentiments than it was at midcentury. One important reason is that the personal material rewards for participating in politics have greatly declined in importance, leaving ideological incentives to fill the void. Almost by definition, ideologically motivated participators are extreme participators, reshaping parties and increasing polarization. Thus, centrist citizens turn away from a politics they see as unnecessarily conflictual, excessively symbolic, and focused on peripheral issues.

Amy Gutmann offers an assessment of identity versus interest politics in "Identity and Democracy: A Synthetic Perspective." The ever-growing attention to group identities and identity groups in normative political theory parallels their salience in contemporary democratic politics. Groups of individuals bound together by a given shared social identity based on nationality, ethnicity, gender, color, class, physical disability, or political ideology make political claims that range from exempting themselves from disproportionately burdensome laws to exercising sovereignty.

A growing and wide-ranging scholarship on group identity and associational freedom in nonideal democracies suggests that "Who should decide what and how in democratic politics?" cannot be answered without taking more notice of the political role of group identities and civic associations. The scholarship on identity and democracy is internally divided over whether voluntary or involuntary group identities generally operate for the better or the worse in democratic politics. What Gutmann calls the school of culture emphasizes the essential contribution that cultural groups make to the lives of individuals in providing a sense of secure belonging and a set of scripts that give meaning to individual lives. The school of culture therefore warns against treating the ideal of the free and equal person as if actual individuals could be conceived independently of any and all cultural contexts. By contrast, the school of choice emphasizes the value of individual freedom from involuntary groups, the freedom to criticize and revise culturally given identities, and a correlative right of free association. The school of choice therefore issues precisely the opposite warning from the school of culture: do not treat cultural groups as if they were primordial, sovereign authorities over individuals who should be accorded the civic standing of free and equal persons in democratic societies. This essay develops a humanist synthesis that avoids the temptation, on the one hand, to elevate cultural groups over the individual and, on the other hand, to conceive of individuals free from socially given identities. A humanist synthesis integrates considerations of culture and choice and attends to the dynamic interplay between group identities and democratic politics.

Randall Calvert attempts to stretch boundaries in "Identity, Expression, and Rational-Choice Theory." Political scientists usually see identification and expression as cultural or psychological processes, either basic to human motivation or deriving immediately from some form of built-in human orientation toward social groups, and thus irreconcilable with sharply instrumental and strategic accounts of human behavior. Nevertheless, rational-choice theorists have attempted with increasing frequency to bridge the theoretical gap between identity and expression, on the one hand, and strategic rational action, on the other. Calvert summarizes these efforts and assesses the contribution they have made toward our understanding of identity and expression. The survey focuses on three connected phenomena which either currently are or during some earlier era were viewed by political scientists as primarily identity expressive and irrational: voting participation, partisanship and ideology, and ethnic politics and violence.

Thomas Risse also seeks a convergence in paradigms in his essay on "Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations across Paradigms." As a theoretical approach, institutionalism can be differentiated from other approaches in international relations in terms of the substantive claim that institutions matter, that is, that they exert clearly identifiable and independent effects on political life. The various institutionalisms can then be distinguished according to which types of effects they ascribe to political and other institutions. Institutions might constrain behavior, but they might also influence preferences or even constitute identities. Rationalist institutionalism follows a "logic of consequentialism." In contrast, constructivist insights in the study of international institutions focus on a "logic of appropriateness" in terms of rule-guided behavior and the enactment of cultural scripts, on the one hand, and a "logic of arguing" emphasizing deliberative and communicative processes, on the other. Risse's essay emphasizes insights that social constructivism brings to the study of international institutions. Yet, rationalist and constructivist institutionalisms do not constitute either/or propositions, he shows, but complement each other to a considerable extent. He thus issues a plea for theoretical synthesis and for conversations across paradigms rather than continued trench warfare. He also mounts an appeal for problem- rather than paradigm-driven research on international institutions.

Seyla Benhabib

Political Theory and Political Membership in a Changing World

Political Theory in the 1990s: The Return of the Real[1]

In his lucid overview of the development of political theory in the 1980s, William Galston expressed the hope that in the future theorists would "try harder to take real political controversies as their point of departure and to attend to the terms in which these debates are conducted. There should be less top-down theorizing or, to put it another way, more of an effort to employ the method of reflective equilibrium—judgment of abstract principles in light of concrete realities, not just vice-versa—that Rawlsians often preach but seldom practice" (1993, 41). Writing shortly after Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation as president of the Soviet Union, Galston urged his theorist colleagues to focus more carefully on actual historical developments and political conflicts, without, nevertheless, giving up the critical and normative functions of conceptual elucidation, institutional design, and assessment.

Much political theory in the 1990s was motivated by similar considerations. As the decade progressed, the big inter- and intraparadigmatic struggles between theoretical approaches, such as postmodernism, critical social theory, feminism, deconstruction, neopragmatism, critical legal studies, on the one hand, and the more empirical and positivistic approaches, on the

1. I have discussed these issues with many colleagues in different contexts. My thanks go to the editors of the volume, Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, for their superb counsel and guidance. Thanks also to Amy Gutmann and Ian Shapiro for their extensive remarks on an earlier draft of this paper and to Carolin Emcke, Veit Bader, James Sleeper, Morris Kaplan, Peter Shuck, Glyn Morgan, Pratap Mehta, Jean Cohen, Nancy Fraser, Nadia Urbanati, Jennifer Nedelsky, and Melissa Williams for their comments during the delivery of some or other version of these thoughts at Columbia University, University of Toronto, University of Amsterdam, Harvard University, and New School University. Finally, I am grateful to my research assistant Annie Stilz for providing valuable editorial and substantive suggestions throughout.

other, gave way to a postparadigmatic peace. Not only were there signs of theoretical exhaustion, generated in part by the all-too-rigid separation of paradigms which had characterized earlier debates (see Benhabib, Butler, et al. 1995), but under the weight of historical developments, theorists across disciplines felt compelled to account for those differences which really made a difference. The civil war in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing, mass murders, mass rape, and the dislocation of several million people in the heart of Europe confronted theorists of "difference" with the moral and political obligation of stating clearly which forms of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and sexual difference were worthy of our moral and political support and why.

The civil war in Yugoslavia was the bloodiest and most tragic, but certainly not the only, scenario that followed the fall of Communism in eastern and central Europe. To the early democratic triumphs of the Solidarity movement in Poland in the previous decade were added the democratization movements in countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, eastern Germany and the Baltic states. As political scientists developed models for studying transitions to post-Communist regime types, political theorists reflected on "the revolutions in Europe" (Laclau 1990) from the perspective of the resurgence of democracy, social movements, civil society, and citizens' activism (Cohen and Arato 1992; Isaac 1998). The transformations of regimes in these countries contributed to the revival of one of the most ancient and honorable preoccupations for students of politics, namely, the study and design of constitutions (Elster 1993; 1996; 1998). The challenges of advising and designing constitutional transitions not only in eastern and central Europe, but in the newly liberated South Africa as well, put on the map some of the fundamentals of political regimes, such as majoritarianism, parliamentarianism, the role of the courts vis-à-vis elected bodies, the formulation of bills of rights, and their status within constitutional systems.

As the pace of history quickened after the fall of Communism in eastern and central Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989, not only in Europe but all around the globe, a paradoxical development made itself felt. On the one hand, global integration in the spheres of economics, armament, finance, communication, information, and tourism proceeded with a dizzying pace; on the other hand, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious separatisms, and demands for regional and local autonomy increased worldwide. Thus European integration under the aegis of the European Union was accompanied by intensified Basque separatist aspirations in Spain; continuing bloodshed among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; regionalist right-wing resurgencies in Italy through the agitation of the Northern League; and the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a political force not only in the Middle East but among immigrant and guest worker communities in Europe as well. Reflecting on the paradoxical logic of integration and disintegration, Benjamin Barber coined the memorable phrase, "Jihad vs. McWorld" (Barber 1995).

Perhaps no other movement for cultural and political autonomy has affected the core of liberal democratic theory as much as the Mouvement Québécois. Building on the status of the province of Quebec as heir to one of the three founding nations of the state of Canada—the Anglophone, the Francophone, and the "First Nations"—the Mouvement Québécois brought Canada to the brink of a constitutional crisis. This state of affairs generated intense and creative soul-searching among many Canadian political theorists among them, Charles Taylor (1993, 1994), William Kymlicka (1995b, c), James Tully (1995), Joe Carens (1995a, 2000), and Ronald Beiner (1995). Under the impact of the Canadian crisis, the relations between group identity and liberal democracy, between liberalism and culture, and between multiculturalism and democratic citizenship were placed on the agenda of political studies throughout the 1990s.

Whether through its own internal logic of development or through the call of history, political philosophy in the 1990s has produced post- and multiparadigmatic works that are characterized by a greater degree of engagement with actual social and historical developments. Counterfactual thought experiments and rarefied examples, typical of analytical moral philosophy, have given way to a more serious engagement with institutions and constitutions, with social movements and cultural trends.

In the following, I would like to examine these broad trends by analyzing a cluster of concepts that are central to the study of politics from a normative and institutional point of view: the nation-state, citizenship, and political membership in liberal democracies. By focusing on what is at times referred to as the field of citizenship studies, I want to illustrate as well as contribute to the further development of a normative political theory that is historically situated and institutionally informed.

■ | The Deterritorialization of Politics

The modern nation-state in the West, in the course of its development from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, struggled to attain four goals: territorial dominion, administrative control, collective cultural identity, and political legitimacy through increased democratic participation. There is widespread consensus that these four functions of the state—territorial dominion, administrative control, cultural hegemony, and democratic legitimacy—are all undergoing profound transformations. The modern nation-state system, characterized by the innerworld of territorially bounded politics and the outerworld of foreign military and diplomatic relations—in short the state-centric system of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—is, if not at an end, at a minimum undergoing a deep reconfiguration.[2] James N. Rosenau captures these changes in brief and dramatic terms: "The international system is less commanding, but it is still powerful. States are changing, but they are not disappearing. State sovereignty has been eroded, but it is still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can still throw their weight around. At certain times publics are more demanding, but at other times they are more pliable. Borders still keep out intruders, but they are also more porous" (1997, 4). Arguing that these contemporary developments present a qualitatively altered stage in the development of the world political system, David Held and his colleagues have introduced the phrase the "deterritorialization of politics, rule and governance" to capture these changes (1999, 32).

Globalization brings with it the embedding of the administrative-material functions of the state in an increasingly volatile context which far exceeds its capacities to influence decisions and outcomes. The nation-state is on the one hand too small to deal with the economic, ecological, immunological, and informational problems created by a more interdependent environment; on the other hand, it is too large to contain the as-

2. States, of course, can be nation-states, multinational states, and multinational federations. These categories are sociological as well as juridical. On the one hand, they refer to the composition of the population defined as citizens and residents of a state within a given territory; on the other hand, they refer to the legal and juridical representation and status of different peoples as they coexist with one another. For example, most European states, like France, Germany, Italy, Greece, and Sweden are nation-states, both sociologically and juridically, even if their populations are becoming increasingly multicultural. The United States, on the other hand, is sociologically a multinational and multicultural society, but legally, it is a nation-state, for arguably, with the exception of Native Americans, Guam and the territories of Puerto Rico (which has commonwealth status), no ethnic and national group retains territorial rights, and even the first three groups have only partial internal and juridical autonomy over their designated territories. Canada, Belgium, and contemporary Spain are multinational and multicultural states which are straddling the borderline between a federation and a nation-state. The province of Quebec enjoys the status of "asymmetrical federalism": Quebec has certain linguistic, educational, and social autonomy rights which set it apart from other provinces of the Canadian federation. Belgium is linguistically as well as administratively sectioned into different communities of French, Flemish, and German enclaves; the province of Cataluña in Spain enjoys considerable linguistic, administrative, and social autonomy.

Throughout this first section of the paper, I will use the term *state* to cover these multiple formations and will only resort to the locution of the nation-state when I am calling attention to the sociological as well as legal-juridical status of the political unit. From the standpoint of a theory of political membership, the changing nature of some contemporary states, as they face the challenges of increased multicultural and multinational autonomy demands, suggests new understandings of citizenship, as well as raises fundamental puzzles about immigration policy: Who determines immigration policies and entry conditions, and at which administrative and juridical levels—the city, the province, the state, or the federation?

pirations of identity-driven social and regionalist movements. Under these conditions, *territoriality* is fast becoming an anachronistic delimitation of material functions and cultural identities. As a global economy undermines the power of nation-states to define redistributive policies and to achieve economic justice at home, alternative sources of cultural hegemony are provided by the inter- and transnationalization of culture, the movement of peoples across porous state borders, and the rise of global media. *Democratic legitimacy* now has to be attained in nation-states where the "we" of "we, the people" is increasingly frayed and amorphous. The crises of redistributionist politics affect solidarity across social classes, while the rise of multiculturalist- and identity-politics-driven movements fragment the "we" and render its boundaries fluid and porous. Who are "we"? Along with the weakening of democratic sources of legitimacy through the decline of the redistributive role of the state, collective cultural identities are growing increasingly volatile and fragmented.

The changing character of the nation-state has implications for the theory and practice of citizenship. Citizenship in the modern world has meant membership in a bounded political community which was either a nation-state, a multinational state, or a federation of states. The political regime of territorially bounded sovereignty, exercised through formal, rational administrative procedures and dependent on the democratic will formation of a more or less culturally homogeneous group of people, can only function by defining, circumscribing, and controlling citizenship. The citizen is the individual who has membership rights to reside within a territory, who is subject to the state's administrative jurisdiction, and who is also, ideally, a member of the democratic sovereign in the name of whom laws are issued and administration is exercised. Following Max Weber, we may say that this unity of residency, administrative subjection, democratic participation, and cultural membership constitutes the "ideal typical" model of citizenship in the modern nation-state of the West (see Weber 1978 [1956], 901–26). The influence of this model, whether or not it adequately corresponds to local conditions, extends far beyond the West: modernizing nations in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, which entered the process of state formation at later points than their West European counterparts, copied this model wherever they came into existence as well.

What is the status of citizenship today, in a world of increasingly deterritorialized politics? As a normative category as well as institutional practice, which has so far defined political membership in the state-centric world, how is citizenship being reconfigured under contemporary conditions? How has the fraying of the four functions of the state—territoriality, administrative control, cultural identity, and democratic legitimacy—affected the theory and practice of citizenship?

This contribution examines debates around citizenship and political membership of the last decades, primarily in political theory but with an eye to political sociology and comparative politics as well. My question is:

What should be the normative principles of democratic membership in a world of increasingly deterritorialized politics? If consequences of the new global constellation are the more fluid movement of peoples across borders and the formation of multiple political allegiances that escape the boundaries of national citizenship, what would be appropriate principles of political membership in this deterritorialized system? Political membership is one aspect of the theory of citizenship, albeit a crucial one. It concerns the institutional processes of access to and acquisition of the status of citizenship. It deals with the principles and institutions of incorporating aliens and strangers, immigrants and newcomers, refugees and asylum seekers into existing polities.

■ | Citizenship Theories, Past and Present

The practice and institution of citizenship can be disaggregated into three components: collective identity, privileges of political membership, and social rights and claims. While political theorists tend to focus on the privileges of political membership, social scientists and social historians have been more interested in the formation of collective identities and the evolution of rights and claims associated with the status of citizenship.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Citizenship entails membership in a political entity which shares certain linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and religious commonalities and which can be distinguished from similar political entities. The precise form of such an entity, whether it is a multinational empire or a national republic, a commonwealth or a federation, varies historically. Viewed analytically, however, the concepts of citizenship, in the sense of being a member of a political community, and of nationality, in the sense of being a member of a particular linguistic, ethnic, religious, and cultural group, are to be distinguished from one another. Political communities need not be composed of nationally and ethnically homogeneous groups. Historically this was just as little the case in the multinational and multiethnic Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires as it is the case today in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

PRIVILEGES OF MEMBERSHIP

The oldest meaning of citizenship is that of the privileges and burdens of self-governance. For the ancient Greeks, a *politos* is a member of the *polis*, one who can be called to military sevice as well as jury duty and who must pay taxes and serve in the *Ecclesia* ("Assembly") in his capacity as member of his *Demei* (family clan) at least one month of the year. The link between the city and the citizen is retained in the etymology of *civitas* and *citoyenne* on the one hand and *Burgher* and *Burgh* on the other.

Citizenship confers on its holders the right of political participation, the right to hold certain offices and perform certain tasks, and the right to deliberate and decide on certain questions. Aristotle wrote in the *Politics:*

> The state is a compound made of citizens; and this compels us to consider who should properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is. The nature of citizenship, like that of the state, is a question which is often disputed: there is no general agreement on a single definition: the man who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an "oligarchy." (1941 ed., 1247b–75a)

In making the identity of the citizen dependent on the type of political regime, Aristotle is emphasizing the contingent nature of this concept. It is not nature, but the city and its conventions, the *nomoi,* that create the citizen. Yet precisely in Aristotle's work we also see how this insight into the socially constituted aspect of citizenship goes hand in hand with an exclusionary vision of the psychosexual attributes of citizenship. Even if it is regime types that determine who a citizen is, in Aristotle's view, only some are "by nature fit" to exercise the virtues of citizenship; others are not. Slaves, women, and non-Greeks in general are excluded from the statutory privileges of membership, but this exclusion is considered rational insofar as these individuals do not seem to possess the virtues of mind, body, and character essential to citizenship. This tension between the social constitution of the citizen and the psychosexual characteristics that the ideal citizen ought to possess accompanies struggles over the meaning of citizenship down to our own days. Struggles over whether women should have the vote, whether non-White and noncolonial peoples are capable of self-rule, or whether a gay person can hold certain kinds of public office illustrate the tension between the social and the naturalistic dimensions of citizenship (see Kerber 1997; Landes 1988; Scott 1988).

Social Rights and Benefits

The view that citizenship can be understood as a status that gives one the right to the possession of a certain bundle of entitlements, benefits as well as obligations, derives from T. H. Marshall (1950). Marshall's catalogue of civil, political, and social rights is based on the cumulative logic of struggles for expanding democracy in the nineteenth and early–twentieth centuries. Civil rights arise with the birth of the absolutist state, and in their earliest and most basic form they entail the rights to the protection of life, liberty, and property; the right to freedom of conscience; and certain associational rights, like those of contract and marriage.

Political rights in the narrow sense refer to the rights of self-determination, to hold and run for office, to enjoy freedom of speech and opinion, and to establish political and nonpolitical associations, including a free press and free institutions of science and culture. Social rights are last in Marshall's catalogue, because they have been achieved historically through the struggles of workers', women's, and other social movements of the last two centuries. Social rights involve the right to form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations; health care rights; unemployment compensation; old age pensions; and child care, housing, and educational subsidies. These social rights vary widely across countries and depend on the social class compromises prevalent in any given welfare state democracy (Soysal 1994).

The primary focus of citizenship studies in political philosophy has been, until very recently, on the privileges of membership. Largely under the influence of the liberal-communitarian controversy (see Avineri and De-Shalit 1992), the theory and practice of citizenship was examined from the standpoint of one predominant theme: In light of divergent conceptions of liberal justice and the human good, how should we think of the virtues and obligations of citizenship? Should citizens view themselves as moral persons with multiple and competing allegiances, as liberals enjoin them to? Or should citizenship be viewed as a "thick moral identity" that is constitutive of who we are as individuals in some deep sense, as communitarians enjoin? This literature on the virtues and duties of citizenship was largely removed from the historical and social analysis of the transformations of institutions and practices of citizenship (see Sandel 1982; Macedo 1990; Galston 1991).

In their critique of liberalism, or to use Michael Sandel's felicitous phrase, of "the procedural republic," communitarians are indebted to Hannah Arendt's political philosophy (Sandel 1996, 26–27 ff.). Particularly in *On Revolution*, Arendt (1963) argued that there was an ambivalence at the heart of the U.S. Republic. The famous principles of the Declaration of Independence sanctified life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Yet as debates among the framers of the Constitution showed, from the beginning the pursuit of happiness was ambivalent between an individualistic vision of the good life, spent in the accumulation of material goods and the joys of private pursuits, and a public happiness, which could only be attained in the pursuit of common good with others, in acting and deliberating together. Sandel (1996) followed Arendt in believing that, in the course of U.S. history, the first meaning of happiness triumphed over the second, thus eclipsing the virtues of engaged and political citizenship.

As political theorists debated the identity and virtues of the citizen, a new literature on the evolution and changing logics of citizenship was produced largely by political sociologists and sociological historians (see Brubacker 1992; Tilly 1990, 1992; Hobsbawm 1992; Soysal 1994; Bauboeck 1994; Bader 1995, 1997). Retrieving some of T. H. Marshall's classical analysis (1950) on citizenship and social class, this recent literature highlighted the need to ground our conceptions of citizenship historically as well as sociologically.

Two books, however, marked a new departure within political philosophy for citizenship studies, and each in its own way attempted to integrate historical-sociological with normative insights: Judith Shklar's *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (1991) and Ronald Beiner's edited volume, *Theorizing Citizenship* (1995).

In her three Tanner lectures, collected in *American Citizenship,* Judith Shklar focuses on the contradictions at the heart of U.S. conceptions of citizenship. The ideals of equality and social standing are fundamental to U.S. citizenship. Social standing means that one is free to earn one's livelihood and to become one's own master through work (Shklar 1991, 3 ff., 64 ff.). Yet the reality of black chattel slavery, which existed in the U.S. Republic from birth until after the Civil War, left its indelible marks on the country and compromised this ideal. The tension between the ideal of equality and the reality of slavery was transformed in future years into a continuing persistence of racism, inequality, poverty, and class differentials at the heart of the Republic.

Unique to Shklar's analysis was the insistence that the U.S. ideal of citizenship and one's status as a wage earner were deeply implicated in one another. Arguing against those like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson, who would ground citizens' virtues in agrarian communities of self-ownership, Shklar claimed that the capacity to earn one's living through one's efforts was more quintessentially American than these other visions. Wage earners were not "wage slaves," as Marx erroneously argued, and as none other than true slaves themselves would have claimed. Wage earning required independence and skill, self-reliance and the ability to cooperate with others in civil society and the economy. And these ideals harmonized well with the U.S. conception of liberty as self-discovery (Shklar 1991, 71 ff.). Using the U.S. case as an example, Shklar gave the concept of citizenship a nonantiquarian and definitely modernist mooring. Not the martial virtues of war and courage, nor even the political virtues of deliberation and persuasion, but rather, the social virtues of self-reliance through cooperation came to the fore in her account.

Ronald Beiner's volume (1995) of collected essays bears an affinity with Judith Shklar's in that, contrary to backward-looking jeremiads about the decline of citizenship, both are committed to thinking through the paradoxes of citizenship in the modern world. Beiner begins the volume with observations relating to several historical events: the fall of Communism in east-central Europe and the Soviet Union, the growth of the European Union into a political-administrative entity, and the rise of identity politics and multicultural movements, all of which challenge nation-states from within. Beiner argued that these historical changes make it necessary to rethink citizenship in the modern world. In the post-Communist period, new nation-states emerged in areas which had been strongly multicultural and multinational societies. Minority cultural rights became an issue for the Germans in the Baltic States; the Hungarians in Rumania; the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; and the Roma Gypsies in Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics, and Rumania. While the new post-Communist states were struggling with the dilemmas of wanting to recreate homogeneous nation-states in contexts that were hardly hospitable to them, throughout the 1990s some Western states like Canada struggled with multiculturalist movements (like those of the Québécois and the First Nations) which were demanding greater linguistic and regional autonomy. Citizenship and national membership stood in a tenuous relationship to one another. The contributors to the Beiner volume examined various aspects of the history and institution of citizenship along these lines.

The Shklar and Beiner volumes, in addition to anchoring the virtues and privileges of citizenship in the realities of the modern world, signaled a new realism and institutional perspective on the part of political theorists who analyzed this concept. Shklar's work, however, did not question the boundaries of political communities from a normative perspective. While it could be argued that the U.S. ideal of citizenship through social standing was particularly hospitable to immigrants, who after all joined this republic as wage earners first and citizens second, Shklar did not pursue this line. Shklar's reticence is characteristic of the field, in which political membership as a topic has been ignored. This observation is confirmed by the concluding essay in the Beiner volume by Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman on "Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory" (1995, 283–322). Noting the explosion of interest in the concept of citizenship among political theorists, Kymlicka and Norman state in a footnote that they will not deal with immigration and naturalization (310). Instead, the survey focuses on the responsibilities and virtues of citizenship, on citizenship and the welfare state, and differentiated citizenship in multicultural societies.

In *Theorizing Citizenship*, Joe Carens's contribution (1995a) alone, under the title "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," inquired whether the territories of nation-states were justifiable from a moral point of view and questioned the state-centric assumptions which had hitherto governed international relations as well as political theory.

Political Membership in Liberal Democracies

Surprisingly, political membership was rarely considered an important aspect of domestic and international theories of justice. The one prominent exception here is Michael Walzer's work. In *Spheres of Justice*, published in 1983, Walzer pointed out that membership is the first social good that needed to be distributed, in that the distribution of all other goods, like income and positions, benefits and opportunities, depended on individuals' being recognized as members of a polity who are then entitled to such benefits. Yet ten years later in *Political Liberalism,* John Rawls would still argue that, "The first is that we have assumed that a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed . . . in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death. . . . For the moment we leave aside entirely relations with other societies and postpone all questions of justice between peoples until a conception of justice for a well-ordered society is on hand. Thus, we are not seen as *joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into a society where we will lead a complete life*" (1996 [1993], 41; my emphasis).

Even if Rawls meant to use the model of a closed society as a counterfactual fiction, as a convenient thought experiment in reasoning about justice, by not making conditions of entry and exit into the political community a central aspect of a liberal-democratic theory of justice, he assumed that the state-centric model of nations with fairly closed and well-guarded borders would continue to govern our thinking in international relations. This became amply clear in *The Law of Peoples:* "An important role of a people's government, however arbitrary a society's boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population" (Rawls 1999a, 38–39). He adds in a note: "This remark implies that a people has at least a qualified right to limit immigration. I leave aside what these qualifications might be. . . . Another reason for limiting immigration is to protect a people's political culture and its constitutional principles" (39). But marginal though "the qualified right to limit immigration" may appear in articulating a "law of peoples," it is not so. Transnational migrations and the constitutional and policy issues suggested by the movement of peoples across borders are central to interstate relations. It is not so much Rawls's claim that there "must be boundaries of some kind" (39), which is problematical, but rather his disregard of the rights and claims of others as they relate to and affect the identity of the liberal democratic polity. In not articulating explicit conditions of entry and exit into liberal democracies, Rawls is misconstruing the nature of membership in them. From a philosophical point of view, these issues bring to the fore the constitutive dilemma between sovereign self-determination claims, on the one hand, and universal human rights principles, on the other.

Despite the widespread neglect of questions of political membership in mainstream political theory, three directions of thought have recently crystallized among defenders of *deterritorialized citizenship,* advocates of *cosmopolitical citizenship*, and *civic republican skeptics* who warn of the decline of citizenship in the wake of these developments.

James Rosenau and Yasemin Soysal see the rise and spread of a new human rights regime, despite all its pitfalls and hypocrisies worldwide, as heralding a new political consciousness and new forms of political membership. The nation-state is waning; the line between human rights and citizens' rights is being eroded. New modalities of deterritorialized citizenship are emerging. Especially within the European Union, argues Soysal (1994), national identities and allegiances are being scrambled rapidly, and it would be hypocritical to want to make "good Germans" out of Turks when contemporary Germans themselves are hardly sure what their own collective identity consists of. Multicultural enclaves in large cities everywhere in the world are harbingers of the new faces of a citizenship which is no longer based on exclusive attachments to a particular land, history, and tradition.

Advocates of open borders and cosmopolitical citizenship, like Joe Carens and Martha Nussbaum, align themselves with the Kantian legacy of a world republic in order to articulate the transformative potentials of the present. Radical universalists argue that, from a moral point of view, national borders are arbitrary and that the only morally consistent universalist position would be one of open borders. Joe Carens (1995a), for example, uses the device of the Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," against the intentions of Rawls himself, to think through principles of justice from the standpoint of the refugee, the immigrant, and the asylum seeker. Are the borders within which we happen to be born and the documents to which we are entitled any less arbitrary from a moral point of view than other characteristics like skin color, gender, and genetic makeup with which we are endowed? Carens's answer is no. From a moral point of view, the borders which circumscribe our birth and the papers to which we are entitled are arbitrary, since their distribution among individuals do not follow any clear criteria of moral achievement and moral compensation. Citizenship status and privileges, which are simply based on territorially defined birthright, are no less arbitrary than one's skin color or other genetic endowments. Therefore, claims Carens, liberal democracies should practice policies that are as compatible as possible with the vision of a world without borders.

Cosmopolitical citizenship, as advocated by Martha Nussbaum (1997a), entails not so much a political practice but a moral attitude of not placing the affairs and concerns of one's immediate community ahead of those of others who may be strangers to us, residing in faraway worlds. In Nussbaum's version, cosmopolitanism is a universalist ethic that denies the claims on us of what is known in moral theory as special obligations. These are obligations that emerge out of our situatedness in concrete human communities of descent or sympathy, genealogy, or affiliation. Nussbaum denies that patriotism, which she considers a privileged commitment to a specific territorially bounded national community, constitutes such a special obligation. Patriotism does not trump "the love of humanity" and should not lead us to ignore the needs of others with whom we share neither culture nor descent, neither history nor genealogy.

Even if we concede that such a cosmopolitical moral attitude has many arguments to recommend it in many circumstances, it is unclear what political, as opposed to moral, practices cosmopolitical citizenship would assume and which institutions, if any, would correspond to this mind-set. It is also interesting to note that this was not the meaning of cosmopolitanism for Kant (see Benhabib 2001).

Unlike the cosmopolitans, the defenders of republican citizenship, like Michael Walzer (1983), Michael Sandel (1996), and David Jacobson (1997), see in the waning of the nation-state the decline of citizenship, whether under the impact of the rise of international human rights norms or through the spread of attitudes of cosmopolitical detachment. Citizenship entails membership in a bounded community. The right to the determination of the boundaries as well as identity of this community are fundamental to democracy; therefore, the argument goes, economic and political globalization threaten to undermine citizenship.

In an elegant passage which has been extensively quoted, Walzer writes:

> To tear down the walls of the state is not, as Sidgwick worriedly suggested, to create a world without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses. The fortress, too, could be torn down: all that is necessary is a global state sufficiently powerful to overwhelm the local communities. . . . The distinctiveness of cultures and groups depends upon closure and, without it, cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life. If this distinctiveness is a value, as most people (though some of them are global pluralists, and others only local loyalists) seem to believe, then closure must be permitted somewhere. At some level of political organization, something like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants. (1983, 39)

There is a quick slide in Walzer's argumentation from "the value of the distinctiveness of cultures and groups" to the need for closure and to the justification for "something like the sovereign state" to control boundaries and set admissions policy. Walzer does not differentiate the methodological fiction of a unitary "cultural community" from the actual institutional polity. A democratic polity with pluralist traditions consists of many cultural groups and subgroups, many cultural traditions and countertraditions; furthermore the national culture itself is formed by the contested multiplicity of many traditions, narratives, and historical appropriations.

Equally significantly, Walzer does not distinguish among principles of *cultural integration* and principles of *political integration*. Cultural communities are built around their members' adherence to values, norms, and traditions which bear a prescriptive value for their identity, in that failure to comply with them affects their own as well as others' understanding of membership and belonging. Though there is always contestation and innovation around such cultural definitions and narratives, what does it mean to be an observant but a nonorthodox Jew? What does it mean to be a modern Moslem woman? What does it mean to be a prochoice Catholic? Cultural traditions consist of such narratives of interpretation and reinterpretation, appropriation and subversion. In fact, the more alive a cultural tradition, the more contestation there will be about its core elements. Walzer invokes throughout much of his work, not only in *Spheres of Justice*, a "we." This "we" suggests an identity without conflict, a unity without "fissure." It is a convenient methodological fiction, but its consequences for political argument can be invidious.

Political integration refers to those practices and rules, constitutional traditions and institutional habits, which bring individuals together to form a functioning political community. This functioning has a twofold dimension: not only must it be possible to run the economy, the state, and its administrative apparatus, but there must also be a dimension of belief in the legitimacy of the major institutions of societies in doing so.

Principles of political integration are necessarily more abstract and more generalizable than principles of cultural identity. Modern states presuppose a plurality of competing as well as coexisting worldviews; in the modern state, political life is just one sphere of existence among many others with claims on us, and the disjunction between personal identities and allegiances and public choices and involvements is constitutive of the freedom of citizens in liberal democracies. Of course, there will be some variation across existing political communities as to the constituents of such political integration: the typology of civic and ethnic nationalisms indicates such a range. Nonetheless, in liberal democracies *conceptions of human and citizens' rights, constitutional traditions as well as democratic practices of election and representation* are the core normative elements of political integration. It is to them that citizens as well as foreigners, nationals as well as resident aliens, have to show respect and loyalty, and not to the vagaries of this or that cultural tradition.[3]

3. Arguably, in some of his later writings, most notably in *What it Means to Be an American*, Walzer emphasizes the "twinned values of a singular citizenship and a radically pluralist society" (1992, 17). The pluralist argument does not consider cultural homogeneity to be essential for a stable polity but does require strong political socialization and adherence to common political values. This position does draw the distinction between *cultural and political integration*, suggested above; nonetheless, the conceptual problem as to how the obligation of an existing polity to accept immigrants and refugees is to be understood, remains the dividing line between my position and that of Walzer. Walzer's contextualism does not change in his later writings. See *On Toleration* (1997) and my critique in Benhabib, *Kulturelle Vielfalt und demokratische Gleichheit*. 1999b, 75.

Membership and the Paradox of Democratic Sovereignty

Inevitably, these attempts to suggest new modalities of political membership in a globalized world have been vague. The institutional and normative practices that would accompany deterritorialized and cosmopolitan citizenship have not been articulated. More significantly, all approaches are avoiding or skirting a paradox, namely, that of democratic legitimacy. Advocates of deterritorialized and cosmopolitical citizenship hardly face this paradox. Defenders of civic republicanism, by contrast, refuse to acknowledge that there is a paradox at all, in that they collapse the boundaries between the ethical and the democratic communities or between cultural and political integration.

Liberal democratic rule in modernity means that all members of a sovereign body are to be respected as bearers of human rights and that the consociates of this sovereign freely associate with one another to establish a regime of self-governance under which each is to be considered both author of the laws and subject to them. Since Rousseau, however, we know that the will of the democratic people may be legitimate but unjust, unanimous but unwise. "The will of all" and "the general will" may not correspond either in theory or in practice. Democratic rule and the claims of justice may contradict one another.

Yet this paradox of democratic legitimacy has a corollary which has been little noted: Every act of self-legislation is also an act of self-constitution.[4] "We, the people" who agree to bind ourselves by these laws, are also defining ourselves as a "we" in the very act of self-legislation. It is not only the general laws of self-government which are articulated in this process; the community that binds itself by these laws, defines itself by drawing boundaries as well, and these boundaries are territorial as well as

4. In her response to an earlier version of this paper, Amy Gutmann questioned whether there was a genuine paradox here, as opposed to a conceptual tension, ambivalence, unclarity, and the like. I would insist that the foundations of all liberal democratic republics are paradoxical, in that they are based on an affirmation of two principles which necessarily, and not just accidentally, pull in different directions. These are the principles of universal human rights on the one hand and of democratic sovereignty, requiring closure and exclusivity, on the other. The recurrence within liberal democratic thought and practice of the question of the nation, and attempts to reconcile nationalism and liberalism are a confirmation of the depth and intractability of this problem. The nation permits closure by making belonging dependent on birth right or, in some rare cases of civic nationalism, like the French and the American, on acculturation and political socialization. However, whether belonging can or should be defined in such terms, and the tension between such more- or less-closed definitions of belonging and universalist human right principles remain unresolved. I follow Hannah Arendt in her trenchant analysis of these paradoxes; and like her, I do believe that more or less just and democratic institutional and political solutions to these paradoxes are possible. See Arendt 1957 and Benhabib 1999a, b, and 2001 for further discussion.

civic. The will of the democratic sovereign extends only over the territory which is under its power; democracies require borders. At the same time that the sovereign defines itself territorially, it defines itself in civic terms: full members of the sovereign body are distinguished from those who "fall under its protection" but who do not enjoy "full membership rights." Women and slaves, non-Christians, and members of nonwhite races as well as servants and propertyless white males have historically been excluded from membership in the sovereign body. They were, in Kant's famous words, "mere auxilliaries to the commonwealth" (1996 [1797], 92).

Furthermore, as was the case with the American and French Revolutions, "we, the people" empowers itself as the sovereign in the name of truths held to be universal and self-evident, namely that "all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with inalienable rights." Thus the democratic sovereign draws its legitimacy not merely from its act of constitution but, equally significantly, from the conformity of this act to universal principles of human rights that are in some sense said to antedate the will of the sovereign and in accordance with which the sovereign undertakes to bind itself. "We, the people" refers to a particular human community, circumscribed in space and time, sharing a particular culture, history, and legacy; yet this people establishes itself as a democratic body by acting in the name of the "universal" (Ackerman 1991). This tension between universal human rights claims and particularistic cultural and national identities is constitutive of democratic legitimacy. Modern democracies act in the name of universal principles which are then circumscribed within a particular civic community. This is the "Janus face of the modern nation," in the words of Juergen Habermas (1998a, 115).

Let me stress that the urgency of articulating principles of political membership in the global era does not arise in the first place from an increase in migration figures. In absolute numbers, the middle of the nineteenth century and the interwar period in Europe (1919 to 1939) involved larger masses of population moving across continents than has been the case in Europe since World War II (Sassen 1999). Rather, this urgency arises in the first place due to shifts in interstate relations through the emergence of an international regime of human rights, and in Europe in particular, through the emergence of the European Union (EU). The political and legal transformations brought about by the EU are creating economic, constitutional, and legal quagmires in this domain (see Benhabib 1999a). Within the European context, three developments are of particular note:

1. The acquisition by citizens of member states of the EU of a European pass and European citizenship.
2. The increasing discrepancy between the rights of EU citizens who reside in countries other than their countries of origin and third-country nationals who are residents of EU member countries but

who are not European citizens. While EU citizens can vote, run for, and hold office in local elections as well as in elections for the European parliaments, third-country nationals cannot do so.

3. The agreements of Schengen and Dublin which liberalized border controls among the signatory countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, and Germany in 1990, signed in Schengen; they were joined by Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Finland subsequently), also intended to homogenize asylum and refugee-granting practices across the EU states.

   Taken together, these three factors have created large discrepancies among the legal status of European Union citizens and foreigners, whether born on the soil of the country in question or not. There are no uniform naturalization procedures across the EU countries. Furthermore, in the wake of the Schengen and Dublin agreements, there has been a sharpening of admission requirements to refugee and asylee status throughout the EU. Whether or not these sharpened practices are still compliant with the requirements of the Geneva Convention remains an open question (Neuman 1993).

Other factors contributing to the salience of questions pertaining to political membership are: changing patterns of migratory flows and of sending and absorption models, mainly caused by the geopolitics of the world's labor markets; the large numbers of refugees and displaced peoples created through civil wars, ethnic and tribal conflict, and border reconfigurations, in short, through the decay and transfiguration of the nation-state structures in many parts of the world like Africa, the Middle East, as well as the Balkans and eastern-central Asia.

As Saskia Sassen notes, "labor migrations are embedded in larger social, economic, and political structures, and . . . they are consequently bounded in geography, duration, and size. There is a geopolitics of migration and there is the fact that migrations are part of systems: both set parameters for migrations" (1999, 155). Such migrations are now global phenomena. There are seasonal as well as long-term migrations from all over the Mediterranean basin countries, not only to northern Europe but also to the oil-rich countries of the Gulf region; likewise, the strong economic performance of Southeast Asian countries have created migratory flows to those countries from as far away as Australia and Germany.

With reference to patterns of immigration within and outside Europe, Rainer Bauboeck has recently observed:

> On the one hand, immigrants who settle in a destination country for good may still keep the citizenship of the sending society and travel there regularly so that the sending country rightly regards them as having retained strong ties to their origins. . . . Temporary migrants, on the other hand, often find it difficult

> to return and to reintegrate. Some migrants become permanent residents in destination countries without being accepted as immigrants and without regarding themselves as such; others develop patterns of frequent movement between different countries in none of which they establish themselves permanently. . . . International migration transnationalizes both sending and receiving societies by extending relevant forms of membership beyond the boundaries of territories and of citizenship (1998, 26).

Add to these trends and currents, the figures concerning refugees and displaced persons.[5] According to the World Refugee Survey, released by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, in 1999 7 million people fled their homes, bringing the world total of refugees and internally displaced people to 35 million.[6] The main reason for this increase is internal conflict: border redrawings (Adzerbaijan and Armenia, Eritrea and Ethiopia); separatist aspirations (Chechnya); civil war as in Colombia, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Angola; ethnic and tribal wars as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka; and forced resettlement of populations, as in the case of the Kurdish population in the southeast of Turkey. "In 1993 and 1994 alone, internal conflicts worldwide forced an estimated 10,000 persons a day to flee their homes and either cross borders or become displaced persons inside their own countries" (Cohen and Deng 1998, 3).

These factors then—shifts in interstate relations, the patterned geopolitics of labor market migrations, the transnationalization of immigration as a result of changes in sending and absorption patterns, and the increased flow of refugees and displaced persons—all suggest that the question of political membership in the global era is a central aspect of the deterritorialization of politics. Contemporary liberal democracies will have to articulate institutional practices as well as normative principles to deal with this new reality, while remaining true to the paradoxical dualism of universal human rights principles and democratic sovereignty.[7]

5. The distinction between refugees and displaced persons is not a strict one; the same group of individuals can have either status, depending on whether they remain within the jurisdiction of their own governments. According to a Brookings Institution report on displaced persons, "Those who were forced from their homes for the same reasons as refugees but who remained under the jurisdiction of their own governments were excluded from international protections: their own governments were expected to provide for their well-being and security" (Cohen and Deng 1998, 2).

6. "Washington File. USCR World Refugee Statistics." *http://www.amb-usa.fr/washfile/Wednesday/ 310.htm.*

7. "States the world over consistently have exhibited great reluctance to decide which persons will, and which will not, be admitted to their territory, and given a right to settle there. . . . States insist that they will undertake no binding obligations to grant rights of permanent settlement to persons arriving at their borders, and that each nation has the sovereign right to determine for itself which persons are

■ | Future Questions and Research Agendas

DISAGGREGATION OF RIGHTS CLAIMS

The irony of current citizenship and immigration practices in most liberal democracies in the world, including the United States, is that whereas social rights and benefits (like unemployment compensation, retirement benefits, some form of health insurance, and in some cases educational and housing subsidies) are granted to citizens as well as legal aliens and residents, the transition to political rights and the privileges of membership remains blocked or is made extremely difficult (see Benhabib 1999a, 720 ff.). Once again, political practice is changing slowly but surely. In Denmark as well as Sweden, foreigners, that is, third-country nationals, can participate in local and regional elections and be candidates for them. In Norway, Finland, and Holland, these rights are granted at the local but not regional levels. Similar attempts in Berlin, Hamburg, and Schleswig-Hollstein to grant local election rights to those foreigners who have resided in Germany for more than five years have been declared unconstitutional by the German Constitutional Court (Weiler 1995). What we are beginning to see is a disaggregation effect, through which the constituents of citizenship like collective identity, political membership, and social rights and benefits are being taken apart from each other (see Cohen 2000). One can have one set of rights and claims without the other: one can have political rights without being a national, as in the case of the EU; more commonly, though, one has social rights and benefits, in virtue of being a foreign worker, without either sharing in the same collective identity or having the privileges of political membership. The danger in this situation is that of permanent alienage, namely, the creation of a group in society that partakes of property rights and civil society without having access to political membership.

These changing institutional practices confront political theorists with questions as to why or how citizenship status ought to be granted or withheld from foreigners and resident aliens of liberal democratic states. Are citizenship practices constituent of a liberal theory of democratic and international justice? Or are these policy matters and institutional arrangements to be left to the discretion of individual states?[8] I want to suggest that the transition from membership in the institutions of a nation's civil society

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acceptable for such admission" (Patricia Hyndman, "Refugees under International Law with a Reference to the Concept of Asylum," *Australian Law Journal* 60, no. 3 [March 1986]: 153, 154).

8. I thank Professor Brian Barry for having brought this question to my attention during a discussion of my paper at the APSA meetings held in Washington, DC, on August 31, 2000.

to political membership should not be blocked and that this is properly a matter of justice. Liberal democratic states can only block such transitions of status, insofar as they misunderstand and misconstrue their own dual normative commitments to respecting universal human rights on the one hand and being self-determining entities on the other. The transition from civil to political citizenship, I would argue, is a human right. Denying citizenship to foreigners and asylees, refugees and foreign laborers, who have resided in our midst for a certain period of time and who have fulfilled certain conditions, would be a denial of their human right to membership.[9]

Contemporary societies are complex, fragmented, and contradictory structures. In such societies human conduct and interactions assume many and diverse forms. We are just as authentically members of a family, of a neighborhood, of a religious community, or of a social movement, as we are citizens of a national or multinational state or a federation. While the modern democratic state remains a possible structural expression of democratic self-determination, the complexity of our social lives integrates us into associations that lie above and below the level of the nation-state. These associations mediate the manner in which we relate to the state. If we stop viewing the state as the privileged apex of a form of collective identity, but instead view it as a "union of unions" (Wilhelm von Humboldt), then citizenship should also be understood as a form of collective identity that is mediated in and through the institutions of civil society.

The increasing analytical as well as institutional separation of the three dimensions constitutive of citizenship—collective identity, political membership, and social rights and entitlements—suggests the need to rethink the identity and virtues of citizens from a normative point of view. In virtue of what do we establish our claim to exercise political rights? What abilities and competencies must we show to participate in and run for local elections? Increasingly, it is what one does and less who one is, in terms of one's origin, which will and should determine these claims.[10] Applied to

9. I have explored the philosophical aspects of the "right to have rights" with reference to Arendt's political philosophy in my Baruch de Spinoza lectures, *Transformations of Citizenship: Dilemmas of the Nation-State in the Era of Globalization* (Benhabib 2001).

10. I do not hereby mean to imply that all citizenship rights should be based on nonascriptive characteristics. The acquisition of residency and citizenship rights through family lineage and family unification procedures is based on ascriptive and nonvoluntary characteristics of persons. As long as the acquisition of residency and citizenship are possible through other than familial bonds as well, I see no problem in recognizing the special status of family claims. The argument here would be that rights which accrue to individuals insofar as they are family members reflect the logic of the modern state, in that the state relates to its citizens not just as political members but also as private persons in civil society and the family.

the case of contemporary Europe, this means very concretely: if an Italian or a Portuguese national can take up residence in Paris, Hamburg, or London and run for office as well as vote in local elections in those countries after about six months, what is the justification for denying similar rights to a Turkish or Croatian national, to a Pakistani, or to an Algerian who has resided in these countries, participated in the economy and civil society of these countries, and is a member of a trade union, religious group, school board, or neighborhood association? The liberal-democratic state is a "union of unions"; while the virtues and abilities that make an individual a good neighbor, a reliable coworker, or an honest businessperson may not be immediately transferrable to the virtues and abilities required by political citizenship, it is just not the case that there is an ontological divide between them.

How then can we formulate just conditions of political membership? What may we expect future citizens to know and to demonstrate competence in? Is it reasonable to impose language proficiency requirements on them? What about a test of civic knowledge, which demonstrates some acquaintanceship with the history and constitutional essentials of a country? And what do we do about the fact that most individuals who have citizenship by birthright may themselves be quite incompetent in one or the other respect in which we require newcomers to demonstrate proficiency? While civic republican thinkers may *inflate* the conditions of transition to citizenship to compensate for their own frustrated ideals of responsible and engaged citizenship, liberal thinkers may be inclined to *deflate* citizenship and reduce it to economic partnership alone.[11] A theory of just political membership will have to navigate some middle course between these alternatives.

I am not suggesting that first admittance should automatically lead to full membership—the logical consequence of an "open borders" position. Rather, I am urging porous borders, which permit transition from first admittance to civil and then political membership along a continuum of transparent, publicly articulated, and constitutionally consistent conditions (see also Bader 1997). Because human rights principles and sovereignty claims are the two pillars of the liberal democratic state, practices of political incorporation must respect the fluidity of the boundaries between citizen and aliens, nationals and foreigners. If there is a fundamental human

11. There have been attempts to develop an economic and narrowly utilitarian approach to citizenship and immigration policy (see Gary Becker "An Open Door for Immigrants—the Auction," *Wall Street Journal*, 14 October 1992, A14). Although self-interest considerations play a large role in determining immigration and labor market policies, they alone cannot define adequately the *nature of liberal democratic membership*. These theories tend to view the political association as some glorified insurance or shareholder company, thus eliding any philosophical characterization of the identity of the democratic polity. But political membership is not only about interests; it is about identity. It is not only about exit; it is about voice.

right to exit,[12] there must also be a fundamental human right to entry, though not necessarily to admittance. While admittance does not guarantee membership, it does entail the human right to know how and why one can or cannot be a member, whether or not one will be granted refugee status or permanent residency and on what grounds. The actions of the liberal democratic state should be consistent, transparent, and publicly accountable in their treatment of foreigners as well as citizens. In articulating such conditions, the liberal democratic state must treat the other(s), the foreigner and the stranger, in accordance with internationally recognized norms of human respect and dignity.

SITE OF CITIZENSHIP: LOCAL, GLOBAL, OR NATIONAL?

In a world of increasingly deterritorialized politics who should make decisions about citizenship rights and the transition from civil to political membership? My arguments in this essay have sought to expose the paradoxical and dual logic of liberal democracies, which are caught between human rights claims and self-determination assertions. Yet I have assumed that the state system, more or less as we know it, is the site for entry into and exercise of membership. Isn't there a contradiction here? Indeed, the dilemmas and issues posed by political membership send us to the heart of the tensions within the state-centric world system. As long as citizenship status is tied to membership within a territorially bounded and sovereign state, such states will remain the sites for entry into as well as access to membership.

A brief look at most international airports of the world, such as New York, London, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam, Tokyo, and Mexico City, makes this amply clear: lines are always formed to distinguish citizens, that is, valid passport holders, from others who may be tourists or strangers, returning migrant workers, or noncitizen family members. Those who seek asylum and refugee status are segregated from passengers waiting in these other lines. In some cases, they are not even permitted to board their respective carriers; in other cases, when they reach their desired land of refuge via legal air travel or, if they are lucky enough, that is, not to perish on the high seas or in transport trucks, they are taken into immediate custody by government and customs officials. Their status at the moment of entry into a country without appropriate papers is not very different than that of a criminal: they are *les san papiers*, "those without papers." To be without papers in the state-centric world is a form of civil death. These practices often escape the sight of the democratic citizenry in the name of whom and for the protection of whom they are exercised. But should such

12. Although the U.N. Charter does not recognize a human right to immigrate, to deny this right to citizens is compatible neither with human rights to liberty of movement nor with the self-understanding of liberal democracies.

decisions be in the hands of border patrols and customs officials alone? What is the responsibility that democratic citizens owe to strangers and foreigners?

Two developments counteract these tendencies toward the increased policing of national borders: practices of dual citizenship and of city or regional citizenship. Dual citizenship, although rejected by many nation-states and kept as a jealously guarded secret by many others, reflects the multiple, overlapping and fluid identities of citizens under contemporary conditions. Worldwide, the number of individuals who count more than one language group, more than one ethnicity, ancestry, or race, as their own is increasing; yet our institutional practices do not respect and recognize the complexities of our cultural identities. The institution of dual citizenship admits to the potential disjunction between a common national identity and citizenship; but dual citizenship creates the specter of conflicting alliances and thus threatens the order of territorially bounded states. In the recent debates which preceded the reform of German citizenship law, over whether or not to permit birthright citizenship to children of foreigners, the specter of a war between Germany and the Turkish Republic, which is the principal sender country for the guest workers resident in Germany, was frequently raised. It was conveniently forgotten that Turkey has been a staunch ally of the West since the 1950s and is, along with Germany, a member of NATO, thus making it highly unlikely that these two countries would go to war against each other. As multilateral treaties and organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, and even the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) increase in number, the practice of dual citizenship will become more salient and harder to avoid.

New sites of citizenship are also emerging at thresholds and spaces which lie below as well as across the boundaries of nation-states. Countries like Switzerland practice cantonal citizenship: access to national citizenship is mediated through membership in and acceptance by the individual cantons. Likewise, there are developments in the cities of Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Bremen (despite the ruling of the German Supreme Court against them in the case of the latter two) to grant citizenship status to foreigners who have resided in these municipalities for a certain period of time. Amsterdam, for example, grants its foreign residents the right to vote as well as run for office in local elections after five years. Of course, the conundrum of individuals who may have municipal citizenship but whose application for national citizenship may be denied will have to be faced by these countries in the near future.

At what level then should entry and acceptance decisions be made—the national, the regional, or the local? We are witnessing indeed a "dispersal of sovereignty" (Sandel 1996, 345 ff.), downward and upward, but away from the nation-state. As political and economic devolution leads cities and regions to increase in economic importance (Sassen 1991, 1996), thus increasing the lateral dispersal of sovereignty, a more vertical dispersal of sovereignty through increased integration into multinational, transnational, and global organizations and institutions is also taking place (Held et al. 1999). Illustrating these paradoxical trends, within the European Union for example, while there are attempts to formulate a uniform refugee and asylum policy to be determined at the level of the European Council of Ministers, there are also attempts at formulating local and municipal conditions of citizenship.

POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP, IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCE

One of the most intensely debated aspects of democratic theory and practice in the last decades has been the question of "difference." How do gender, culture, ethnic and "racial" differences among the citizenry affect the equal value of citizenship for all in liberal democracies (Benhabib 1996b)? Do the legal and political institutions, which claim impartiality and neutrality, serve the interests of all in equal measure? Or are claims to impartiality ideological smoke screens, behind which the dominant subjectivity of one small group among the citizenry is hidden, namely that of white, Anglo-Saxon and usually propertied males (Young 1989, 1990)? Are democratic representative institutions and the public sphere of current regimes so configured as to accomodate the subjectivity of individuals of diverse colors, cultures, and gender? How can democracies be reformed such as to accomodate difference (Phillips 1991, 1993, 1995; Young 2000)?

In this contribution I have not considered issues of difference as they would affect membership and citizenship practices. However, a disproportionate number of the world's population that is seeking entry and admission into liberal democracies come from usually nonwhite and non-Christian third world countries like India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Phillipines, Burundi, Rwanda, Algiers, Morocco, and so on. Women and children are those whose legal status of membership is most precarious. In most cases, in virtue of not having access to the labor markets, women and children can only become immigrants through family unification law. Immigration can increase their vulnerability by making them dependent on the authority of the male at home, not only for their living but also for their legal and civil status. However, in other markets where female labor is more coveted than that of male—the international "nanny connection," the manufacture of textiles and clothing apparel, some segments of the electronic industry—female migration can also lead to increased independence and financial and civil self-sufficiency for women. Citizenship studies in the coming decades will have to focus on the empirical as well as normative aspects of practices of political membership as they are interlaced with gender, cultural, ethnic, and "racial" differences (see "Hypatia" 1997, 1998).

The rapidly growing literature on multiculturalism (see Taylor 1994;

Kymlicka 1995b; Tully 1995) also has implications for membership and citizenship practices. As liberal democracies become more diverse and fractured within, as the unitary ideal of citizenship is challenged within the borders of these territories, it becomes more difficult to know exactly what to expect of newcomers and how to integrate them into the receiving societies. Ronald Beiner quotes Jean-Marie Colombani, the editor of *Le Monde:* "Just when we need a strong sense of nationhood to help integrate and absorb a new generation of immigrants, with different races and religions, the French are asked to transfer their allegiance to some vague European idea. This contradiction is feeding an identity crisis and undermining trust in our political leadership."[13] Caught between the pull of the European Union on the one hand and the demands for multiculturalism on the other, European nations in particular have become quite insecure about their integration and absorption policies.

A more confident note that "citizenship in diverse societies" or "group differentiated citizenship rights" need not lead to the decline of citizenship and to illiberal immigration practices is sounded by Canadian political theorists Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (2000) and Joe Carens (2000). Both are committed to reconciling strong multiculturalist visions with the basic principles of liberal democracies. Kymlicka, however, draws a strong distinction between the rights of immigrants in liberal democracies and the rights of indigenous peoples, who possess a "societal culture" (1995b, 80). Immigrants' claims to equal access to societal culture can be met, in his view, by enabling them to integrate into "mainstream cultures" (114). In addition to providing language training, argues Kymlicka, liberal democracies should permit special Sabbath and Sunday closing laws and special dietary regimes and dress codes for immigrant groups. Special representation rights, territorial concessions, or distinctive language rights are not to be granted to immigrants; in Kymlicka's scheme they are reserved for indigenous peoples and national minorities.

Carens argues that the asymmetry on which Kymlicka bases this differentiation collapses, for his concept of societal culture is fundamentally flawed (2000, 56). It undermines, in Carens's view, the claims to cultural rights for immigrants; it weakens the claims of smaller, more vulnerable minorities; it homogenizes culture and propagates a kind of monoculturalism (56; for a similar critique of Kymlicka, see Benhabib 2001). Whereas it is unclear what admission and integration policies—except for language instruction—would follow from Kymlicka's model, Carens claims that a "commitment to liberal democratic principles sets limits to the range of morally permissible policies. There are some things that no liberal democratic state may legitimately do and other things every liberal democratic state is obliged to do" (2000, 108). To demand some proof of linguistic competency is permissible, but to forcibly assimilate immigrant groups by

13. Cited in the *Washington Post,* 21 March 1989, A32, and in Beiner 1995, 20.

totally banishing their languages from the public to the private realms is not. Likewise, to deny immigrants entry on the basis of their color, creed, ethnicity, and religious beliefs would contradict human rights and the constitutional commitments of liberal democracies.[14]

Theories of multicultural democracy then, would not lead one to embrace a wholly different set of criteria for admission and entry than would other versions of liberal democratic theories. Rather, the distinctive accent of multicultural democratic theories would be in how they conceptualize the transition to political membership. Given that language and special representation rights, and even some form of territorial autonomy, are granted certain minority groups by multicultural theorists, what would be the basis for denying them to immigrants? Indeed, what constitutes the litmus test for political membership in societies with "diverse citizenship" (Kymlicka 2000)? Wouldn't there be a natural tendency in such societies toward the devolution of admissions and naturalization policies from the state and federal level to provincial and regional governments, as is currently the case with the province of Quebec in Canada, for example, which sets its own immigration and naturalization criteria? Would such processes of devolution be good for newcomers and outsiders? Would they be compatible with the universalist commitments of liberal democracies or would they lead to the resurgence of local particularisms and exclusivist ideologies?

CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL FOR THE REST?

The institution and practices of U.S. citizenship pose a special dilemma for citizenship theorists: on the one hand, with the possible exception of

14. The most challenging philosophical issue confronting us in developing a just theory of democratic membership in the global era is to give substance to universalist human right claims, while respecting the right of democratic polities to set some reasonable and fair limitations on their immigration policies. The Geneva Convention of 1951 pertaining to the Status of Refugees and Asylees stipulates that the right to be granted refuge from persecution on the basis of one's race, color, creed, and political activities is a universal human right of the individual. This right of refuge also entails the right of "non-refoulement," that is, that refugees should not be returned to their countries of origin, even when their claim to asylum has been denied if doing so would endanger their life and liberty. Hence in extraditing refugees, signatories to the Geneva Convention must prove that they are being granted safe haven in third countries.

Given this status of international law, how can we define universal human rights in terms that both respect differences among various constitutional and legal traditions and set constraints on these traditions and practices? This puzzle about reconciling generality and diversity in the formulation of human rights assumes a particularly acute form in immigration, refuge, and asylum disputes, in that these practices bring to light most clearly the contradictions and frailties of the international system of nation-states.

Canada, no other major country in the world has been built around the integration, absorption, and naturalization of millions of immigrants, refugees, and asylees from the entire world. In many respects, the transition from civil to political membership that I advocate parallels most closely the U.S. practice of granting permanent residency to foreigners who meet certain requirements, thus enabling their transition from permanent residency to citizenship within three to five years. For the hundreds of thousands of permanent residents who become U.S. citizens every year, this is a process that requires proof of language competence; proof of residency for three consecutive years, beginning from the date of acquisition of permanent resident status; proof of financial independence or employment status (proof that the foreigner who is becoming a citizen will not be a burden on the state's welfare system); and demonstration of civic competence through a brief exam by an Immigration and Naturalization Service official. In many ways, and with the arguable exception of demonstration of financial status which itself permits different interpretations, these practices provide an idealized model of citizenship through consent and civil membership. Add to this the fact that any child born on U.S. territory automatically acquires U.S. citizenship, the United States presents itself as the total counterpart to ideologies of *jus sanguinis* ("citizenship by parental genealogy"). Nevertheless, even the practices of U.S. citizenship are riddled through with contradictions, inconsistencies, exclusions, and arbitrary classifications. Viewed against the evidence of history, the liberal democratic ideal of political membership by consent appears as a chimera.

In his impressive study, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History*, Rogers Smith (1997) argues that "through most of U.S. history, lawmakers pervasively and unapologetically structured U.S. citizenship in terms of illiberal and undemocratic racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies, for reasons rooted in basic, enduring imperatives of political life" (1). Singling out the struggle between the liberal, individualist, and civic republican traditions that have dominated U.S. political thought and practices since its inception, Smith nonetheless contends that liberalizing and democratizing changes have been often accompanied by the resurgence of inegalitarian ideologies and institutions. Such resurgences, more often than not, resulted in exclusionary practices which are at the core of the first nation in modern political history to base itself on the principles of popular consent through rightful association. Smith points out that "when restrictions on voting rights, naturalization, and immigration are taken into account, it turns out that for over 80 percent of U.S. history, American laws declared most people in the world legally ineligible to become full U.S. citizens solely because of their race, original nationality, or gender. For at least two-thirds of American history, the majority of the domestic adult population was also ineligible for full citizenship for the same reasons"

(1997, 15). Far from being a model, in Smith's account, U.S. citizenship turns into an example to be avoided.[15]

Smith sees these ideological inconsistencies and contradictory and exclusivist practices to be driven by the imperatives of elites to offer myths of civic identity and foster a sense of peoplehood. From a normative point of view, however, his observations raise the question whether liberal democracies should permit any kind of closure at all. We are dealing with two kinds of exclusion here. On the one hand, there is the exclusion of those who have been denied legal personhood and political citizenship, namely black chattel slaves, until after the Civil War (1865) and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Women, who were not granted full suffrage in the United States until 1920, were nonetheless citizens. On the other hand, we find immigration and naturalization laws pertaining to everything from the voting status of foreign residents to the military obligations of foreigners, immigrants, and fortune seekers, who have flocked to the United States in the last two and a half centuries.

While conceding that the first two kinds of exclusion constitute blatant injustices and historical wrongs, one has to ask whether Smith's account heeds the distinction between *justice claims* in a liberal democratic understanding of membership and *policy matters* which should be left to the discretion of the lawmakers. Throughout much of its history, the United States's immigration and naturalization practices have been governed by quotas not only pertaining to race and gender but also to nationality, ethnic origin, and even religion. It is interesting that for Smith these quota-based exclusions cannot be regarded as the prerogative of a political sovereign. In fact, Smith extends the same liberal, universalist nondiscrimination clauses to citizens and strangers, members and residents alike. If Michael Walzer and John Rawls err by stressing the sovereign right of collectivities to determine immigration and naturalization policies—without spelling out the constraints which ought to guide such policies—Smith errs by eliminating the tension between universal rights and sovereignty claims altogether.

15. With the passage of the Immigration and National Acts Amendments of 1965 (*U.S. Statutes at Large* 79 [1965]: 911), discriminatory immigration clauses which had all but prevented immigrants from Asia and other third world countries to come to the United States were declared illegal. Prior to 1965, U.S. law had consistently restricted non-European immigration. A 1790 federal law limited citizenship privileges to whites; blacks (including slaves and free blacks) and Chinese immigrants who came to the United States to work in the 1840s were not accorded citizenship rights. In the 1920s national origin laws were passed that expressly gave preference to established European groups, while barring Japanese immigration entirely. Since 1965 these patterns have radically changed: In 1992, 29 percent of immigrants came from Asia and 44 percent came from Latin America and the Caribbean (see D. L. Coleman 1996, 1120–21, n. 149).

What, if any kind of closure then, becomes justifiable in liberal democracies? Smith's answer would be: none based on ascriptive characteristics of individuals, including not only race and gender but nationality, ethnicity, linguistic, and religious background as well. I agree with this claim. Citizenship, immigration and naturalization practices ought to be governed by standards of universal human rights that individuals are entitled to by virtue of being human. But policies which are *governed* by these principles may not be *determined* by them. As Carens puts it: "There are some things that no liberal democratic state may legitimately do and other things that every liberal democratic state is obliged to do" (2000, 108). Where do we draw the line? This is a question that Smith's book urgently raises but does not answer.

■ | Conclusion

As trends toward the deterritorialization of politics continue, as changes in absorption and immigration patterns hold apace, as the numbers of refugees and displaced persons rises, and as new political regimes like the EU in Europe emerge, political membership will remain one of the most-pressing theoretical and practical problems for liberal democracies for the next half-century. Liberal democracies, which are caught between human rights claims and sovereignty assertions, will have to examine their immigration, absorption, and naturalization policies in the light of these dual commitments. Immigration law has rarely left the domain of administrative regulation; it has rarely been discussed as an aspect of constitutional tradition and interpretation (see Neuman 1996). Under the impact of social and political changes, this state of affairs is changing in Europe as well as the United States. We can expect that in the next couple of decades, significant constitutional issues will emerge in the wake of the deterritorialization of politics. A new political constellation will demand new political answers. I have suggested in this contribution that the most compelling answers to these problems will require not only normative theory but a hybrid mode that draws on historical-institutional analysis, as well as comparative politics and jurisprudence.

KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN

Citizen Participation in America: What Do We Know? Why Do We Care?[1]

Citizen participation goes to the heart of democracy. In fact, it is difficult to imagine democracy on a national scale without the right of citizens to take part freely in politics. Through their political participation, citizens seek to control who will hold public office and to influence what policymakers do when they govern. When they take part politically, citizens communicate information about their preferences and needs and generate pressure on public officials to respond. Concern about the participation of American citizens as an object of systematic investigation by political scientists dates back at least as far as Harold Gosnell's pathbreaking work, *Getting Out the Vote* (1927). However, because research on participation is connected so tightly to the development of the sample survey, only in the last half-century has it emerged as a field of inquiry for American political science. The past decade has witnessed important intellectual advances from work that grounds empirical research in the fundamental concerns of democratic theory. This chapter reviews that literature and asks: What is participation and why do we care about it? Why do people take part? How can we explain the decline in aggregate rates of participation? What does the tyranny of the sample survey imply for participation research?[2]

Many, though by no means all, Americans are active in politics. Roughly half of American adults will cast a ballot in a presidential election,

1. This essay draws heavily from what I have learned about political participation from Henry E. Brady, Nancy Burns, and Sidney Verba and from our jointly authored work. I am fortunate, indeed, to have benefited from their brains, their wisdom, and their friendship in the course of a long research collaboration. I am grateful to Henry, Nancy, Sidney—and to Jan Leighley and Robert Y. Shapiro—for helpful comments.

2. A number of helpful sources contain general discussions of political participation. Among them are Milbrath and Goel 1977, Bennett and Bennett 1986, Leighley 1995, Brady 1999, and Conway 2000. These sources provide extensive references to earlier works and thus are an important supplement to the emphasis in this chapter on research published over the past decade.

but fewer than one-tenth will campaign for any candidate. In any year, roughly one in three will get in touch with a public official, one in six will work informally with others in the neighborhood or community to solve a local problem, and fewer than one in twenty will attend a protest or march. About half belong to an organization that takes stands in politics. It is widely known that the United States lags behind other democracies in electoral turnout, a regularity that is explained by a number of factors: the fact that voter registration is left to the initiative of the individual in the United States, the scheduling of elections on Tuesdays, the possibility of divided government, the number of elections and the length of the electoral ballot, the absence of polarization between the parties, the weakness of the parties as mobilizers of citizens, and the way that turnout is measured.[3] However, what is true for voting is not true for all kinds of political participation. When it comes to other forms of political activity—for example, contacting public officials, working in electoral campaigns, or getting involved in their communities—rates of participation in America compare very favorably with those in other democracies.[4]

■ | Mapping the Terrain: The Boundaries of Voluntary Political Activity

"Voluntary political participation" refers simply to activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action, either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies. Citizens in American democracy who wish to have an impact have a variety of participatory options. They can communicate their concerns and opinions directly to policymakers, or they can seek to affect policy indirectly by influencing electoral outcomes. They can donate their time or their money. They can use conventional techniques or protest tactics. They can work locally or nationally, with others or on their own, in an informal effort or in the context of a formal organization.[5]

Each of the three defining components of the domain of behavior known as "voluntary political activity" has porous, ill-defined borders. First, with respect to the *political* nature of this domain of endeavor, it is essential to recognize that the distinction between political and nonpolitical ac-

3. For summaries of these arguments and extensive citations, see Teixeira 1992, 9–18; Dalton 1996, 43–47; and Lijphart 1997.

4. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 69–70; Dalton 1996, ch. 3; and Putnam 2000, p. 31.

5. For an extremely useful guide to the various kinds of participatory acts, the technical problems in measuring participation, and the available data sources, see Brady 1999.

tivity is by no means clear, and voluntary activity in both the religious and secular domains outside of politics intersects with politics in many ways. For one thing, participation in these spheres is in many ways a politicizing experience. Those who engage in voluntary activity outside politics may develop organizational and communications skills that are transferrable to politics; they may make social contacts and, thus, become part of networks through which requests for participation in politics are mediated; and they may be exposed to political cues and messages, as when a minister gives a sermon on a political topic or when organization members chat informally about politics at a meeting.

Furthermore, the institutions that provide a context for nonpolitical voluntary participation have a complex relationship to politics and public purposes. For example, churches and, especially, nonprofit organizations undertake many activities—ranging from aiding the homeless to funding cancer research to supporting the symphony—that are also undertaken by governments here and abroad.[6] Moreover, many voluntary associations and even churches get involved directly in politics, and their attempts at influencing policy outcomes constitute a crucial source of input about citizen views and preferences. Support of an organization that takes stands on public issues, even passive support or support motivated by concerns other than government influence, represents a form of political activity. For many citizens it may be the main form of political participation, albeit often at second hand.

Activity that is *voluntary* is not obligatory and receives, if any pay at all, only token financial compensation. Nevertheless, the boundary between choice and coercion is indistinct. When a request for participation is accompanied by leverage—for example, when it comes from the boss—the boundary of the voluntary may be breached. Similarly, the distinction between voluntary activity and paid work is not always clear. It is possible to serve private economic purposes through social and political activism. Many people seek to do well while doing good, undertaking voluntary activity for which they receive no compensation—for example, in their churches, in charities, in politics—in order to make contacts or otherwise enhance their jobs or careers or to pursue policy goals that have consequences for their pocketbooks.

Finally, with respect to *activity*, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the point at which actually doing politics shades into being attentive to politics. Thus, working for a mayoral candidate or attending a pro-life march are clearly political acts, but what about following political events in the news or watching public affairs programs on television? Similarly ambiguous is the status of communication about political issues—political discus-

6. Indeed, the sharing of functions among a variety of private, nonprofit, and public institutions is one of the hallmarks of the peculiar American political economy. On this theme, see the essays in Wuthnow 1991.

sions among friends, letters to the editor of a newspaper, calls to radio talk shows—in which the target audience is not a public official.

The fuzziness of the borders that surround the domain of voluntary political activity implies that, no matter how sophisticated the conceptualization of this terrain, what really matters are the actual measures. Many studies of political participation focus exclusively on what is, at least with respect to national politics in any modern democracy, the single most important political act: the vote. Although its decisive role in the choice of governing elites renders the vote as the first among equals of forms of democratic participation, the vote is in many ways distinctive among participatory acts. Because voting is, by far, the most common form of political activity and because the principle of one-person, one-vote implies that the vote cannot be multiplied in volume, voters are, in the aggregate, more representative of the public than are other groups of participants. Furthermore, the constellation of participatory factors that explain voting is different from that for other political activities: attitudes such as political interest figure more importantly and civic skills less importantly in the explanation. In addition, the rewards attendant to voting are sui generis: voting provides more in the way of civic gratifications such as the sense of having done one's duty and less in the way of material or social benefits. For these reasons, it is a mistake to use voting as a surrogate for the entire array of kinds of political activity.[7]

■ | Why Does Democratic Participation Matter?

Discussions about democratic participation—and civic engagement more generally—are ordinarily conducted as if the reasons why we care about it are self-evident. Rather than make such presumptions, it seems appropriate to make explicit why political participation matters. When we bother to ask, we see that there are three broad categories of reasons for caring about levels of political activity: the creation of community and the cultivation of democratic virtues, the development of the capacities of the individual, and the equal protection of interests in public life.[8]

7. On the ways that voting is unique among political activities, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.

8. This discussion of the various reasons for concern about participation, which draws heavily on Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 1999, ch. 12, makes no claims to being either novel or definitive. There are a number of helpful discussions—which vary in the rubrics used to categorize the salutary consequences of civic involvement—about why we care about civic engagement. Among them are Mansbridge 1980, ch. 17; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992, ch. 1; Putnam 1993a; Skocpol 1996; Newton 1997; Edwards and Foley 1997; and Putnam 2000, esp. sec. 4. For empirical results based on experimental data, see Morrell 1999. For philosophically informed analyses of the consequences of associational life, see Rosenblum 1998b and M. E. Warren 1998, 2001.

First, political participation—and voluntary activity more generally—have implications for community and democracy. The heirs to Tocqueville who make this argument stress several themes. When people work together voluntarily—whether for political or nonpolitical ends—democratic orientations and skills are fostered: social trust,[9] norms of reciprocity and cooperation, and the capacity to transcend narrow points of view and conceptualize the common good.[10] Thus, when there is a vigorous sector of voluntary involvement—and the strong associational foundation that underlies it—it becomes easier for communities and for democratic nations to engage in joint activity and to produce public goods. Communities characterized by high levels of voluntary activity are in many ways better places to live: the schools are be'ter, crime rates are lower, and tax evasion is less common.[11] Moreover, a vital arena of voluntary activity between individual and state protects citizens from overweening state power and preserves freedom. Those who are concerned about declining rates of civic participation in the United States emphasize these multiple beneficial consequences for politics and society.

The other two reasons for concern about levels of political participation shift our attention from social to individual benefits. Not only does the community gain when citizens take part but, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, individuals grow and learn through their activity. Political participation builds individual capacities in several ways: those who take part learn about community and society, they develop civic skills that can be carried throughout their lives, and they can come to have a greater appreciation of the needs and interests of others and of society as a whole.[12]

The third rationale for concern about civic engagement, one that has particular relevance for political scientists, acknowledges the conflicting interests of individuals and groups and focuses on equal protection of interests. This perspective draws nourishment from Madison's fundamental

9. This perspective clearly draws from James S. Coleman's concept (1988) of social capital. For an informative essay on the relationship between social capital and social and economic outcomes, see Jackman and Miller 1998.

10. Many commentators point out that the inevitable result of collective action is not necessarily to foster community and democracy. Some groups—for example, militias—hardly promote democratic values. Moreover, organizations of like-minded individuals beget conflict as well as cooperation. See, for example, the arguments and references contained in Foley and Edwards 1997; Berman 1997b; Fiorina 1999a; Rosenblum 1998b, 1999; and Putnam 2000, ch. 22. For a more general discussion of the criticisms of participatory democracy, see Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993, chs. 1, 8, 9.

11. For elaboration of this theme, see Putnam 2000, sec. 4.

12. See, for example, Bachrach 1967, Pateman 1970, and Parry 1972. For empirical evidence supporting this point of view, see Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993 ch. 11.

insight in *Federalist* No. 10 that differences of opinion are sown in the nature of humankind, especially in the unequal acquisition of property. Through the medium of political participation, citizens communicate information about their preferences and needs for government action and generate pressure on public officials to heed what they hear. Of course, we know that public officials act for many reasons only one of which is their assessment of what the public wants and needs. And policymakers have ways other than the medium of citizen participation of learning what citizens want and need from the government. Nonetheless, what public officials hear clearly influences what they do. Therefore, so long as citizens differ in their opinions and interests, the level playing field of democracy requires that we take seriously the fact that citizens differ in their capacity, and desire, to take part politically. The democratic principle of one-person, one-vote is the most obvious manifestation of the link between voluntary participation and equal protection of interests. However, for forms of voluntary political participation beyond the vote—for example, writing letters to public officials, attending protests, or making political contributions—there is no such mandated equality of participatory input.

The questions raised by an emphasis on equal protection of interests are somewhat different from those raised by a focus on the nurturance of community and democracy or the development of the individual. First, the cooperative voluntary activity that promotes community and democracy or fosters individual faculties need not be explicitly political. Indeed, some versions of the neo-Tocquevillian argument about community and democracy focus explicitly on voluntary activity in the zone between state and market. In contrast, when equal protection of interests is at stake, the voluntary activity that counts is necessarily political. Furthermore, when it is a matter of the cultivation of democratic habits or the education of individuals, the aggregate quantity of civic engagement is critical. When we move from a conception of congruent community interests to one of clashing individual and group interests and, thus, to a concern with equal protection of interests, questions of representation come to the fore. What matters is not only the amount of civic activity but its distribution, not just how many people take part but who they are.

■ | Why Do Individuals Participate?

An important item on the agenda of concerns for students of political participation is to explain individual differences in activity. Multivariate analysis makes clear that the origins of political participation are complex and that different kinds of political participatory acts require different explanatory models.[13] Many factors enter into an explanation of why individuals choose to take part in politics. In their accounting of the mainsprings of participation, the Civic Voluntarism Model, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) group the variety of characteristics that predispose an individual to be politically active into three sets: resources, orientations to politics, and recruitment. In other words, in their construction, individuals are more likely to take part when they can, when they want to, and when they are asked.

When individuals command the *resources* that make it possible to do so, they are more likely to participate. Important among these resources are the civic skills—those organizational and communications capacities that make it easier to get involved and that enhance an individual's effectiveness as a participant—that are acquired throughout the life cycle during childhood beginning at home and in school and later on, during adulthood, on the job, at church, in nonpolitical organizations, and in politics itself.[14] Another crucial resource is money to make contributions to campaigns and other political causes. Available time would also seem to be an essential resource for political activity. Interestingly, when other participatory factors are taken into consideration, however, the number of hours left over after accounting for time devoted to school, paid work, and the care of home and children has no impact on participation, and the busy are as politically active as the leisured.[15]

In addition, several psychological *orientations* facilitate political activity. All else equal, individuals are more likely to participate if they are politically informed, interested, and efficacious, that is, if they know and care about politics and if they think that their participation would make a difference. Although political efficacy has generated particular attention among participation scholars, knowledge about politics is equally strongly related to participation, and interest in and attentiveness to politics are even more tightly connected to political activity. As would be expected, those who identify with a political party also have higher rates of participation, especially in electoral politics.[16] The strong relationships between

13. The discussion in this section and the remainder of the paper is implicitly multivariate. That is, unless explicitly stated to the contrary, the reader can assume that assertions about the various attributes that are associated with participation imply that other factors have been taken into account. Thus, there is an implied "all other things equal" in every sentence that describes empirical findings from research into political participation.

14. Respondents in the Citizen Participation Study were asked whether they had undertaken such activities as giving a presentation or speech or chairing a meeting in various nonpolitical venues. For discussion of the measurement of civic skills and their role in political participation, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, ch. 11.

15. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chs. 12–13.

16. There is a great deal of variation in the ways that these psychological orientations to politics are measured. Further variation is introduced by the differences in

these political orientations and political participation raise questions of causal order. Does, for example, political interest raise political activity or does taking part in politics cultivate political interest?[17]

It is not simply general political predispositions that figure among the factors associated with participation. After all, political participation is about politics; thus the content of political preferences matters as well. Those who have intense issue commitments—for example, those who take a strong pro-life or pro-choice position on abortion—are, not surprisingly, more politically active.[18] The relationship of group consciousness to political activity is more problematic. Of course, the Marxian concept of group consciousness—the belief that group members have common problems requiring joint political action—originally grew out of class analysis. However, contemporary discussions of group consciousness are more likely to focus on a sense of political solidarity and shared political fate that is anchored in race, ethnicity, or gender. In contrast to the results for other politically relevant orientations, the findings about the participatory consequences of group consciousness have been decidedly mixed.[19]

The catalyst for political participation is *recruitment:* those who have the wherewithal and the desire to take part into politics are more likely to

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the ways that individual measures are combined into scales. For descriptions of the various measures, discussions of their use in the literature, and extensive data, see the essays by Reef and Knoke (political alienation and efficacy, ch. 7), Citrin and Muste (political trust, ch. 8), Price (political information, ch. 10), and Weisberg (partisanship, ch. 12) in Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman 1999, as well as Abramson 1983; Bennett 1986; Iyengar 1990; Zaller 1992; and Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996. The summary works on participation mentioned earlier are also extremely helpful: Milbrath and Goel 1977, Bennett and Bennett 1986, Leighley 1995, and Conway 2000.

17. On this issue see the discussion by Leighley (1995), who points out the shortcomings of cross-sectional survey data for dealing with these issues. For an empirical analysis that seeks to address the problems of uncertain causality and finds support for the impact of political orientations on participation, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 350–355.

18. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, ch. 14.

19. In their analysis of the roots of participation among African Americans, Verba and Nie (1972) demonstrated links between group consciousness and political participation. The findings about the impact of group consciousness on activity in subsequent analyses are not especially consistent (see, for example, Schlozman and Verba 1979, ch. 10; Shingles 1981; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Klein 1984, 136; Tate 1991; Tolleson Rinehart 1992; Ardrey 1994; Wilcox 1997; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; as well as the discussions in Walton 1985; Flammang 1997, 116–19). One regularity underlying what would seem to be discrepant results is that an association between group consciousness and political activity is more likely to emerge in studies conducted during the 1960s and 1970s—when the temperature of U.S. politics was elevated—than in studies based on data collected later. In their 1990 data, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001, chs. 10–11) find that group consciousness does not generate participation but, instead, channels partici-

do so if they are asked. Systematic inquiries confirm the well-known role of parties in mobilizing turnout and electoral activity.[20] Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, ch. 6) emphasize the extent to which it is not simply the characteristics of individuals but the operations of mobilizing institutions that determine participation and make a more general argument about the implications for participation of the attempts at political mobilization that come at the behest of politically motivated strategic elites—not only party activists but also those who run electoral campaigns or lead political organizations or movements. Beyond the efforts of political elites, processes of recruitment to citizen participation inhere in day-to day life outside of politics: requests for political activity may also come from those we know—relatives, friends, neighbors, workmates, fellow organization or church members—as well as from the managers, leaders, and staff of nonpolitical institutions. No matter whether the request comes in a mass mailing, through a phone call, or over the backyard fence, those who seek to get others involved choose as their targets people who would be likely to participate if asked. Thus, while the request may generate activity, those who are asked tend to have characteristics that make them inclined to take part.[21]

The various factors that shape participation are not equally relevant for various participatory acts. For example, strength of partisanship has a more substantial effect on voting than on getting involved in a community problem-solving effort; income is much more strongly related to campaign giving—and, in particular, to the size of the gift—than to protesting; civic skills matter more for time-based political activities such as contacting a

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pation. That is, group consciousness does not act as an independent participatory factor for African Americans, Latinos, and women. However, if active, group-conscious members of all three groups are more likely to participate on issues having relevance to group identities.

20. Recent studies demonstrating that the participatory payoff of party efforts at mobilizing citizens include Southwell 1991; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, ch. 12; and Wielhouwer 1999. On the basis of a randomized field experiment, Gerber and Green (2000a, b) show the impact of nonpartisan get-out-the-vote messages. When delivered through personal canvassing, the consequences for participation of these mobilizing messages were substantial. In contrast, telephone calls with similar messages made no difference.

21. On informal processes of recruitment to citizen activity as well as the significance of institutionally based mobilization efforts by employers and leaders of nonpolitical organizations or religious institutions, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chs. 5, 13. On group-specific processes of political mobilization for racial and ethnic minorities, see Leighley 2001. For analysis of the attempts by rational recruiters to locate potential activists and discussion of the problems of causal direction raised by these processes of targeting, see Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999. Rosenstone and Hansen make a parallel argument with respect to the attempts by political parties to mobilize likely and sympathetic voters (1993, 166–69).

public official than for voting; and so on.[22] Hence, in generalizing about the roots of political activity it is important to bear in mind the differential relevance of various participatory factors for different political acts.

The Endurance of the SES Model

It is common to deride the Socio-Economic Status (SES) model of participation—which stresses the strong association between political activity and an individual's income, occupation, and, especially, education—as simplistic, apolitical, and atheoretical.[23] Yet, the SES model, which is fundamental to such pathbreaking analyses of political activity as Verba and Nie's *Participation in America* (1972) and Wolfinger and Rosenstone's *Who Votes?* (1980), shows no signs of early demise. Its endurance can be attributed in part to its considerable empirical power in predicting political participation. In contrast to other variables often discussed as being central to the understanding of participation—for example, characteristics of political and social context—in any multivariate analysis, socioeconomic status is invariably positively associated with political activity.[24] Even critics of the SES model never fail to include socioeconomic variables in their analyses when they probe the consequences for participation of such political variables as registration laws or the competitiveness of elections.

Moreover, recent scholarship has begun to address its theoretical deficiencies by elaborating the causal links between political activity and high levels of income, occupation, and education. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, ch. 15) make headway in explaining how the components of socioeconomic status function to produce participation and demonstrate why education is so central to this process. Not only does education have a direct impact on political activity, but more importantly, education has indirect effects through its consequences for the acquisition of nearly every other participatory factor. The well-educated earn higher incomes on the job; are more likely to develop civic skills at work, in organizations, and, to a lesser extent, in church; are more likely to receive requests for political activity; and are more politically interested and knowledgeable.[25] Nie,

22. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 356–64.

23. See Leighley 1995, 183–88, for a trenchant summary of the criticisms of the SES model.

24. While the positive association between SES and political participation seems to obtain across democracies, researchers have made clear that voter abstention in nondemocratic systems may have a very different meaning and, thus, very different demographic contours. Brady and Kaplan (forthcoming) find no relationship between education and voting in Estonia during the 1980s and argue that "the act of voting during the Soviet era was not about political choice and representation, but a ritual in which the better educated may have chosen to abstain."

25. For a summary of how education operates to raise turnout, see Jackson 1995.

Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) address the puzzling discontinuity between the fact that, within any cross-sectional sample, high-SES individuals are the most politically active and the fact that rising levels of education with-in the public have not produced commensurate returns in participation. They stress the primacy of relative rather than absolute education. According to their analysis, what matters for political activity is the positional advantage accruing to those who are well educated relative to their age cohort rather than any particular level of educational attainment. Thus, they construe educational attainment more as a sorting mechanism that allocates "scarce social and political ranks that place citizens either closer to or further from the center of critical social and political networks" (6). In particular, they demonstrate the relationship between educational level and what they call "network centrality," being personally acquainted with or known to people in important positions in local or national politics and the media (ch. 3).

The strength of the relationship between political participation and such indicators of community attachment as home ownership and length of residence in the community poses an analogous problem but has received less attention from scholars. Like SES, community attachment is consistently a powerful predictor of activity, especially on the local level. Unlike SES, we know relatively little about why. Until we establish *how* community attachment operates to facilitate participation—by creating a stake in community outcomes, by making it easier to know how and where to take part, by increasing political interest and knowledge, by placing individuals in networks of mobilization, all in ways not measured by surveys—researchers will probably continue to include it, without much theoretical justification, in their multivariate analyses, where it will figure significantly in the explanation of activity.

■ | From Whom Do Public Officials Hear?

The processes by which people come to take part imply that, taken together, activists are not representative of the American public and, thus, that public officials are disproportionately likely to hear from people with certain politically relevant characteristics. Participatory input is stratified not only by socioeconomic status but also by race or ethnicity, by gender, and by age. In terms of overall participation, Anglo-Whites are more politically active than are African Americans and, especially, Latinos. Men are more politically active than women. And the middle-aged are more politically active than are young adults or the elderly.[26]

26. These regularities are not completely consistent across particular acts. African Americans are not underrepresented among protesters, women are not underrepresented among voters, and the young are not underrepresented among campaigners.

Cataloguing the groups that are under- or overrepresented among activists does not, however, constitute a causal explanation. It is essential to understand what it is about being, say, Anglo-White or male that leads to higher levels of participation. In most cases, group differences can be explained in terms of disparities in participatory factors just discussed. Once group differences in participatory resources—in particular, education and income—are taken into account, the disparities in participation among Anglo-Whites, African Americans, and Latinos disappear.[27] Similarly, once the differences between men and women in resources and such political orientations as political interest, information, and efficacy are controlled, the gender gap in political activity closes.[28]

The deficit in activity of the young is more difficult to explain. It is commonly asserted that the younger citizens are less likely to take part because they have not yet settled down. According to this story, once they acquire the roles and responsibilities of adulthood—full-time jobs, families, and mortgages—they will become more active.[29] However, with other factors taken into account, these adult roles and responsibilities do not have an independent impact on participation. Rather any association between political activity and marriage, jobs, or parenthood is a function of differences in resources, recruitment, and political orientations related to various adult statuses.[30] That is, under certain circumstances, adult roles are associated with enhanced levels of participatory factors, but it is the resources, recruitment, and orientations, not the adult statuses, that matter

27. See Verba and Nie 1972, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, and Leighley and Vedlitz 1999. For descriptive data about participatory differences among various Latino nationality groups, see de la Garza et al. 1992, ch. 8.

28. See, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001, ch. 10.

There is also the possibility that the process works differently for different demographic subgroups. That is, group differences in political participation could result not from group differences in participatory endowments (in other words, in the *levels* of participatory factors) but from group differences in the participatory payoff from participatory factors (the *effects* of participatory factors). Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) make the most systematic investigation of this possibility and find that the gender disparity in activity results almost entirely from men's advantage with respect to a variety of participatory factors and not from gender differences in the efficacy of these factors in producing participation. This approach seems to have greater potential for understanding participatory differences among racial and ethnic groups. See, for example, Hritzuk and Park 2000 and Leighley 2001.

29. See, for example, Verba and Nie 1972, ch. 9.

30. On the indirect effects of marriage and children on political activity and on how those effects are different for men and women, see Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001, ch. 12. On the processes of convergence that render members of a couple more like one another politically during the early years of marriage, see Stoker and Jennings 1995.

for activity.[31] Nonetheless, in contrast to the circumstance for gender or race, differences in participatory endowments among age groups do not fully explain the gap in participation between the young and their elders. Indeed, the unexplained difference in activity between those in their twenties and those in their forties is actually larger than the initial disparity between African Americans and whites or between women and men.[32]

Memberships in demographic groups may not be the key to the causal understanding of political activity. They are, however, absolutely fundamental to politics.[33] Thus, understanding the origins of group differences in participation does not put the matter to rest. Knowing, for example, that disparities in participation among Latinos, African Americans, and Anglo-Whites stem not from race or ethnicity per se but from group differences in participatory factors, most of which are rooted in class differences, does not obviate the fact that policymakers are hearing less from African Americans or, especially, Latinos. These are groups with distinctive political preferences and participatory agendas: they differ in their opinions on public matters and, when they are active, they are concerned with a different mix of issues. Hence, it makes a difference with respect to equal protection of interests if participatory messages to policymakers underrepresent input from African Americans and Latinos. That the sources of these group differences in activity lie in characteristics other than race or ethnicity does not vitiate the political significance of disparities in participation.[34]

31. This paragraph draws from Schlozman, Brady, Verba, and Erkulwater 2001. They show that the relationship between the assumption of adult roles and political participation is complex. In general, full-time work enhances such participatory factors as income and work-based civic skills and recruitment. However, young adults who take on the adult responsibilities of full-time jobs and children in their late teens or early twenties are actually less politically active than those who stay in school and delay parenthood and full-time work until they are somewhat older. Moreover, the participatory consequences of parenthood—which are indirect rather than direct—differ for men and women. Parenthood pushes fathers into the work force; having toddlers keeps mothers home with attendant consequence for the acquisition of work-based participatory factors and, thus, for political participation.

Strate, Parrish, Elder, and Ford (1989) focus on the central role of "civic competence" (a composite of political attentiveness, media use, and political knowledge) in their analysis of age-related effects with respect to voting.

32. Green and Shachar's finding (2000) that voting in one election increases the probability of voting in subsequent ones lends credence to the notion that one possible answer to the puzzle of life-cycle differences in political activity lies in the independent impact of habit.

33. The discussion in this and the following paragraphs draws heavily from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, ch. 7.

34. Nor does it obviate the importance of the question of why there are such enduring and pronounced socioeconomic differences among groups defined by their race or ethnicity. Class differences along racial or ethnic lines reflect the legacy of historical and social processes that have everything to do with racial or ethnic status.

The same logic obtains for participatory differences rooted in groups defined by gender, class, age, or such politically relevant characteristics as dependence on government benefits. When the messages to public officials are skewed, then the democratic norm of equal responsiveness to all is potentially compromised. Although the politics of policy outcomes hinge on many factors, only one of which is what policymakers hear from citizens, it is hardly surprising that Medicare benefits for the elderly generate more political attention than Medicaid benefits for the poor, that student loan programs have taken a much bigger budgetary hit than have veterans' benefits, or that the voices of public aid recipients were barely audible in the controversy over welfare reform.[35]

These considerations force us to rethink somewhat the important argument made by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, ch. 6) about the political consequences of the demographic skew in the electorate. Wolfinger and Rosenstone demonstrate that, although the electorate is not demographically representative of the public at large, voters do not differ from nonvoters in their partisan leanings or their opinions on policy matters as expressed in surveys, a finding that obtains for other forms of political activity as well.[36] However, political participants, including voters, can be distinguished from inactives in ways that are of great political significance: although similar in their attitudes, they are distinctive in their personal circumstances and dependence on government benefits, in their priorities for government action, and in what they say when they get involved. These disparities are exacerbated when we move from the most common political act, voting, to acts that are more difficult, convey more information, and can be multiplied in their volume. Thus, the demographic stratification of activist publics is of potential political consequence.[37]

35. For evidence comparing the rates of political participation of recipients of means-tested and non-means-tested government benefits and demonstrating how much lower the former are than the latter, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 217–19. On the complexities of participatory representation and how actual or anticipated political participation might influence public officials, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, ch. 6.

36. In their discussion of turnout, Gant and Lyons (1993) make an argument similar to Wolfinger and Rosenstone's. For additional perspectives, see Bennett and Resnick 1990; Teixeira 1992, 101–4; and Lijphart 1997.

37. We have seen that, when it comes to demographic characteristics, there is widespread agreement on the nature of the demographic biases that differentiate voters from nonvoters but controversy over the meaning of those findings. With respect to partisanship, the situation is inverted. If either party is favored by low or high turnout, the political implications are quite clear. However, there is no consensus as to whether variations in turnout systematically help one party or the other. For differing views, see the controversy between Radcliff (1994, 1995) and Erikson (1995a, b), as well as Nagel and McNulty 1996, 2000.

Beyond the Individual: Contextual Effects

The scholarly inquiries that have made the past ten years a decade of progress in participation research are based on the results of sample surveys. Survey-based scholarship has been legitimately criticized as unduly individualistic—ignoring the impact of the political and social contexts in which individuals are embedded.[38] To overcome the implicit individualism of the sample survey, participation researchers have attached additional information—gathered either in surveys or from archival sources—about political and social context to individual records and have used aggregate data analysis to connect political and social characteristics to levels of turnout within political jurisdictions.

Substantial cross-national variations in electoral turnout make clear that the propensity to go to the polls is not simply a function of the attributes of individuals and suggest that we must pay attention to the participatory consequences of electoral laws and arrangements. Using the states as laboratories, a large number of studies consider a variety of electoral reforms designed to raise turnout by making it easier to vote.[39] A number of these electoral reforms have been shown to have a positive impact on turnout: among them, easing restrictions on casting absentee ballots, permitting mail-in ballots, and, not surprisingly, compulsory voting.[40]

The extent to which registration requirements act as a deterrent to turnout has long been a focus of concern not only among scholars (see, in particular, Wolfinger and Rosenstone [1980]; Powell [1986]) but also among policymakers. In fact, it was the impetus behind the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The National Voter Registration Act contains several provisions designed to lower barriers to registration: registration by mail; restrictions on the purging of voter registration lists; agency-based

38. For discussion of the need for contextual analysis and summary of the literature to that point, see Books and Prysby 1988; for discussion of the nature of contextual effects and the difficulties in studying them, see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, chs. 1–2. Huckfeldt and Sprague have a more-limited and more precise concept of contextual effects than the rather general sense in which they are discussed here.

39. One potential source of discrepancy among the studies cited below is the decision whether to concentrate just on turnout or to model registration and turnout as separate processes, or to model candidate choice as part of the turnout process. For discussion and citations, see, among others, Jackson 1996, Timpone 1998, Brown, Jackson, and Wright 1999, and Lacy and Burden 1999.

40. On absentee eligibility, see Oliver 1996. Oliver makes clear that reducing the hurdles to absentee voting is not sufficient on its own but is effective only in combination with efforts by parties to mobilize voters. On all-mail elections, see Southwell and Burchett (2000), and on compulsory voting, see Franklin 1999. Oliver and Wolfinger (1999) consider another possible deterrent to voter registration, the fact that in some states jury lists are constructed from registered voters, and find no evidence that jury aversion depresses voter registration. On compulsory voting and its possibly unconstitutional status in the United States, see Lijphart 1997, 8–11.

registration at public assistance and unemployment compensation offices; and, most notably, the "motor voter" provision for registration at state motor vehicle bureaus. The numerous studies assessing these and other measures aimed at easing registration requirements suggest that provisions for motor voter and agency registration, as well as extensions of the registration period closer to the election, including same-day registration, all raise voter registration while provisions for mail registration and restrictions on purging have no impact.[41] There is, however, less agreement about the magnitude of the changes occasioned by these reforms.[42] Furthermore, the findings are quite inconsistent when it comes to the representational impact; that is, whether liberalizing registration requirements alters the composition of the electorate with respect either to partisanship or to the demographic characteristics, in particular, the race and SES, of voters.[43]

Less permanent aspects of the political context also have potential consequences for participation. Scholars have investigated a number of hypotheses about how characteristics of electoral contests influence turnout: visible elections, close elections, and high levels of campaign spending would all be expected to elevate turnout, and divisive primary seasons and negative campaigning would be expected to depress turnout. Unfortunately, beyond the well-known regularity that turnout is higher when there is a presidential contest at the top of the ticket, empirical inquiries reach no consensus on how these attributes of elections affect the propensity to go to the polls.[44] Another contextual factor with possible implications for

41. Teixiera (1992), Mitchell and Wlezien (1995), Rhine (1995), Knack (1995), Knack and White (1998), and Martinez and Hill (1999) all consider several of these reforms together. Franklin and Grier (1997) concentrate on motor voter. Highton (1997) focuses on same-day registration. A number of analysts point out that, because states require the renewal of driver's licenses only at several-year intervals, the effects of motor voter provisions would not be expected to be immediate. Knack (1995, 809) discusses the necessity of paying attention to the ways that particular reforms interact. Thus, the absence of effect from mail-in registration may reflect that, if coupled with more powerful programs like motor voter or same-day registration, mail-in registration becomes less needed.

42. Part of the issue is whether higher rates of registration translate into higher rates of turnout. Modeling registration and voting as separate selection processes makes clear that the less-motivated voters who were deterred from registering by high barriers may be less likely actually to vote if their registration results from the lowering of the registration hurdle. On this logic, see Knack 1995, Timpone 1998, and Martinez and Hill 1999.

43. With respect to whether facilitating registration ameliorates the socioeconomic bias in the electorate, see the conflicting findings in Nagler 1991, Highton 1997, Timpone 1998, and Martinez and Hill 1999.

44. As mentioned, inconsistent results of multivariate analyses may reflect decisions about how to model the processes. Furthermore, Leighley and Nagler (1992b) confirm Wolfinger and Rosenstone's model and underscore the importance of individual-level characteristics in explaining voting. Jackson (1996) finds

participation is the way citizens respond to the characteristics of political elites. Having attractive choices on the ballot seems to raise participation.[45] Furthermore, for African Americans and women, the presence of fellow group members in the political environment—running for or holding visible public office—is ordinarily but not always associated with higher levels of political activity, often by virtue of its effect on political interest, political knowledge, or some other participatory orientation.[46]

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that, although personal factors are important as predictors of turnout within the electorate, campaign factors gain explanatory power as predictors of turnout when the analysis is confined to explaining turnout among the registered. While senatorial and gubernatorial elections on the ballot seem to enhance turnout, there is disagreement as to whether the effect obtains only in off-years (Jackson 1999) or in presidential years as well (Boyd 1989). Although Nownes (1992) and Hogan (1999) find no effect for either a history of competitiveness or the closeness of the election, Cox and Munger (1989) and Franklin and Hirczy de Miño (1998) confirm earlier studies showing that turnout rises in close elections. Cox and Munger argue that the relationship between closeness and turnout reflects not the calculations of rational voters who bother to go to the polls only when their vote would have the possibility of making a difference but rather the calculations of strategic elites who spend more and engage in enhanced mobilization efforts when the election is expected to be close.

Related to the concern with closeness is the finding in Franklin and Hirczy de Miño 1998 that divided government at the national level is negatively associated with turnout. Contrary to the common wisdom and results in Cox and Munger 1989 and Hogan 1999 that show a positive impact on turnout from campaign spending, Southwell (1991) finds a negative association between spending and turnout. Since voter mobilization efforts that might accompany higher spending are not measured, the causal mechanism linking spending and turnout is not clear. Boyd (1989) finds that primary contests depress turnout; in contrast, Stone, Atkeson, and Rapoport (1992) find that any demobilizing effect from the divisiveness of primaries is more than offset by the mobilizing effect of nomination campaigns. Kahn and Kenney (1999) and Wattenberg and Brians (1999) contest the finding in Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, and Valentino 1994 that negative campaign advertising depresses turnout. Finally, Norrander (1991) finds that although political characteristics of the campaign have some effect on the likelihood of voting in presidential primaries, the two most powerful variables are characteristics of individuals: age and interest in politics.

45. Southwell (1991) demonstrates that negative evaluations of candidates are associated with abstention in Senate elections. Lacy and Burden (1999) show that the presence of Perot on the ballot in 1992 raised turnout by nearly 3 percent beyond what it would have been had there been no third-party option.

46. For African Americans, Bobo and Gilliam (1990), Tate (1991, 1993, ch. 5), Gilliam (1996), and Gilliam and Kaufmann (1998) find an impact on psychological engagement with politics or political activity of having African Americans on the ballot or in office, but Gay (1998) does not. For women, Hansen (1997), Sapiro and Conover (1997), Kahn and Kenney (1999), and Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) all find a positive relationship between a gender-integrated political environment and the orientations to politics associated with activity. On the basis of much more limited data, Koch (1997) does not.

Researchers have also considered the implications of other aspects of the nature of the community, including its political culture, racial diversity, and size.[47] Although most of these studies focus exclusively on the vote as a form of political activity, J. Eric Oliver (2000, 2001) considers a variety of kinds of participation and leads us to rethink much of what we thought we knew about the consequences of suburbanization for civic life. His analysis shows that, taking other factors including the characteristics of individuals into consideration, with increases in the size, affluence and economic homogeneity of municipalities comes a decline in rates of participation.[48] Often, Oliver is able to nail down the causal process behind the contextual effect. For example, those who dwell in large cities are less likely to be mobilized by friends and neighbors—a result of the fact that they are less likely to know and to interact with their neighbors.

INDIVIDUALS IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The relevant environment for political participation is not confined to the jurisdictions in which individuals live. A crucial component of the analysis of individual political participation is the role of the nonpolitical institutions of everyday life—the workplace, religious institutions, voluntary associations—in generating participation. These nonpolitical institutions operate in several ways to facilitate a variety of kinds of political activity, not just voting.[49] Sometimes the mobilization is, to use Leighley's (1996) term, *intentional:* employers, clergy, and organization leaders and their

47. Adopting Daniel Elazar's well-known categories, King (1994) demonstrates that a "moralistic" political culture in which democracy is valued and citizens are understood to have a responsibility to take part is associated with higher levels of turnout. Schlichting, Tuckel, and Maisel (1998) and Hill and Leighley (1999) find a relationship between racial homogeneity and turnout. However, Brace, Handley, Niemi, and Stanley (1995) find that the creation of majority-minority districts does not necessarily result in higher levels of turnout.

Hill and Leighley (1994) bring analogous considerations to a concern with the socioeconomic representativeness of state electorate and find that the determinants of the turnout and the class representation of a state's electorate are different. The mobilization variables that have an impact on turnout (for example, the restrictiveness of registration) are not related to the extent to which the SES composition of a state's electorate reflects the SES composition of a state. Instead, the representativeness of states' electorates is positively associated with the level of per capita income and negatively associated with the ethnic heterogeneity of the population.

For an ethnographic approach to the patterns of Latino politics in five large cities, see de la Garza, Menchaca, and De Sipio 1994.

48. In contrast, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) find economic (and racial and ethnic) heterogeneity to be negatively associated with a different kind of involvement, membership in organizations.

49. On this theme, see Verba and Nie 1972, ch. 11; Peterson 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, pt. 3; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Leighley 1996; Harris 1999; Greenberg 2000; Radcliff and Davis 2000; and Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001.

staff may take political stands in the name of the institution and ask those affiliated with the institution to take political action, either as part of an effort to further institutional ends or as part of a generalized campaign to boost turnout or political activity. Often, the participatory consequences emerge as a by-product of institutional functioning: the interactions that occur when people come together in institutions build social capital, deepening trust and democratic values, and develop the informal social networks in which political discussions take place and through which requests for participation are mediated; furthermore, activity in these nonpolitical contexts enhances civic skills, the organizational and communications skills so useful in the political sphere.

In certain ways, these institutions are fungible with respect to political participation. An individual can acquire civic skills as an officer of the Elks or on the religious instruction committee at church, can receive requests for political activity from workmates or from fellow organization members, and so on. However, in fundamental ways, these institutions are not interchangeable.[50] Reflecting processes of differential selection into institutions and differential treatment within institutions, nonpolitical institutions differ in terms of the extensiveness of the participatory factors they provide and the way those participatory factors are distributed. For example, the workplace is a rich source of civic skills, but work-based civic skills flow disproportionately to those with high levels of education and jobs that require expertise. In contrast, although internally hierarchical, religious institutions distribute civic skills in a much less stratified manner than places of employment do. Furthermore, there are substantial differences among institutions when it comes to the political messages that accompany institutionally driven political activity. When a church makes institutionally based attempts to mobilize the flock for political action, the policy matter at stake is likely to be quite different from that embraced by a labor union. Thus, the processes by which individuals come to be affiliated with institutions and gain participatory factors within institutions have implications for who takes part and what they say.

The Public Promotion of Participation

Ordinarily, we think of participation as emerging from below, spontaneously or in response to the efforts of strategic elites. However, there is an important top-down element as well: governments act in many ways to invite citizen participation. While the efforts of federal bureaucracies to organize constituencies ranging from farmers to veterans are a staple in the analysis of organized interests, this theme receives less attention among

50. For an analysis demonstrating the singular importance of nonpolitical organizations in generating political activity, and a critique of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, see Ayala 2000.

scholars of citizen participation.[51] An exception is Berry, Portney, and Thomson's analysis (1993) of five cities in which urban governments have experimented with participatory democracy—citywide systems of promoting neighborhood associations and giving them authority in local decision making. On the basis of their systematic evaluation of the implications of this kind of strong democracy, Berry, Portney, and Thomson deliver a mixed but positive verdict. Neighborhood-based participation does give citizens a real voice in governance. The neighborhood groups involved are seen as responsive to their constituents and effective in influencing policy (189). Furthermore, these arrangements seem to promote democratic values such as an increased sense of community and governmental legitimacy (chs. 9–10). Nevertheless, they seem not to generate greater participation. Rates of overall participation in the five cities are "unexceptional" when compared with other cities that share their characteristics (81). While these arrangements do not overcome the class bias characteristic of participation in the United States, neither do they exacerbate SES stratification.

■ | The Decline in Democratic Participation

Michael Schudson's sprawling history (1998) of civic life in the United States reminds us that the possibilities and expectations for citizen participation have been transformed several times throughout American history. Recent decades have witnessed a decline in political participation. Explaining that decline, a different intellectual enterprise from explaining participation itself, is another important item on the agenda of participation scholars. The well-known erosion in voting turnout that began after the recent high in 1960 was the first, and most immediately visible, manifestation of a more general trend. The decay in turnout is surprising because, for two sets of reasons, we might have expected turnout to have risen over the period. First, the educational attainment of the public rose substantially in the second half of the twentieth century. Second, a variety of procedural reforms including, for example, reductions in residency requirements and, most recently, motor voter provisions have made it easier to register and vote.

Why, despite these forces that would have been expected to boost turnout, has turnout ebbed? Ruy Teixeira's answer (1992, ch. 2) to the puzzle first posed by Richard Brody (1978) focuses on a variety of potential causes, most of which involve the changing characteristics of the individuals within the electorate.[52] He discusses aggregate changes in a number of

51. See, for example, Walker 1991.

52. See also Cassel and Luskin 1988.

political orientations. He dismisses one common assumption, that increasing cynicism is responsible for decreasing turnout by showing that, while the public is, indeed, more politically cynical, cynicism has no independent effect on turnout.[53] Thus, we cannot explain the decline in turnout in terms of increased cynicism. However, the erosion both in citizens' perception that the government is responsive and in their sense that their votes matter does help to explain changes in turnout. In addition, although the causal mechanisms are not always spelled out in detail, the decline in social connectedness—as measured by the diminishing rate of marriage and lower rates of church attendance—and the changing age structure of the population that occurred as the baby boom generation entered the electorate also explain the falloff in turnout. Furthermore, the erosion in political connectedness—the decline in strong partisan identifications, in newspaper reading, and in campaign interest—helps to account for changes in turnout. Finally, one structural factor, the increase in the frequency of elections and the complexity of ballots, contributes to the erosion of turnout.

Others have elaborated this explanation. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, ch. 7) emphasize changes in the characteristics of the system in addition to changes in the characteristics of individuals. They stress, in particular, the consequences of the decline in voter mobilization by parties and social movements.[54] Miller and Shanks (1996, ch. 5) focus on the distinctive characteristics and behaviors of recent entrants into the electorate. They demonstrate that the post–New Deal generations that came of age after 1968 are less party identified and less socially connected than their elders, tendencies that would themselves contribute to the decline in turnout. Moreover, the non-party-identified and socially disconnected members of post–New Deal generations are substantially less likely to go to the polls than members of older generations with similar characteristics.[55]

The decline in voting is part of a more general erosion in voluntary ac-

53. This conclusion is supported by Nownes 1992.

54. This line of reasoning has proven controversial. In their discussion of the origins of the decline in turnout, Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1999, 85) point out that the decline in contacts from political parties has not tracked the decline in turnout very well. In fact, even though turnout was falling, party contacts rose during the first part of the 1960s and rose again in the 1990s. (Rosenstone and Hansen's data end in 1988.) Gerber and Green (2000b) suggest a resolution to the inconsistency. Their experiment in New Haven demonstrates the relative effectiveness of personal canvassing compared to direct mail and phone calls as a means of mobilizing voters. Thus, while parties may be reaching a larger share of the electorate, they are using less personal—and, thus, less effective—methods.

55. Lyons and Alexander (2000) connect the concern with party contacting to the generational analysis. They show that younger cohorts are less affected by party contacts.

tivity since the 1960s. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, ch. 3) use the frequencies from the Roper Social and Political Trends data, a two-decade series of polls that included a large battery of participation items, to establish that the decrease in electoral turnout is not an isolated political phenomenon. Rather it is part of a decrease in all forms of political activity that is related to structural changes in American political politics, in particular, the weakening of party efforts to mobilize voters. The decline in other forms of political activity is not, however, as steep as for voting turnout. In fact, for a few kinds of political participation, in particular, making electoral contributions, the volume of activity has increased. What this means is that there has been a transformation in the mix of participatory activities. The widely discussed decline of American political parties and the reinvigoration of interest groups, coupled with the nationalization and professionalization of both sets of institutions, have redefined the role of the citizen activist as, increasingly, a writer of letters and checks.

Furthermore, broadening our purview beyond conventional understandings of what constitutes political participation introduces further ambiguity. Joe Soss (2000) argues that applying for and receiving government welfare benefits can be construed as a form of political participation, analogous to other forms of political action. Because many who are eligible for government benefits do not become claimants, applying for welfare is—like many modes of political activity—a voluntary act that is undertaken in search of selective, material benefits and that involves political learning and the cultivation of political orientations. The number of clients of means-tested and non-means-tested government programs has varied substantially over the past half-century but does not track the secular decline in voting. Similarly, going to court can be interpreted as a form of political participation—in essence, the judicial analogue to particularized contacting. That is, individuals who file suit use public auspices to gain benefits, usually from other private parties. One of the hallmarks of recent decades is Americans' increased litigiousness. While these forms of public involvement for which there has been no obvious decline have consequences for individuals' ability to protect their interests, their implications for the creation of social capital and for individual learning are less clear.

With his resonant metaphor of *Bowling Alone*, Robert D. Putnam (2000) recast the conversation by placing the decline in voter turnout and other forms of political activity in the context of an overall erosion in civic engagement and social activity. Not only have voting and other forms of political activity waned since the 1960s, but participation in community organizations and clubs; religious, voluntary, and charitable activity; and informal socializing have ebbed as well. Thus, Americans are less likely not only to vote or get involved in a campaign but also to belong to the PTA, to attend church, or to go on picnics or give dinner parties. Although they are more likely to watch sports on television, they are less likely actually to do sports.[56] Concomitant to these trends is a decline in social trust.[57]

In his search for the sources of the decline in civic engagement, Putnam (2000, sec. 3) examines a large number of possibilities. A number of social trends—for example, the transformation of family life in the United States, White flight from racial integration in the aftermath of the successes of the civil rights movement, big government, and the entry of women into the workforce—turn out not to have the expected impact in diminishing civic engagement.[58] Pressures of time and money as well as suburbanization, sprawl, and commuting do contribute to the decline of civic engagement although the effect is less substantial than is sometimes assumed. The major culprits are the effects of electronic media, especially television, in privatizing leisure and the replacement of the long civic generation by the much less engaged baby boomers and generation Xers.[59]

What are the implications of the decline in political participation for matters of participatory representation? As fewer voices are heard, has there been any change in whose voices are heard? With respect to voting, there is no consensus as to whether the decline in turnout has come disproportionately from those at the bottom of the SES hierarchy and, thus, has exacerbated the demographic bias of the electorate.[60] In their study of the

56. Putnam's first exposition (1995) of his thesis generated a great deal of discussion and considerable criticism. In the eventual book-length version, Putnam not only corrects some errors and takes heed of points made by his critics but also marshals additional evidence in support of his contention that civic engagement is declining. An extended—though not especially compelling—rebuttal can be found in Ladd 1999.

57. The relationship between participation and social trust represents another example in which the causal direction is uncertain. Brehm and Rahn (1997) demonstrate that, while participation and interpersonal trust are reciprocally causal, participation is an even stronger cause of social trust than vice versa.

58. In his nuanced discussion, Putnam (2000, 277–79) makes clear that the various aspects of civic engagement are not inextricably bundled. Thus, instability in family structure is probably associated with decreasing religious attendance and participation in youth-related activities, though not with other aspects of civic decline. Similarly, women's increased workforce participation has affected social connectedness much more than the more public forms of involvement (194–203). In fact, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001, chs. 8, 10, 12) demonstrate not only that women with full-time jobs are more politically active than those at home full-time but that work itself provides participatory factors.

59. These two factors interact. The impact of television is especially pronounced for members of these younger generations.

60. For differing points of view, contrast Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 241–45) with Leighley and Nagler (1992a) and Shields and Goidel (1997). Shields and Goidel (2000) find no change in the SES stratification of campaign donors over the period. Since, unlike voters who are limited to a single ballot, donors can vary how much they give, Shields and Goidel's findings might have been different if their data had contained measures of the size of the contribution.

consequences for political stratification of the overall decline in various modes of political activity, Brady, Schlozman, Verba, and Elms (2002) find that the socioeconomic bias in political participation fluctuated somewhat in the two decades separating the early 1970s and early 1990s, but was more or less the same at the end of the period as at the beginning.

In contrast to the stability in the socioeconomic stratification of political participation is the changing ideological composition of activist publics. Survey data confirm the impression gleaned from journalistic accounts, that citizen politics in the United States has become more polarized. Putnam finds that the decline in civic engagement has been especially pronounced within the large, and growing, sector of the public that describes its political views as moderate, thus producing a circumstance such that political activists are drawn disproportionately from the ranks of those at both ends of the political spectrum (2000, 342). Furthermore, Berry (1999, ch. 7) links the rise of citizens' groups of the left to what he calls "liberalism transformed": these national-level organizations that are active in Washington politics often entail only a checkbook commitment from members and alter the focus of representation from class-based economic concerns anchored in unions to postmaterialist issues like political reform, consumer protection, and environmental preservation.

In contrast to Putnam's emphasis on the decline in civic engagement and Berry's analysis of the eclipse of the representation of the economic concerns of the working class and the poor, are sociological studies in the tradition of Harry Boyte's *The Backyard Revolution* (1980) that consider local activity that builds the civic capacities of ordinary citizens. These studies tend to be ethnographic rather than survey-based and descriptive rather than causal. In addition, they tend to concentrate on the left end of the political spectrum. For example, even when they consider faith-based organizing, they tend to focus not on grassroots religious activity in the name of conservative social concerns but on initiatives on behalf of a progressive agenda. Recent examples include Mark R. Warren's study (2001) of the Alinsky-style Texas Industrial Areas Foundation and Carmen Sirianni and Lewis Friedland's investigation (2001) of "community renewal" on a national basis.

■ | The Tyranny of the Sample Survey in Participation Research: Past and Future

As I assembled my half of the reading list for my department's graduate field seminar in American politics a few months ago, I faced almost an embarrassment of riches when it came to the proposed session on political participation. As I hope this essay has made clear, during the past decade scholars of participation have produced a large quantity of important research, including a number of first-rate books.[61] The bulk of this research partakes of several characteristics that make it at once both quite contemporary and rather old-fashioned. Most of the studies reviewed here are relentlessly empirical: they use quantitative evidence, usually the results of national sample surveys, and sophisticated statistical techniques to consider causal questions. They generate methodological controversies about such matters as the choice of specific statistical methods, the correct specification of the model, and problems of causal direction. Yet, even when they seem unduly narrow, the questions posed are anchored in such enduring issues of democratic theory as the cultivation of democratic values, legitimacy, and equality.

The emergence of systematic study of political participation is tied inextricably with the development of the sample survey, and to a certain extent the research progress in the recent past reflects the availability of new data sources.[62] None of the data sets available to participation researchers is perfect. The discipline's principal source of longitudinal data about the political commitments, characteristics, and behaviors of the American public, the American National Election Studies (ANES), is an invaluable archive. It contains excellent measures of a variety of kinds of electoral participation, but because it is tied to biennial elections, it contains only intermittent measures of nonelectoral political participation. Thus, the ANES is of limited utility to those interested in political activity construed more broadly. In fact, the availability of the ANES, with its electoral focus, may help to explain why so much of the participation research since Verba and Nie's agenda-setting work (1972) appeared has focused exclusively on the vote as a form of citizen activity. Within the existing framework of participation research, progress could be made on a number of the central intellectual problems discussed here—for example, matters of causal direction or distinctions among various kinds of participation—if only better data were available. What is needed are longitudinal, preferably panel, surveys containing a rich battery of items and samples large enough to include ample cases of individuals who engage in such rare political acts as attending a political protest or making a large contribution.[63] Since the

61. For the record, the book that I chose to teach for the session on political participation has neither my name nor that of any of my research collaborators on the cover.

62. These include, most notably, the Citizen Participation Study, the Roper Social and Political Trends data, and the DDB Needham Life Style surveys.

63. Although panel surveys would allow us to trace the participatory histories of individuals and to explain much more fully changes in individual political activity, panel studies have the disadvantage that attrition is relatively high and those who cannot be found in later waves are unlikely to be a random sample of initial members of the sample.

ANES is currently threatened by budget cuts from the National Science Foundation, it is extremely unlikely that the resources for such a study would become available.

Sample surveys are in many ways the appropriate instrument for research on political participation from the standpoint of both social science method and democratic theory: they not only provide a reasonably accurate baseline view of the American public but permit the assessment of the extent to which the norm of political equality is violated by politically relevant differences between participants and the public at large.[64] Nevertheless, surveys also have serious limitations. Surveys are justifiably criticized for failing to capture the historical and social context in which respondents' view are embedded. In addition, even when the questionnaire is long and the questions are well formulated, surveys cannot capture the rich texture of individuals' thinking and experiences. Thus, data from surveys gain greater resonance when supplemented by less superficial—but also less systematic—evidence gleaned from other sources: longer, open-ended interviews; participant observation; historical analysis; the media; or popular culture. If incorporated into research on participation, such qualitative sources not only would yield a deeper and more-rounded picture of the complexity of social life but would supply hypotheses worth testing, generating the questions we want to answer more systematically.[65]

At the same time that this has been a productive period for participation research that adheres to a certain framework, this research is limited by the fact that it seems somewhat divorced from other developments in the social sciences. Perhaps most surprising is the relative paucity of references to the dominant perspective in the certain fields within the discipline, rational choice. In what now seems to be the distant past, Anthony Downs (1957, chs. 3, 14) and Mancur Olson Jr. (1965) posed a formidable challenge to democratic theory by positing the irrationality of voting and collective action on behalf of shared political objectives.[66] Of course, the rational-choice perspective is hardly completely absent. Studies often use the language of costs and benefits as a way of exploring the compensatory benefits—whether material or, to an extent not always recognized by the

64. On this issue, see Verba 1996.

65. Recent examples of this kind of work include M. E. Warren 2001 and Sirianni and Friedland 2001.

66. Whiteley 1995 contains an extended discussion of the rational choice challenge to political participation and the theoretical failures of rational choice in accounting for participation as well as extensive citations to the literature. For additional discussion and empirical evidence about the benefits attendant to various kinds of participation, see Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 1995. For an assessment that seeks to specify the circumstances under which rational choice approaches are helpful in understanding political activity, see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 2000.

stronger advocates of the rational-choice perspective, intangible—and the magnitude of the costs.[67] By and large, however, there seems to be tacit agreement with John Aldrich's observation that voting is "the major example of the failure of rational choice theory" (1993, 247) and an implicit assumption that rational-choice approaches are more productive for other political science problems, such as the behavior of legislators. In short, researchers seem to go about the business of seeking to understand political participation with much less concern about the free-rider problem than might have been expected.

Another surprise is the absence of intersection between research on participation and research on social movements.[68] On superficial examination, these two literatures seem quite separate. Cross-references in either direction are infrequent. The vocabulary is different. While participation scholars (by and large, political scientists) seek causal explanation and agonize over the choice of statistical method and the specification of the model, scholars of social movements (in the main, sociologists) are oriented to the construction of theory and obsess over matters of definition and categorization. Most importantly, the dependent variables tend to differ: students of political participation seek to explain individual behaviors, students of social movements to account for collective events.

Nevertheless, there is a great deal of substantive overlap. Contrary to what might be expected, research on political participation takes social structure seriously and research on social movements investigates the opportunities offered and constraints imposed by political institutions and processes. This overlap implies that these two sets of scholars have much to learn from one another. For example, the literature on participation tends to give short shrift to the role of deeply held political convictions in animating political activity; the emphasis in the social movement literature on "framing"—in particular, the processes by which politically relevant iden-

67. Examples include Uhlaner 1989, Morton 1991, and Teixeira 1992. Note that self-interested motives should not be equated with a rational-choice perspective. Green and Cowden (1992) find that White parents whose children were being bused were more likely to take part in antibusing protests, an action that involves self-interested objectives but would be considered irrational from the perspective of the free-rider problem—unless a particular individual is so well known or influential that he or she could make a difference by acting alone.

Empirical studies do not always substantiate the rational-choice perspective. For example, Oliver and Wolfinger (1999) adduce data to test the assumption that individuals make the rational choice to avoid registering to vote so as to avoid jury duty and find that the assumption does not hold up empirically.

68. The literature on social movements is very extensive and deserves a bibliographical essay of its own. As an introduction, see the helpful essays and references to the literature in two edited volumes: Morris and Mueller 1992 and McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, esp. Introduction and chs. 1, 2, 6, 11. A few recent works include Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, McCarthy and Wolfson 1996, Minkoff 1997, Tarrow 1998, and Cress and Snow 2000.

tities are constructed and definitions of collective interest emerge and are transformed—is a useful corrective. Reciprocally, social movement research pays scant attention to the way that what Sidney Tarrow (1998) calls the "contentious politics" of social movement activity relates to the ordinary participation that links citizens to policymakers on a day-to-day basis.[69] In the American context, the boundaries between contentious and mainstream politics are quite indistinct, and social movement activists often realize policy gains by using very conventional forms of involvement such as going to court. Furthermore, the rejection of sample surveys as unduly individualistic can lead social movement researchers to erroneous inferences. Although it is intrinsic to the understanding of social movement activity that it, by posing a challenge to authorities, is the "weapon of the weak," systematic evidence from surveys shows that the poor are underrepresented among protesters—although to a lesser extent than they are underrepresented among other kinds of activists.[70]

Similarly, historians and political scientists in the American political development tradition sometimes take up matters surrounding political participation. Alexander Keyssar's history (2000) of suffrage is an outstanding example.[71] However, there seems to be relatively little cross-fertilization between historically-oriented and survey-based studies of political activity.

Most serious is the failure of contemporary scholarship on participation to connect with inquiries that ask one of the most fundamental questions in political science, "Who governs?" The black box that has foiled students of organized interests for so long—the difficulty of making systematic assessments of the relative importance of various factors in influencing public outcomes—challenges participation researchers as well. It is easy to adduce evidence from anecdotes and case studies to demonstrate that citizen input through the medium of participation is one, though only one, among many factors that have an impact on policy. An exception to the absence of investigation into the policy consequences of citizen participation is Andrea Campbell's forthcoming study of the links between activity by senior citizens and policy on Social Security. Although her findings are not politically counterintuitive, she is able to demonstrate with systematic evidence that threats to Social Security produced upsurges in activity by se-

69. In light of its emphasis on matters of definition, it is especially puzzling that the social movement literature never elaborates the relationship between social movement organizations (SMOs) and the larger category of interest groups.

70. See Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 190–91.

71. Examples by political scientists might include historical studies of women's participation in party politics by Andersen (1996) and Freeman (2000) and work by Skocpol (1999) and Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson (2000) on the history of voluntary associations.

nior citizens and policy response by Congress.[72] In the aggregate, however, we know far too little that is systematic about the way that participatory messages are received and interpreted and the circumstances under which they make a difference.

Finally, perhaps political science's most consistently thoughtful student of democracy, Robert A. Dahl (1994), challenges us to think in fundamentally new ways about citizen participation in a democracy. He traces how the movement from the direct, or assembly, democracy of the Athenian city state to the representative democracy of the nation state recast the role of the citizen activist. We are now in the midst of a similarly fundamental transformation associated with internationalization and the creation of transnational institutions. He poses the question of whether democracy can adapt to this transformation and whether there will be a place for meaningful citizen participation in a transnational system. Or are citizen activity in its current incarnation, and the possibilities for democratic renewal and accountability that accompany it, about to be changed profoundly in an increasingly global world?

72. Other inquiries that have attempted to link political participation to policy outputs include those by Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson (1995) (as corrected in Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1997), who show that the mobilization of lower-class voters in a state is related to the generosity of state welfare benefits, and Fording (1997), who shows that, where coupled with electoral power, political violence can bring policy benefits in the form of increased welfare benefits.

Nancy Burns

Gender: Public Opinion and Political Action[1]

In 1983, when Marianne Githens discussed the state of the gender and politics field she wrote of the "mass of conflicting data and interpretations" and yearned for political science to look at gender and politics with clearer eyes (1983, 489). In 1993, when Susan Carroll and Linda Zerilli (1993) turned to assess the field, they were cautiously optimistic, pointing to the tremendous growth in the field, to the ways in which feminist theory and more empirically based work were drawing on each other, and to the challenges remaining with respect to central conceptual categories in the field. In this review, I take up this topic again and conclude that we are at a tremendous turning point. We have conceptualizations, methodological tools, cumulative knowledge, and a vast set of new questions to answer. And we have at hand one other immensely valuable resource—the theoretical and methodological work in other subfields and other disciplines, work that we can reconfigure and put to our own purposes.

I center my attention here on the literatures on American political behavior and public opinion—broadly conceived—at the mass and elite levels. In the first pages of the review, I worry about critical issues of conceptual development and method, issues that have often characterized the contributions gender scholars have made to political science, issues that will, I suspect, drive the future study of gender and politics. The first of these issues is preoccupied with studying categories in an individualistic discipline, the second, with linking life spaces, and the third, with building truly comparative analyses. The last pages of this review turn to specific literatures—on social movements, participation, public opinion, and elite

1. The article has benefited tremendously from suggestions and criticisms from Michael Dawson, Ira Katznelson, Mary Katzenstein, Claire Jean Kim, Donald Kinder, Helen Milner, Rebecca Morton, Karen Orren, Pam Trotman Reid, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Abigail Stewart, and the participants in the Conference on the State of the Discipline; from Anna Maria Ortiz's research assistance; from Barb Opal's help obtaining publications; and from years of conversations with Donald Kinder, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba.

politics—and offer a guide to these literatures, set against the backdrop of these three defining concerns.

Throughout, I make suggestions about where the field might turn next. In making these suggestions, I point to literatures in other subfields and literatures in other disciplines as sources of theoretical guidance. At heart, I'm a social scientist. So I turn to literatures that offer theoretical lenses conducive to my social science bent or literatures that develop empirical portraits of gender in action, that is, to history, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and economics. Other scholars writing this review might find their theoretical inspiration in other fields than these, and so might substitute literature for anthropology, architecture for sociology, or biology for economics. I suspect, though, that even with these substitutions, there would be significant overlap in the places we'd go for inspiration. In the end, the point of my examples is to encourage serious interdisciplinary borrowing wherever it offers theoretical or empirical guidance. And while I draw especially heavily from my list of seven disciplines, others might develop a different and equally compelling list.

Conceptualization and Method: The Problem of Categories in an Individualistic Discipline

I start this review at the beginning: What do we mean by gender? From relatively early empirical efforts to untangle gender from data, scholars have been sure that gender is a multifaceted life experience, with many pieces, growing out of the complicated ways humans make people's—women's *and* men's—sex matter in a range of unlikely settings. But scholars have had access to different data and have been concerned with speaking to different theoretical traditions. What sometimes have looked like differences in the definition of gender have tended to be differences in measurement and data and method, instead. To take one example, nearly twenty years ago, Sapiro (1983) argued that gender is a constellation of life experiences; and her analyses centered on comparing the consequences of particular constellations in women's lives. Though today we might have more detailed data about the content of life experiences, Sapiro's approach is not tremendously different from the Giddens-inspired one (1984), combining structure and choice, constraint and agency, scholars are more likely to employ today. More recent accounts sound quite similar to Sapiro's conceptualization: to Nicholson's mind, for example, gender operates as a "network of characteristics" (1994, 100–1), or to Deaux and LaFrance, it is "a repository of possibilities from which situations select" (1998, 807). Gender is a repertoire of mechanisms that provide social interpretations of sex, that enable sex to structure people's lives. Gender is a set of ways in which people and institutions make sex matter. Gender is a principle of social organization. Gender is a hierarchy.[2]

Gender is not a property of individuals. It is a property of groups (Jackman 1994). Part of the theoretical and empirical difficulty of undertaking analyses of gender comes in trying to figure out which are the right groups for any particular inquiry, in trying to see how some women or some men share particular manifestations of gender, that is, how they share experiences with particular elements of the repertoire of mechanisms through which people and institutions make sex matter. Scholars have wanted to know where, when, how, and for whom sex is made to matter and what the consequences are for politics of this mattering. This is a difficult question to answer, largely because gender scholars in political science often have two valuable and competing goals. They want to devise theory and method to study categories—properties of groups—in a discipline taken with individualism. They want to understand how the category, woman or man, comes to matter in individuals' lives.

One standard approach has been to adopt gender as a rather content-free dichotomous variable dropped into a regression, on the idea that that will offer evidence about whether, by chance, gender matters.[3] This approach uses a particular definition of the right groups for all inquiries. This kind of analysis, used mostly outside the field of gender and politics, assumes that the right groups are all women and all men, that whatever gender is, it happens to differentiate the average woman from the average man. It ignores variation within the category, variation in the ways in which sex comes to matter for women and for men. *Perhaps* there are experiences that all women share; that they are rapable comes to mind. And *perhaps* there are experiences that all men share. Catherine MacKinnon (1987) relies on precisely this distinction between women's and men's location in the hierarchy of sexual access to generate a compelling analysis of how gender matters in some parts of the law.[4] The power of her analysis is most evident in some domains, such as the law relating to sexual harassment or domestic violence. But it would be odd to apply her analysis to all dependent variables we might investigate with respect to gender.

To get the gender result right—to see properly how gender matters—

2. As Stevens says of categories like these, "race always entails race-ism, just as much as gender differences always entail sexed forms of domination and that class entails exploitation" (1999, 173). MacKinnon makes the same point: gender, she says is "a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female subordination . . . at root a question of hierarchy" (1987, 40).

3. For one helpful criticism of this approach, see Achen 1992. See, as well, the discussion in Barth 1969 about the importance of investigating continuous boundary maintenance in the face of categories that are ostensibly dichotomous.

4. Jackman (1994) relies on this distinction as well to motivate her analysis of the creation and maintenance of gender hierarchy.

we have to figure out whether the things that differentiate all, or almost all, women from all, or almost all, men are the things that drive the social and psychological processes relevant to the dependent variable at hand. Often those who take gender as a dichotomous variable fail to take this first step. In the end, with the clear exception of analyses like MacKinnon's (1987) and Jackman's (1994), this particular solution to the problem of categories in an individualistic discipline has not been very satisfactory. It relies on an odd melding of individualism and essentialism. And, again with notable exceptions, it generates results that can't tell us much about gender because these analyses are usually not tied to processes or mechanisms through which we make people's sex matter.

The analytic problem of gender is complicated in two ways. First off, because gender is a property of groups and because any group composing half the population is especially heterogeneous, the processes or mechanisms through which sex comes to matter will almost always operate on some women and some men, not all women and all men. That is, these processes will have some specificity. The second complication comes from the intimacy between women and men and the extent to which women and men share social locations. These aspects of social organization mean that while gender is sometimes carried out through overt coercion—discrimination and violence—and sometimes through more subtle forms of social pressure, it is also often carried out through the complicity of women. As Nancy Hirschmann puts it, "women [sometimes] seem to choose what they are in fact restricted to" (1996, 52). Roberta Sigel (1996) calls this "accommodation." Mary Jackman (1994) sees this as a consequence of the paternalism through which gender is maintained. These features of gender make gender harder on analysts than some other relatively bounded categories. Unlike race—wrapped up as it is with striking spatial segregation—average differences between women and men are rarely "divides" (Kinder and Winter 2001), and thus the wedding of an undifferentiated category to an individualistic enterprise makes less sense in the study of gender than it does in the study of some other bounded categories.[5]

Theorists have been working to devise ways to think about categories—like gender—that sometimes matter in people's lives, categories that sometimes unite some people, categories that matter to different people for different reasons, categories that, despite their lack of regularity and dependability, profoundly and persistently structure people's lives (Haslanger 2000; Wingrove 1999; I. M. Young 1994). At the same time, scholars who focus on intersectionality—that is, on the overlap between categories like gender and race—have spent their time on the other side of this issue (Crenshaw 1992; Higginbotham 1992; hooks 1984; Kim 1999; Nakano Glenn 1992; Stoler 1996), on the sometimes imperialistic reach of gender, race, and ethnicity, on the ways in which a focus on gender alone

5. "Bounded" is how Tilly (1998a) describes categories like gender and race.

erases systematic distinctions of race and a focus on race alone obliterates gender. In so doing, these scholars of intersectionality have highlighted the struggle to include categories and the hierarchies they represent in analyses of individuals. They have focused especially on one aspect of categorical specificity—on who is in the relevant category. And they have paid somewhat less attention to the places and dependent variables where this more specific category plays a role. And sometimes scholars have simply traded one category—women or African Americans—for another—African American women—without seeking to build an accommodation between categories and individuals. It is surely true that there are differences between some African American women and some white women, but it is also surely true that some of the pieces of the hierarchy of gender pay precious little attention to the differences between these two groups. We want accounts that specify when categories matter, which categories matter, and for whom they matter (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001).

Gender scholars need categories—be they comprehensive or somewhat more circumscribed. Otherwise, we risk "morselizing" (to borrow Robert Lane's word) experience and missing the systematic and common ways categories like gender or race work in a range of different settings, for a range of different people. Categories are what we study. Of course, we need theory and method suited to accommodate categories to the analysis of individuals. And that accommodation has come when we have connected categories to processes and mechanisms, thereby noticing *and organizing for our analyses* the tremendous heterogeneity within categories. There is much more to do on this problem of categories, theoretically and empirically. We will succeed to the extent that we tie the ways we use categories to specific parts of the repertoire through which sex comes to matter in women's and men's lives.

This problem of categories makes trouble for empirical analyses. It turns out that it can be hard to see the property of a group in individual data. And it is especially hard to see the complicated residues of gender when our data have come from individuals at a single point in time. This is partly to do with the special nature of gender as a category, with the social organization that keeps gender from generating a divide. Attending to these two things together—the place of categories in individual-level analysis and the social organization of gender—requires sophisticated methodological tools. But only recently have we been able to train these sophisticated tools on the problem of understanding the difference gender makes in political life. By contrast, in some other fields, in some other surprising fields like econometrics, scholars have built quite good careers developing methods to untangle the ways gender interacts with economic institutions like the workplace (Heckman 1979; Heckman and Willis 1977; for a political application of these tools, see Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999). In these other fields, studying gender has meant developing new tools of quantitative analysis that notice the ways gender links social spaces, that allow for the heterogeneity in the category. In political science, we haven't done quite as much of this as we should have. We have not worked to devise new quantitative approaches that cross the divide between category and individual with the same zeal that we've applied to developing qualitative approaches to studying gender. But we are starting to remedy this, starting to figure out how to craft or reconfigure quantitative tools to allow us to see the residues gender leaves in our data. As a consequence, armed with new methodological tools, scholars are having more luck linking sophisticated conceptions of gender with individual-level data.

I hope we hone methodological tools that center on two features of gender. The first: because of the social organization of gender, it is much easier to see as it cumulates in people's lives than it is to see in a cross-section. Despite that, we have rarely used analyses of panel data to untangle gender from data.[6] Scholars less committed to methodological individualism and more comfortable with categories than most political scientists turn to aggregate analysis to solve this problem (Jackman 1994; Tilly 1998a). These aggregate analyses can sometimes offer a clear view of the cumulation of inequality, and they can do this with cross-sectional data. But we are individualistic political scientists, after all, and so we will have to devise different strategies, starting perhaps with a larger investment in panel analysis.

And the second: while gender does, of course, happen in politics, gender operates in *most* social institutions, and, as a consequence, much of the action is often offstage, *in* the variables we use to explain political outcomes and not in the coefficients in our models (for efforts to develop an analytic method to address the issue, see Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Sapiro and Conover 1997; and, for an excellent conversation on just this point, talk to Sue Carroll). This has important consequences. First, gender has already done much of its work when, for example, it gives people levels of education or engagement with religion and not politics. Second, gender scholars have often pointed to the links gender builds between public lives and private ones, frequently aiming to sort out the implications of the way we organize our private lives for power in public spaces (Blair and Henry 1981; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Carroll 1989; Gurin 1987; M. M. Lee 1976; McGlen 1980; Okin 1989; Sapiro 1983; Stoper 1977). They have insisted that we notice the relevance of outcomes in domains outside of politics for political thought and action.[7] And they have said we should go farther than that: we should examine the details of social processes outside of politics and work out the implications of those processes for political analysis. Because gender comes to matter in almost

6. For important, early exceptions to this claim, see Andersen 1975 and Andersen and Cook 1985.

7. Again, MacKinnon makes this point especially clearly: she says that men "get preferred because society advantages them before they get into court" (1987, 35).

all social institutions in one way or another, it builds a special kind of linkage across these institutions. As scholars, political scientists have developed a special talent for ignoring these linkages. We have an unfortunate habit of attending to the coefficients in our models and not to the levels of the variables with which our respondents come to our equations, a practice that—in its rush to individualism, in the ways it erases the consequences of categorical treatment—can make gender invisible. Of course, we may want categories to organize our individual-level analyses by making us focus on categorical differences in coefficients; but if categorical treatment happens to individuals outside of politics, we may be even more interested in categorical differences in the levels of variables in our models. In addition, perhaps because of the widespread reliance on gender as a content-free dichotomous variable, political scientists are used to the idea that gender can be captured in a single coefficient. Usually, however, it can't be: when gender is in coefficients, it is often in a *pattern* of coefficients. (Think, for example, about how to see the role gender plays in access to the workforce: one important part of that would be in the pattern of coefficients on children and marriage for women compared with those same coefficients for men.) Gender scholars—and scholars interested in the residues of hierarchical categories in general—must push political science to new practices.

In my discussion to this point, I have assumed the value of comparative study. The field has recently and profitably turned in that direction. Gender scholarship has often run on implicit comparisons between different groups of women or between women and men, but it has made advances more recently by taking advantage of the explicit comparative leverage that comes from developing theoretical claims about gender in men's lives or working class women's lives or African American women's lives. These claims have been successful when they have turned on the particular mechanisms that make sex matter and when they have been comparative. This expansion of comparative possibilities has made a tremendous difference to work on gender in a range of subfields—American political development (see, for example, Mettler 1998; Skocpol 1992), public opinion (Conover 1988; Sigel 1996), legislative turnover (Blair and Henry 1981; Carroll 1989) and participation (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Political scientists, like scholars in other disciplines, have often studied men, but they have rarely studied men with an eye to the ways in which gender shapes men's thoughts and actions (for excellent exceptions, see J. Adams 1996; Bederman 1995). In contrast with other disciplines, political science has been slow to take up the comparative leverage on gender offered by different groups of women. We must expand our commitment to comparative study—of hierarchies and of intersectionality—to understand how, for all its variability, gender is a systematic social force.

To my mind, the issues I have outlined in these first pages characterize the field and outline its possibility for growth. Some pieces will likely endure—the variability of gender, its location in a constellation of life experiences, and the focus on interlocking life spaces. Some pieces present challenges to new generations of scholars—to think more creatively about the place of categories in an individualistic discipline like political science, to devise better methods for seeing gender in individual-level and often cross-sectional data, and to develop the theoretical tools for more comparative work on gender. The likely next step for political science, the postinstitutional step, will be to develop a rich account of the interaction between institutions and individuals, to draw more forcefully than modern institutional analysis has on the psychological and sociological foundations of thought and action, and to place those richer accounts of thought and action in the context of the increasingly strong work on institutions themselves. Gender scholars, who must deal repeatedly with gender in a range of settings for a range of people, should be in front of this new political science.

The field is in a remarkable position, with the foundations laid for a tremendous range of interesting research, without being overtilled, and with a deep supply of theoretical tools. The field is especially fortunate. It is coming of age precisely when the comparative possibilities of gender scholarship—possibilities grounded in the study of comparative hierarchies and in the comparative study of intersectionality—are exploding.

■ | Citizens and Elites, Action and Opinion

With this overview in hand, I turn my attention to the questions, approaches, and evidence from the literatures in American politics on social movements, public opinion, participation, candidates, and policymakers. In almost all of these literatures, explanatory tastes have been driven, in part, by the field's desire for an account of gender that can contend with heterogeneity.

Of course, as in any field, gender scholars have also been guided by explanations that depend partly on the explanatory turn in vogue at the time, and most recently, that explanatory turn has centered on institutions. Early work focused on the roots of gender in childhood and centered its attention on socialization within the family (Greenstein 1965; Hess and Torney 1968; Iglitzin 1974; Orum, Cohen, Grassmuck, and Orum 1977). As early as the mid-1970s (in Andersen's [1975] and Welch's [1977] seminal articles), we tried to locate gender away from childhood socialization and within adult life. Initially and not surprisingly, the impulse in this turn to adulthood was to focus on roles and role expectations within the family and the workplace. More recently, we've maintained our concern with institutions, but we have drawn our theoretical inspiration less from Parsons and more from a pragmatic interest in the details of adult institutions (once again, with a focus on the family and the workplace). And we increasingly nod to theoretical traditions in other fields, traditions that develop the case for the connection between gender and institutional life. Surely, in the not too distant future, we will integrate more fully theoretical approaches to institutions and institutional life developed in other fields into our scholarship—organization theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), gender theory like Eagly's (1987) in psychology, for example. Our theoretical impulses value constraint—as opposed to gender as a set of choices freely made—and contingency—as opposed, perhaps, to essentialism—in a way that is consistent with the theoretical turn to institutions in other fields.

Chances are high that we will return to things we have abandoned. Childhood surely *is* part of the story of the variability of gender. Our worry about explanations rooted in childhood socialization was that these explanations neglected contingency and variability. In early accounts of childhood socialization, there seemed to be one way for little boys, one way for little girls. But this problem is not inherent in explanations rooted in childhood. Work in the last ten years in psychology and political science provides gender scholars the tools to reconsider socialization to politics in a more contingent and variable way (in psychology, the work of Eccles [1994] and her colleagues focuses on the mechanisms of gender socialization; in sociology, see Thorne 1993 on childhood play; and in political science, Jennings and Stoker 1999 and Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 1999 provide the empirical lens for a reconsideration of the roots of gender variability in childhood).

The Contours of Institutional Analysis

What We Have Done

In their recent institutional turn, gender scholars have had several analytic goals in mind. Sometimes, they've been interested in understanding how gender is conceptualized within an institutional space and in sorting out the consequences of that conceptualization (Epstein 1988; Skocpol 1992; Orloff 1996). In so inquiring, they have followed Goffman's fascination with the ways humans can make gender relevant in almost any setting. And they have followed his outline for institutional analysis. As Goffman put it, "It is not, then, the social consequences of innate sex differences that must be explained, but the way in which these differences were (and are) put forward as a warrant for our social arrangements, and, most important of all, the way in which the institutional workings of society ensured that this accounting would seem sound" (1977, 302).

Other times, scholars have been interested in whether the rules of conduct in an institution define and enable women's fights for standing and power. M. F. Katzenstein (1998) offers an account along these lines. In her story of efforts to change two conservative institutions—the military and the Catholic Church—from within, military women and women in the Catholic Church faced different rules of conduct. Military women had access to the judicial system; they thus had ready-made routes and forms for contestation. These activists won regularly, but their victories were on small issues suited to available legal arguments. Such routes didn't exist in the Catholic Church. So women in the Catholic Church had to make their own way; their way was persuasion, discursive politics, an effort to change the basic ideas church members held about gender. In Harvey's account (1998), the institutions were political parties, but the story wasn't much different. The incentives offered up by politics shaped the strategies party leaders, leaders of women's groups, and members of Congress pursued immediately following Woman Suffrage.

Scholars have also looked at whether any different voice women might use depends on the positions of power they hold within institutions. While these arguments have been developed extensively in other disciplines (Eagly 1987; Kanter 1977), versions of them are starting to appear in political science. Sigel, for one, says that institutional constraints, "rather than women's preferences or skills, explain most of the ways that women's behavior differs from that of men" (1996, 16). Okin, too, draws on this perspective. She says, for example, "Once we admit the idea that significant differences between women and men are *created by* the existing division of labour within the family, we begin to see the depth and the extent of the social construction of gender" (1998, 127). To some extent, work that argues that women's arguments depend on the opportunities presented them fits here as well (Katzenstein 1998; Reingold 2000), as does the linguistic analysis offered by Kathlene (1994).

WHAT WE HAVE LEFT UNDONE

Mostly outside of political science, scholars have been interested in the sex segregation of institutions, and they've been especially engaged with the possibility that sex segregation and role differentiation anchor ends of a continuum. Jackman, for example, argues that when sex segregation of institutions disappears, we get role differentiation between hierarchical groups: hierarchy is regularly and predictably managed and maintained through separation of one sort or another, that is, through spatial segregation or role differentiation (Jackman 1994). Others have been interested in the consequences of sex-segregated social life for women's economic and political opportunities more broadly (Smith-Lovin and McPherson 1991). This scholarship draws on increasingly sophisticated ideas about social networks (Granovetter 1973; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). And, as Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin point out, "The picture that emerges from the research about social networks is one in which women seldom meet men in status-equal, role-similar interactions" (1999, 195). We've seen mere traces of this important work in political science. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) look especially at political discussion among husbands and wives. Stoker and Jennings (1995) examine the joint political activity of husbands and wives. Sapiro (1983) considers the determinants of the size of women's social networks. And Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) explore the consequences of sex-segregated organizations for women's and men's skill development.

One other important line of work, mostly outside of political science, has explored the extent to which men and women "do gender" in a particular domain. To what extent do women and men play out their ideas of appropriate gender roles within a domain? To what extent are they accountable to gender? This interactional approach (put forward most forcefully by West and Zimmerman [1987]) builds on the models developed by Goffman (1959, 1977) and focuses more on the connections between our own ideas and our actions than on any sort of external constraint that might shape behavior. In psychology and sociology, scholars have focused on where our gender role beliefs come from, on the specific, gendered socialization processes that encourage children to value certain pursuits and to code those pursuits as male or female (Eccles 1994; Thorne 1993). In political science, scholars have worked with related ideas, though the connection to the interactional school has been tenuous. In particular, scholars have differentiated women with respect to their views of women's proper roles, and they have argued that the beliefs that work to keep women at home also influence the kinds of political involvements in which women engage (Clark and Clark 1986; Gurin 1987; Klatch 1987; Luker 1984; Mansbridge 1986; Mathews and DeHart 1992; Sapiro 1983; Tolleson Rinehart 1992).

We have work to do to round out our current fascination with institutional analysis. I hope that as scholars pursue this line of inquiry, they build tighter links to other disciplines and to institutional analysis (in addition to the literature on American political development, where the linkages are already strong) in other fields in political science. I hope as well that we use the lens gender provides us to develop new ways of thinking about institutions.

THE LITERATURE

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

I turn away, now, from conceptual and explanatory issues that concern the field as a whole, and to specific literatures. I start with the literature on social movements because it is perhaps the most conceptually rich of those I examine here, and many of the ideas developed in this literature could be interestingly and profitably combined with the work on citizen and elite behavior I will turn to next. Among the literatures I examine here, this one is the most distant from methodological individualism, and so its successes—like the successes in the study of gender and social policy—have come largely without having to contend with the problem of categories.

What have scholars found in this literature? To start, they have shown that women's movements, like most social movements, depend heavily on indigenous—preexisting, sex segregated—organizations and networks. We have seen this over and over again: in Jo Freeman's pathbreaking work (1975) on the networks that enabled the modern women's movement; in Nancy Cott's book (1977) on the ways in which women used the skills and arguments they developed within religious institutions to move to public work on social reform; in Jane Mansbridge's arguments (1986) about the mobilizing advantages of anti–Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) forces compared with pro-ERA activists; Mathews and DeHart's engrossing account (1992) of the whole range of networks on which anti-ERA activists could draw. Of course, this reliance on indigenous organizations is a general result about social movements (McAdam 1982). What is perhaps especially interesting is the repeated reliance on an institutional space in which women have been especially active (though not always especially honored): religious institutions.

Organizers have been quite creative: they have drawn on religious institutions to craft a wide range of women's movements. Women seem to have only fleeting opportunities—like those Freeman (1975) outlines—to draw on other kinds of indigenous institutions. Women's movements that haven't been able to rely, for the long term, on the grassroots support provided through indigenous institutions have sometimes ended up relying on a small group of activists, for good or ill (Mansbridge 1986). Of course, other social movements—movements not focused on gender—that rely on indigenous organizations often end up reproducing the gender hierarchies within those organizations (see, for example, C. J. Cohen's discussion [1999] of gay and lesbian activists' efforts to be heard in modern African American politics and Payne's investigation [1995] of women's activism within the early, rural Civil Rights movement). There are hints in this literature about what might be special about women's indigenous institutions, about the difficulty—striking in comparison with race—of finding a segregated space in which to build consciousness and resources.

In the past, women seemed able to turn arguments others made to limit their roles to their own purposes, exploiting those arguments to open up more spaces for political power. Women's abilities to do this were enhanced because, historically, accounts of gender—unlike accounts of some other group-based hierarchies—were especially nuanced and well developed in political life (for the strongest elaboration of this argument, comparing the possibilities of this strategy for women, Blacks, the working class, and Jews, see Herzog 1998; for other important versions of this account, see Cott 1977; Bederman 1995).

In addition to subverting arguments others make to limit their roles, women have also been able to use small grants of power or standing within institutions to push for change. They have used the space others have given them or they have taken for themselves in elite institutions in creative ways. Harrison (1988) writes of the ways in which women developed strategies to ensure policies to aid women reached the federal agenda and to ensure the appointment of women in the federal bureaucracy. Katzenstein (1998) tells of strategies women developed to change conservative institutions from within. Freeman (2000) describes the approaches women invested in traditional party politics devised to make a space for power inside American political parties. And Andersen (1996) points to the changes wrought in the practice of electoral politics from the political incorporation of women. These works provide the grounding for new questions gender scholars could ask: Compared with other kinds of hierarchies, does gender make for an odd kind of integration into these spaces? If the focus were race and not gender, how would the story change? Does intimacy provide access? Does essentialism make it easy to keep some forms of institutional segregation alive?

Scholars believe that the sometimes surprising places where feminists find themselves make for a diffuse and potentially resilient movement (Boles 1994; Costain 1992; Katzenstein 1998). This has been true even inside American political parties, where women were active and influential well before women had the right to vote (Andersen 1996; Cott 1990; Edwards 1997; Freeman 2000; Harrison 1988; Harvey 1998; Higginbotham 1990). Their insider strategies often changed the relationship of the parties to political issues (like the ERA; see Harrison 1988; Freeman 1987), and these strategies almost always increased the representation of women in federal bureaucracies.

Consciousness has been an undependable resource for politics. While scholars have fine-tuned their measures of gender consciousness over time from Gurin's seminal work (1985) on gender consciousness through Tolleson Rinehart's important effort (1992) to tease ideology out of the measure of gender consciousness and Wong's efforts (1998) to compare measures of closeness to a range of different groups, scholars have had trouble demonstrating the impact of consciousness.[8] In recent years especially, they have had an easier time demonstrating that consciousness relates to policy preferences than to political action (Conover 1988; Conover and Sapiro 1993). While consciousness may channel political action (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001), it has been only unreliably connected to political participation since the early 1980s. Many scholars—using a range of measures differing in the details—find that the power of gender consciousness to generate action has waned over the last thirty years. In the 1970s, women's

8. Of course, consciousness has a long history in the study of race and class (for a discussion, see, for example, Elster 1985; Schlozman and Verba 1979; Verba and Nie 1972).

consciousness seemed to encourage political participation among women (Hansen, Franz, and Netemeyer-Mays 1976; Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997, 88–91; Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Klein 1984, 136; Tolleson Rinehart 1992, 134–139). Since then, no. And, when scholars have compared the power of Black consciousness with the power of gender consciousness to generate activism, they have gotten different results, sometimes finding that Black consciousness is especially important (Wilcox [1997], who found that gender consciousness did not make a difference) and sometimes not (Ardrey 1994). But Sigel (1996, 127) offers hope that scholars will pay more attention to the priority that members of a disadvantaged group give to their group membership. She argues that when scholars move to incorporate priority into their traditional measures of group consciousness, they will see much more clearly the role of group consciousness in shaping a range of outcomes. In a related fashion, I. M. Young (1994) suggests we look for mechanisms that trigger consciousness, that U.S. women may not wear their consciousness on their sleeves (see, as well, Tolleson Rinehart 1992; Sapiro and Conover 1997). Dawson (2001) develops promising new tools for examining Black feminist consciousness. Work in psychology has continued to refine measures of gender consciousness (Henderson-King and Stewart 1994) and offers guidance here as well. It would be helpful to understand more thoroughly whether gender consciousness takes a different form than race consciousness. What trouble does intimacy make for conceptions of linked fate?

The existing work on consciousness and the changing results over time—changes that seem more connected with the year the data were collected than with the method employed by the researcher—suggest a dynamic account of consciousness, one that links elite mobilization to mass participation and that draws more heavily on notions of political opportunity (Tarrow 1994; see Sapiro and Conover 1997). We have important beginnings of this argument in Costain 1992, Conover and Gray 1983, Klein 1984, and Katzenstein and Mueller 1987. One could go even farther to develop a rich account of the incentives and actions of elites and their consequences for citizen behavior, perhaps along the lines of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) or Kollman (1998). Harvey (1998) does some of this, but, though she alludes to citizen behavior, her work and her evidence are concentrated at the elite level.

Gender identity is clearly at home in, comfortably articulated with, a whole range of social movements. Of course, Goffman could have told us that. Gender-identified women are at home in the Klan and can develop a perfectly sensible account of why women's values belong in the Klan (Blee 1991) (*and* they use surprising indigenous institutions like the Quaker Church to develop the base for Klan organizing). Because women sometimes buy into hierarchical accounts of gender, through the cooptation Jackman (1994) describes or the accommodation Sigel (1996) points to, this malleability—this fit of gender identity with many different kinds of movements—is perhaps not surprising (Tolleson Rinehart's work [1992] to pull ideology from gender identity moves in exactly this direction). As a consequence of this malleability, elites have been able to exploit gender identity for their own ends, in the ways Harvey (1998) suggests, as a kind of campaign slogan parties learned how to use, or in the ways Bonk (1988) points to, in which women are seen by politicians as a kind of infinitely redescribable, recombinable, redividable group.

Women's marginal political space has sometimes provided the impetus for expanding Americans' political repertoire (Tilly 1986). Flexner (1975) describes women's successful work to modernize lobbying strategies in order to win Woman Suffrage. Charles Payne (1995) tells of the ways in which women were shunned as public spokespersons for the Civil Rights movement but, in the face of these barriers, used their skills to develop new, tremendously successful, grassroots strategies for the movement. Katzenstein (1998) takes up this topic as well and arrives at an account of discursive strategies of women in the Catholic Church. Kollman discusses the ways groups like the National Organization for Women (NOW) have tried to shape public opinion, hoping that "Public legitimacy for policies [NOW proposes] . . . will follow the group's activities rather than precede them" (1998, 108). Freedman (1999) analyses the consequences of the campaigns pro-choice and pro-life groups wage, in Freedman's words, to "manipulate ambivalence," that is, to build legitimacy for their side among those who don't yet know their own minds. And Dawson (2001) provides evidence of the emerging payoffs to the discursive strategies Black feminists are pursuing within the academy.

The work on gender and social movements has explored—powerfully—the ways in which women have and haven't been able to rely on social movements to create political change, the special forms women's activism has taken, the special strategies women's activism has employed, and why. The picture that emerges from this literature taken as a whole is of the creative potential embedded in the just-marginal position of women with respect to the political system. This literature can do more, now, to develop accounts of comparative hierarchies within and across social movements, to think about the comparative study of intersectionality, to ask what exactly is special about gender.

PUBLIC OPINION

The literature on gender and public opinion has been consumed—more than the literature on social movements—by a focus on difference. The best work has looked at difference in the context of theoretical accounts of women, men, and gender taken together. Though it's been closer to the individualistic core of the discipline, this literature has only just started to struggle with the tension between individuals and categories.

Scholars have carefully mapped the terrain on which there is a gender gap in opinion on political issues (Frankovic 1982; Goertzel 1983; Klein

1985; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Conover 1988; Kenski 1988; Miller 1988; Welch and Sigelman 1989; Bendyna and Lake 1994; Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997; Norris 1985; on local political issues, Schumaker and Burns 1988; Burns and Schumaker 1987). For the past two decades, women have been more Democratic than men. And they've consistently supported welfare policies and opposed international aggression and the use of violence somewhat more than men. At the local level, men have been more supportive of economic growth, and women more supportive of public welfare and neighborhood protection, though the differences are larger among policymakers and activists than among citizens (Schumaker and Burns 1988, 1080). The places where there has been no gap are less surprising in light of the work of Tolleson Rinehart (1992) and Sigel (1996) demonstrating the tremendous variability in women's views of their own roles: there have been no aggregate differences of opinion on abortion, women's rights, or the Equal Rights Amendment (Craig and O'Brien 1993; Ladd and Bowman 1997). Scholars—worried that the literature has gotten caught up in an essentialized account of gender—have emphasized that, where there are differences, "they are certainly not large enough to warrant making the kinds of sweeping statements differentiating women and men that have long been part of stereotype" (Conover and Sapiro 1993, 1095).

We know something as well about the ways in which women and men prioritize issues. Recent work has begun to explore women's and men's political priorities (Paolino 1995; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Sapiro and Conover 1997; Dolan 1998), sometimes looking at the connections between salience and vote choice in general and sometimes exploring the link between support for women candidates and salience. In the general models, it seems as if women and men do sometimes find different issues salient when they make political choices, though the results are still murky. The most-intriguing result is that "women are considerably less likely than men to cast egocentric economic votes, but are as likely, or perhaps more so, to cast sociotropic economic votes" (Welch and Hibbing 1992, 197). The results are clearer when the focus is on support for women candidates; women sometimes weight issues such as parental leave and their own views on feminism more heavily in these vote choices (Paolino 1995; Dolan 1998), though there is more work to do here to develop a richer theoretical account (see the important beginnings to do just that in Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Results from the participation literature also suggest that women and men may sometimes prioritize issues somewhat differently. When scholars ask people about the issues on which they participate, they find that, while the bundles of issues on which women and men participate are remarkably similar, there are a few issues on which women are more active than men—education and abortion—and a few on which men are more active than women—taxes and foreign policy (Schlozman, Burns, Verba, and Donohue 1995). Interestingly, women's greater activism on abortion (in data taken in 1990) comes from women opposed to abortion. In addition, disadvantaged women much more than disadvantaged men are active on issues of basic human needs and crime and drugs (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). And, scholars suggest, gender conscious women's participation *is* different from other women's in its focus on gender-related issues (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). In one other way, scholars have looked at the differences between women and men in terms of political priorities; they have compared how thought-out, how elaborated, women's and men's views are about political and social issues surrounding gender. What they have found is that men seem much less engaged with the topic of gender than are women (Sigel 1996).

What are the roots of these differences in opinion? What conceptual tools have we used to think about this question? The classic piece on this topic is Luker's compelling portrait (1984) of the worldviews of pro-choice and pro-life activists. Luker developed an argument about the opinion ingredients (Kinder and Sanders 1996) of abortion views. To her mind, views on abortion are intimately tied with "beliefs about the roles of the sexes, about the meaning of parenthood, and about human nature" (1984, 158; see, too, the accounts in Mathews and DeHart 1990; Mansbridge 1986; and Klatch 1987). Scholars have built on the foundation Luker provided to think about other forms of gender-based opinion ingredients, and they have asked whether men's and women's opinions are similarly structured. They have explored group differences in the links between feminism and ideas about motherhood, comparing groups of African American women activists with groups of white women activists and finding that some African American women activists are more comfortable with putting motherhood at the center of their feminism than are some white women activists (Polatnick 1996). They have explored the possibility that maternal thinking might offer special guidance to opinion (Ruddick 1989). With the data available, it looks like the answer is no (Sapiro and Conover 1997). They have investigated the possibility that women with feminist or gender consciousness might be more supportive of the Democratic Party, abortion rights, women's rights, or the ERA and more opposed to violence; in general, the answer here seems to be yes (Carroll 1988; Conover 1988; Sapiro and Conover 1997; Tolleson Rinehart 1992). They have begun to explore the possibility that context itself can make feminist consciousness more relevant for individual-level opinion for some people some times (Sapiro and Conover 1997). Some scholars have focused on men's social welfare attitudes and the extent to which it is those attitudes which generate much of the gender gap in partisan identification and vote choice (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). By building accounts based on heterogeneity and its link to specific processes, this part of the public opinion literature has begun to offer hints about how to work out an accommodation with individualism.

There have been more fleeting efforts to examine the other side of this question, the consequences of *sexism* as opposed to gender consciousness for public opinion. There are hints of this in Tolleson Rinehart's examination (1992) of the consequences of traditional views on gender for policy views and more than hints in Sanbonmatsu's effort (2000) to measure gender stereotypes and to assess their consequences for vote choice. Jackman (1994) offers one of the few accounts of the ways aspects of sexism shape public opinion. Her aggregate-level analysis, combined with the increasingly rich psychological literature on varieties of sexism (see the helpful review in Deaux and LaFrance 1998), provides the foundation for exploring this issue at the individual level. Jackman (1994) makes a strong claim that sexism in the United States is carried out more through paternalism than through coercion and hostility; Sigel's (1996) data on women's accommodation to inequality provides some supporting evidence. Using aggregate analysis, Jackman (1994) argues that, even among men, sexism is not much about hostility. In psychology and at the individual level, the story looks more complicated (see, especially, Glick and Fiske 1996). This emerging—and extremely promising—part of the literature would do well to look at the ways scholars have studied racism and public opinion.

The literature on gender and public opinion has tremendous potential for growth, as scholars take up the comparative study of hierarchies, drawing lessons from and developing comparisons with the rich and varied ways scholars have explored the connections between racial thought and public opinion and as scholars spend more time in literatures in other fields—like psychology—where scholars have developed a wide range of theoretical tools to use to think about thinking about gender. These other fields offer mechanisms that political scientists can use to think systematically about the variability of gender.

PARTICIPATION AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

The literature on gender and participation, too, has focused on difference, on the gap between women and men. However, the literature has been less centered on charting the terrain of difference and more concerned with explaining the gap. As a consequence, this literature has grappled more often with variability among women and men.

With respect to political participation, scholarly analyses of gender and political activity have reported small but persistent sex differences in overall levels of political activity. This small gender gap in participation is, it seems, narrower in the United States than in other countries (Christy 1987; Verba, Nie, Kim, and Shabad 1978). Scholars have been developing a mostly structural story of constraint, located in institutions outside of politics.

Scholars have offered four major explanations for women's slightly lower levels of political participation in the United States—all centered on the heterogeneous but systematic ways gender structures individual lives. First, scholars have suggested that the difference is a consequence of resource disparities between women and men. Earlier work focused on income and education (Welch 1977); later work looked at a wider array of resources, ranging from institutionally acquired skills to free time to the control of money at home (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 1997, 2001). Second, scholars thought that women might participate at lower levels than men because marriage, motherhood, and homemaking socialize women out of politics (Andersen 1975; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Sapiro 1983; Welch 1977). Third, scholars have asked whether childhood socialization depresses women's political involvement (Welch 1977). Finally, scholars have examined the role of perspectives on gender roles as a cause of political activity; this explanation is often linked to adult or childhood socialization (Clark and Clark 1986; Sapiro 1983; Tolleson Rinehart 1992).

The cumulative results of the investigations of these hypotheses have been mixed. Women's employment mattered in the earlier investigations (Andersen 1975; Welch 1977); it seemed to matter less or have mixed effects in later investigations (Beckwith 1986; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Tolleson Rinehart 1992). Education has almost always helped women; however, the gender-based education differential has been persistently narrowing (Welch 1977). At times ideology mattered, with liberal, less traditional, or more gender conscious women participating at higher levels (Andersen 1975; Clark and Clark 1986; Sapiro 1983; Tolleson Rinehart 1992). Under some conditions, women's roles have influenced their political involvements (Clark and Clark 1986; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Sapiro 1983).

Early scholars yearned for data on the details of institutional experiences, especially for details about the workplace, in order to move farther from the dichotomy of gender and toward a differentiated view of the processes that come to make sex matter (Andersen and Cook 1985, 622). These scholars built a field by creatively and opportunistically making do with the data available on employment, housewife status, parenthood, marriage, education, beliefs about women's place, and gender consciousness to test complex theoretical ideas about the relationship between gender and political participation. With the advent of data sets containing much more detail on experiences in the workplace and in the family, scholars have been able to broaden their investigations to examine more fully the mechanisms that link gender with political involvement (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). They have been able to ask, in more detail, whether and how inequality at home shapes political participation. They found that division of labor doesn't seem to matter directly. For women, what does seem to matter is participating in the process of decision making within the family, and for men, what matters, alas, is being in control at home (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 1997, 2001).

In the end, the current account on the table is one of small cumulative differences in resources growing out of a host of institutions, in childhood and in adulthood. Women have access to lower levels of education and income. But they are also tremendously disadvantaged—and men are tremendously advantaged—by the ways gender links the home and the workplace, putting men in and keeping more than a few women out of the workplace. The workplace goes further than that to disadvantage women; in particular, workplaces allocate their benefits—money, politically relevant skills, and mobilization—on the basis of gender. Marital status and children do not have a direct impact on political participation in the cross-section, but they do have an indirect effect. For women, the indirect effect comes largely from the ways large-scale division of labor at home keeps some women with small children out of the workforce. For men, the indirect effects come from advantages to men, advantages that come from the ways children encourage men's workforce *and* religious participation. The story has come to center on the way gender links institutions and on the centrality of gender to institutions outside of politics. And in so doing, this literature has moved to an accommodation with categorical analysis.

That the roots of political life should rest, in part, in nonpolitical civic life comes as no surprise. Women have, of course, been involved in nonpolitical civic life for a very long time. And their movement between civic spaces has been well documented in the literature (Cott 1977; Davis 1981; Giddings 1984; Greenberg 2001; Harris 1999; Lerner 1979; Scott 1984). These nonpolitical civic spaces have often provided the skills and mobilization to bring women (and men) to politics (Tate 1991, 1994; Harris 1999; Walton 1985).

With all of this work, puzzles remain. The first is that of women's low psychological involvement with politics. Evidence of these lower levels of psychological involvement with politics is all around us (Andersen 1975; Baxter and Lansing 1983; Beckwith 1986; Bennett and Bennett 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993, 1996; Rapoport 1982, 1985; Sapiro 1983; Soule and McGrath 1977; Tolleson Rinehart 1992). The most successful recent efforts to understand women's lower levels of political engagement have turned to look at politics itself, at the paucity of elite women in politics, especially. Through both longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses, these efforts have suggested that the presence of women in visible political positions engages women citizens (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Hansen 1997; Sapiro and Conover 1997). McDermott (1997) makes a compelling case for the role candidate gender plays in low-information elections, demonstrating the power candidate gender has in shaping vote choice when citizens know little about a candidate. And Huddy and Terkildsen (1993) explore the traits and issue competencies that women and men have in mind when faced with cues from candidate gender; their work suggests that traits—such as compassion and trustworthiness—might be at the center of people's interpretation of gender in the electoral context (see, too, Kahn 1992). Stenner (2001) goes farther than this to show that women confronted with strong female candidates gain self-esteem and self-confidence. This self-esteem and confidence lead to an increase in their political knowledge and interest. In Stenner's experiments, men experience exactly the opposite outcome when faced with strong women candidates: they tune out. Work by Kahn suggests that the media has historically covered women candidates less well than men candidates (Kahn 1994a) and that this difference in coverage may make women candidates seem less viable (Kahn 1992, 1994a).

This line of work offers increasingly tight linkages to the psychological literatures that can provide guidance about the mechanisms that might enable women candidates to engage women (and possibly disengage men) with the political system, mechanisms that move the literature to a clearer view of contingency and variability. In addition, because the gap in engagement appears to open well before women and men are settled into adulthood, we'll want to turn back to consider childhood. With the theoretical tools I mentioned earlier, we can develop a contingent account of gender and childhood socialization to politics.

Another puzzle centers on the comparative study of gender and political action. There is very little work developing the theoretical and empirical bases for a comparative and intersectional account of women's and men's participation. Consider, for example, Asian-American women's political participation. As Junn has pointed out using aggregate analysis, basic resource-based models of the constraints on political action—models focusing on education and income—seem to do a poor job of accounting for Asian-American women's levels of political activity (Junn 1997). Consider, as well, the work of scholars studying Arab-American women's political action (Lin and Jamal 1998), demonstrating the consequences of the organization of Arab-American interest groups for women's and men's political action. There are hints about how a fully comparative analysis would go: building on the emerging literature on African American women's and Latinas' political activity (Ardrey 1994; Baxter and Lansing 1983; Fulenwider 1981; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Harmon-Martin 1994; Welch and Secret 1981), Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) suggest that the constraints many African American women and Latinas face are located in the institutions outside of politics. Inequality, they suggest, accumulates for these women almost everywhere, in almost every institution, sometimes along lines of gender (treating most women in these groups in more or less similar ways), sometimes along the lines of race or ethnicity, always along the lines of class, and sometimes in inventive combinations. The one clear exception to this story comes from the participatory benefits religious institutions provide to African American women's political action. Payne's work (1995) on the early, rural Civil Rights Movement also has things to offer here: pointing (as do Lin and Jamal 1998) to the incentive structures embedded in social organization, to the central role of surprising networks, and to the problem for African American women's activism that arises when actors outside the movement assume that women can't be leaders and go in search of African American men to speak for the movement.

Scholars in this literature have started to build the links between individuals and institutions, to build accounts of structure and agency together. And the task for scholars, now, is to develop an account of these linkages in a way that takes better account of comparative hierarchies and comparative intersectionality. This will be easier to do the more scholars ground their analyses in the mechanisms and processes offered up by other disciplines.

CANDIDATES

The literature on candidates for political office has been focused largely on the disadvantages women face in the electoral process, and as a consequence has remained focused on the contours of the aggregate differences between women and men.

Women have taken different paths to political office than men, paths that are more likely to travel through voluntary organizations or teaching careers than through law offices or businesses (Burrell 1994; Carroll 1985; Duerst-Lahti 1998; Gertzog 1995; Kirkpatrick 1974), though there are hints that this may be changing (Dolan and Ford 1997). And, historically, women ran for their first political office later in life than did men (Stoper 1977); recent analyses suggest that this practice continues (Burrell 1994). Early on, scholars redirected concern away from women's choices and focused on problems at the level of the political system. They found that women's lower levels of recruitment to office had to do less with whether there were pools of eligible women and much more to do with the strategies parties pursued to recruit candidates. Where parties used male networks for recruiting, not surprisingly, they found male candidates (Rule 1981). Carroll (1985) broadened this system-level examination considerably to find the problems women had with access to campaign money, incumbency, and the rareness of open seats. Burrell's recent work (1994) examines House candidates and worries, especially, about the numbers (low, to her mind) of women choosing to run for political office. She finds that political parties, more recently, have been especially welcoming of women candidates, that the gap in fundraising has closed and perhaps reversed, with women candidates in the 1990s often receiving more money than their male counterparts. But, as Burrell points out, "Money is still a problem since so few women have been able to run as incumbents" (1994, 128).

In a promising line of work, scholars have looked at another feature of the electoral system, multimember districts. They found that these districts were especially good for black and Anglo-white women's recruitment and election (Carroll 1985; Rule 1990, 1992). When scholars looked cross-nationally, however, the results were not nearly as crisp as in examinations that had focussed solely on the United States (Welch and Studlar 1990). At the local level, things remain murky as well. Some scholarship points to the very different structural features underlying African American men's and women's election to local office, focusing especially on the advantages district-based elections give to men and not to women (Karnig and Welch 1979; see, too, Welch and Herrick 1992). MacManus and Bullock (1989), however, could find only fleeting influences of electoral structure on election of women to office. Scholars usually find that women have an easier time getting access when the office is less desirable (Diamond 1977; Welch and Karnig 1979).[9] In the end, as Carroll put it, "Barriers in the political opportunity structure affect the recruitment of women candidates, reduce their probability of winning election, and constrain their future officeholding aspirations" (1985, 157). Given the growth in the literatures on such topics outside of the subfield, it may be time to revisit this question, with new ideas about the mechanisms through which these institutions operate.

POLICYMAKERS

Scholars in this literature have been especially interested in two questions: whether women change legislative processes and whether women face discrimination in legislatures.

How much do the differences between women and men rest in the institutional spaces and positions of power in which they find themselves? Fowlkes, Perkins, and Tolleson Rinehart took up this question in 1979 in their investigation of motivation and roles among party activists:

> [We] encourage a closer and more general examination of the political structures in which men and women operate. The actual mechanisms by which party context affects organizational orientations and behavior are yet to be determined. The parties may attract people of different backgrounds and expectations, or the organizational setting and its political environment may mold and shape party recruits. (1979, 780)

While studies have continued to find some differences in political ambition and expectations (Kirkpatrick 1976; Constantini and Bell 1981; Jennings and Farah 1981) and differences in goals (with women somewhat more interested in problem solving than in conflict) (Constantini and Craik 1977; Kirkpatrick 1974), scholars are increasingly likely to consider the intersection of context and gender, and increasingly likely to locate explanations away from women's and men's choices and in the institutional spaces in which women and men find themselves.

Women policymakers often have different policy priorities than men (Thomas 1994; Kelly, Saint-Germain, and Horn 1991; Welch and Thomas 1991; Mandel and Dodson 1992; Mezey 1994; Rosenthal 1998; Saint-Germain 1989; Schumaker and Burns 1988). Sometimes women understand the causes and consequences of problems differently than men

9. For a helpful review of this literature, see Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994.

(Kathlene 1995a). And women often consider one of their jobs to be representing women (Burrell 1994; Tamerius 1995; Thomas 1991; Bratton and Haynie 1999). In creative combinations of theory on gender with theory on legislatures, Thomas and Welch (1991) find that women state legislators prioritize bills on children and family more than men and that they are "proudest of [the] advance of women's issues" (1991, 452) and Tamerius (1995) finds that women legislators act on their priorities: they give more speeches on feminist concerns, cosponsor more feminist legislation, and sponsor more feminist legislation than their male counterparts. Jennings suggests that African American women mayors pay more attention to issues of basic human need than other mayors (Jennings 1991).

Women's sometimes distinctive priorities are easier for women to enact when there are other women in office and where there is a women's caucus to provide continuing organization and support (Thomas 1991). Norton (1995) points out that these priorities are also easier to enact when women hold positions of power on the appropriate committees and subcommittees. Schumaker and Burns suggest that structural biases in local government—especially the overwhelming structural push for economic development—mean that, at the local level, the preferences of women policymakers and activists are much less likely to win than those of men, and their analyses suggest that "the participation of more women, greater depth of involvement by women, and greater involvement in stronger groups by women does not significantly increase the impact of women on the resolution of community issues" (1988, 1091). Flammang (1987), too, finds that, at the local level, perhaps because of the structural features Schumaker and Burns identify, women in positions of power have trouble turning their priorities into policy. Bratton and Haynie (1999) find that, at the state level, bills introduced by women in state legislatures are as likely to pass as those introduced by men.

Scholars have paid attention to other features of the claim that institutional position conditions political voice. Reingold (1996, 2000) finds that women and men use quite similar legislative strategies to get their jobs done; she suggests that, as much organization theory would argue, institutional norms dominate any individual differences in opinions or goals. Interestingly, Schlozman (1990) and Nownes and Freeman (1998) find exactly the same pattern when they compare women and men lobbyists: they use indistinguishable strategies, though their priorities are different. Harvey (1998) applies this insight to postsuffrage gender politics. Harvey's account suggested that postsuffrage women activists were less committed to a particular brand of politics than they were to winning (Harvey 1998). In the end, this work suggests we attend even more systematically to the institutional space in which women and men policymakers operate—to the details of the institutions of legislatures and city councils and bureaucracies and to the sometimes structural limitations on levels of government. In the most inventive effort I know of to do just this, Mettler points to the structural limits on women's policy successes that grew out of the New Deal, "as programs geared toward men became nationally administered programs and those aimed toward women retained state-level authority. What emerges as truly exceptional about the construction of the welfare state in the New Deal, then, is that citizens became divided by gender between two different sovereignties that govern in very different ways" (1998, 19).[10]

Scholars have also investigated whether gender shows up in interactions to undercut women's authority, after women have gained access to institutions, after they've gained positions of power. This sort of investigation suggests a form of gender that's more free floating, less tied to particular institutions or positions of power. When Kathlene (1994, 1995b) examined interactions in twelve state legislative committee hearings, she found that women in positions of leadership used different styles than men did, and, especially when women were in positions of leadership, men reacted in verbally aggressive ways. She argued that, at least in these legislative committees, access and position didn't translate into equal power for women (Kathlene 1994). Examining the 1990 hearings on the nomination of David Souter to the Supreme Court, Mattei (1998) found that men interrupted witnesses who were women more often than they interrupted men, questioned women more on issues of fact, and challenged women's claims more often than they challenged men's. The differences in effect on policy, then, may be in more subtle details of policy than scholars have examined thus far.

These literatures on candidates and policymakers have made important advances in recent years. There are new places to take these literatures. They could be more fully integrated with the innovative work coming out now on gender and political parties (Wolbrecht 2000). They could be linked more tightly to the formal literatures on electoral systems. They could be tied, even more than they already have been, to work on mass politics and to work on interest group networks. These literatures should be a valuable site for building the link between theories about institutions and theories about individuals.

■ | Conclusion

With this review in hand, what are my hopes for the future? That gender scholars within political science become more self-conscious about the systematic ways gender as a social category, as a principle of social organization, is different from other principles of social organization. That gender scholars push farther to develop methodological tools to carry their rich understandings of gender to individual-level data, where the tension be-

10. For a different account of the interaction between federalism and gender, see Skocpol 1992.

tween categories and the discipline of political science is acute. That gender scholars take advantage of the gains from explicit comparative analysis among women and men, groups of women, groups of men, always. And that political science take lessons from gender scholars about interlocking life spaces, about where to look for the residues of hierarchy in individual-level data, about the care with which one should treat choices and constraints, about political repertoires, and much more.

To return to an earlier theme, the field is in an enormously promising position, with theory, data, method, cumulative knowledge, and questions in hand. We are at a kind of beginning, I think, with much of the crucial struggle for legitimacy—and the discursive work that required—behind us. Work on gender in other disciplines—history and psychology and sociology come to mind—moved perhaps more quickly past the struggle for legitimacy. These fields have tools and approaches we could put to good use in ours. We've started to do that. There's more to do. And there always will be. Work on the complicated and subtle implications of gender in peoples' lives, in public life, and in institutional life requires serious interdisciplinarity.

Michael C. Dawson and Cathy Cohen

Problems in the Study of the Politics of Race

Introduction

The study of the impact of race *on* politics is overdue for reinvigoration. While contributions to our understanding of racial politics continue to be made, some important lines of research have become stagnant. For example, daily we learn more about the racial attitudes, voting patterns, and policy opinions of whites and African Americans in particular. Often left unexplored, however, in such analyses are the differences in opinion and behavior that exist within groups. Furthermore, we have little understanding of how such differences map onto the politics of communities, not just the individual acts of people within certain socially imposed groupings but the ways in which those acts are read collectively as manifesting some community consciousness, identity, and politics.

Part of the reason for our unequal levels of information regarding racial politics in the United States is political science's excessive reliance on the discipline of economics as a source of methodological and theoretical inspiration as well as our constant emphasis on the individual level of analysis. This dependence has led to the emergence of dominant methodological approaches in political science, rooted in the use of economic modeling and the individual as the unit of analysis. These problems are exacerbated by the high degree of fragmentation found within the study of racial politics. The fragmentation is found along a variety of fissures. One fissure is between both positive and normative theory on one hand and empirical studies on the other. Thus, rarely are we confronted with work on race and politics that engages important normative theories and concepts like justice, equality, or democracy through a lens informed by careful empirical work. Another fissure corresponds to the race of researchers. Political scientists of different races largely pursue different research agendas and often different methodological approaches as well. The absence of significant comparative studies—except the relatively small number of studies that compare whites and African Americans—across racial and ethnic groups and across historical periods means that we loose the superior insight that is likely to be garnered from studies that are explicitly comparative at least in their theoretical perspective if not in each empirical research endeavor.

Our task is to address fragmentation and other problems that afflict the field of race and politics. We emphasize the need for a firm theoretical foundation on which to conduct empirical research as well as research directions we believe to be promising. One central theme that extends throughout this essay is the need to understand the process of racialization and racial orderings throughout history and from the perspective of different racial and ethnic groups. More often than not political science seems oblivious to the different methods, times, and reasons groups become racialized subjects. Further, the dynamic trajectory of racial ordering and its consequences for not only policy areas such as immigration but also the evolution of state operations and orientations seems noticeably absent from our analyses. Exploring the historical and specific processes of racialization should provide greater insight into such staples of political science inquiry as electoral realignment, public opinion shifts, and interest group proliferation.

Another focus of our analysis will be on the need to reinvigorate the study of race and politics by highlighting the intersections of race with other "ascriptively" based social cleavages. Sociology, for example, has long profited from the study of race and class. William Julius Wilson's work for all the controversy it has sparked over the past two decades has been enormously influential in shaping the research agenda of a significant portion of the social sciences. This influence is in no small part due to his focus on the intersection of race and class in American politics and society. Both the *Declining Significance of Race* (1980) and *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987) had the intersection of race and class as their central problem. Similarly, legal theorists such as Kimberle Crenshaw (1990) owe the power of their work in part to their rigorous focus on the importance of the intersection of race and gender. Within political science, Cathy Cohen's work (1999) similarly draws its authority from its probing of the intersection of race and sexuality in her study of the politics of AIDS in black communities. We believe that the study of race and politics must move toward greater investigation of the intersections of forms of subordination as well as the intersection of the concerns of political science with those of the other social sciences.

We begin this essay with a brief overview of a theoretical framework for understanding racial dynamics within the United States, that of racial ordering. We follow that discussion with a cursory examination of some of the major areas of contributions that continue to be made in the study of race and politics. Several problems in both theoretical and empirical research will then be discussed. The main emphasis, however, will be on working through several examples of areas of research that might help revitalize the research agenda in race and politics. Finally, we argue that forging a strong link between normative and positive political theory and empirical studies of race will be critical to reinvigorating the study of race. To keep the discussion manageable, we limit our discussion to research in the United States though one of the more vigorous areas of current research is the comparative study of race and politics.

Theoretical and Empirical Problems in the Study of Race

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

This essay was originally titled "Ascription and Social Changes," which is of course both too vague and too massive. We initially decided on the title because so much of the literature dealing with the process of racialization and categorization in the United States has centered on how people of color have been ascribed behaviors and attributes meant to justify their secondary position. A close examination of the literature dealing with race and politics, especially that originating from political scientists, however, suggests that far from examining the social processes that racialize, categorize, and constrain the life opportunities of different groupings of people in this country, largely people of color, most of this work has focused on individual manifestations of political differences that correlate with visible and self-identified racial differences.[1] Most of this literature takes racial categories as a given as well as the resulting ordering of occupants within these hierachcical categories. Ignored are the historical and social contexts through which the complicated processes of racialization and categorization utilized in this country have developed and evolved.

Webster's defines *ascription* as:

> 1. The act of ascribing: attribution 2. Arbitrary placement in a particular social status (Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 9th ed., 109)

The benefit of using ascription, as defined by Webster, as a central concept to describe the process of racial classification in the United States is that it allows us to underscore the social processes or construction of racial categories. Furthermore, the inclusion of *arbitrary* in the definition, which is not to be confused with random, reminds us of the willed placement of groups within categories and for reasons having little or nothing to

1. One work that explicitly undertakes a massive study of race and other forms of ascription in American political development is Rogers Smith's 1997 *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in American History*.

do with biology. This seems to be a fact that political science has forgotten, hidden perniciously by excessive focus on the individual as the unit of analysis to the exclusion of all other candidates. Most social scientists and biologists reject biological deterministic explanations of racial classification, recognizing racial classifications or orderings as the clear product of social processes. From this perspective, emphasis is placed on the actions of elites and segments of the state in creating, imposing, and justifying racial and ethnic orderings meant to privilege and protect those with power. This process of classification is, of course, a dynamic one, where categories expand and subdivide over the years with a changing political economy.

Thus, to better understand the process of racial classification and its consequences for politics in this country, political scientists and other scholars must move away from individualist models where respondents and their political views and actions are examined or counted independent of the historical and social context in which their racial and ethnic identities are given meaning. Similarly, we must move away from models where the aggregate of individuals within an out-group, such as the percentage of African Americans, is plugged into the equation as the experience of the entire group or the threat posed to other groups. Without any attention to the historical and current context of these interactions or phenomena we may be severely misinterpreting the meaning of the data. Instead, we must utilize frameworks that acknowledge the processes of racialization and categorization that are embedded in social interactions where groups are assigned places within changing social structures. These structures are tightly rooted in but not completely defined by the political economy. This theoretical conception of race as produced by and part of social, political, and economic structures will enable political scientists to better understand key phenomena such as preference formation and perceptions of individual and group interests.

There are, of course, many competing definitions of social processes and social systems that might be employed for an analysis of racialization and racial categorization. One that we believe to be helpful is that of William Sewell (1992). For Sewell a social structure, and there are many that comprise our lived experience, is defined by a distribution of material resources and an associated schema. Labor markets, for example, fit Sewell's definition of a social structure. Labor markets hierarchically distribute jobs and wages (among other things) across industries, firms, regions, individuals, and social groups. On the schema side, labor markets are associated with normative behaviors and roles which must be abided by if one wants to participate, statuses which vary across occupations, expectations of appropriate levels of certification or credentials for a given location within the market, and other scripts which signal and communicate appropriate interactions and actions. Our contention is that the best way to understand racial groups, particularly as differentiated from ethnic groups, is that the former are associated with a social structure where race is the organizing principle for distribution of material and psychological resources as well as a racial schema which assigns roles, scripts, behaviors, expectations, stereotypes, and normative evaluations based on citizens' racial assignment. One key aspect of racial structure in the United States, we and others contend, is that it contains a racial hierarchy that orders not only status and honor but distributions of life chances as well. In short, there is a racial order within the United States that structures and is structured by not only American society but also American politics, political institutions, and the state.

Tom Holt argues, in his book *The Problem of Race in the 21st Century* (2000), that racial orders must be understood within their historical context. Holt divides the history of the United States into three periods, each characterized by a modal organization of the nation's political economy. Fairly typically he divides U.S. history into three modal periods; pre-Fordist, Fordist, and post-Fordist. During the pre-Fordist period, slavery and its immediate aftermath, marked by Reconstruction, forged the dynamics and structural logic of the racial order. Jim Crow racism, where blacks were partly integrated into the bottom of the industrial economy but were neither full participants in either the polity or civil society, predominated during most of the Fordist era.[2] It was also during this era that Holt identifies organized industrial manufacturing as the central dynamic motor and organizing principle within the economy. A much more complicated racial dynamic has evolved alongside the service and high-tech centered economy of the post-Fordist era according to Holt.

Holt argues that while the "tropes" of racial ideology are fairly constant, the "repertoire of practices" varies over historical periods. In other words, two phenomena stay fairly constant. First, the ordering of the racial structure has remained relatively impervious to change with the twin anchors of whites on top and blacks at or near the bottom remaining constant throughout all three periods. The contestation in the middle has been about who does not get lumped with blacks. For example, middle-class blacks, immigrants of Asian and Latino/a descent, as well as various central and southern Europeans and Irish, have all gone to great lengths to distance themselves from either blacks in general or poor or working class blacks specifically during different historical periods. Claire Kim describes this process as the "minorization of immigrants" (2000, 36).

Second, just as the main contours of the racial order have remained

2. Some works which outline the racial ordering of various types of good within the United States up to and including life chances are Farley and Allen's *Color Line* (1989) and Oliver and Shapiro's *Race and Wealth* (1995). Many other works document these differences across a wide range of domains. For example, enormous racial differences continue in the twenty-first century in health outcomes, wealth, labor market participation, and perceived status, just to name a few categories.

constant so too have the stereotypes associated with African Americans. Some of the main features of this demonized imagery include blacks being stereotyped generally as lazy, dependent on the state, less intelligent, and prone toward criminality. While black men are constructed as dangerous and rapacious and black women are construed as lewd and domineering. What has changed across historical epochs argues Holt have been the racial practices used by the state and its citizenry to maintain the racial order. Thus, fundamental to understanding the racial social structure in the United States is recognizing the consistency and resiliency of this structuring framework. So while the practices for managing racialized subjects evolve, the general ordering and justification remains largely unmoved, in particular for those African Americans on the bottom. Racialization, thus, comes to have a near totalizing effect on the lived experience of African Americans, intersecting and transforming all other identities and social locations. One important implication argues Holt is that "Racism colonizes other categories and concepts—like economic rationality and justice and notions of values and entitlement" (2000, 76). Higginbotham's exhortation to feminist historians a decade earlier to beware how race "colonizes" other categories is equally applicable to political scientists who study race:

> Feminist scholars, especially those of African-American women's history, must accept the challenge to bring race more prominently into theories and analyses of power. The explication of race entails three interrelated strategies, separated here merely for the sake of analysis. First of all, we must define the construction and "technologies" of race as well as those of gender and sexuality. Second, we must expose the role of race as a metalanguage by calling attention to its powerful, all-encompassing effect on the construction and representation of other social and power relations, namely, gender, class, and sexuality. Third, we must recognize race as providing site of dialogic exchange and contestation, since race has constituted a discursive tool for both oppression and liberation. (1992, 252)

We must remember that when Holt and Higginbotham write of the colonizing effect of race, there is also an inherent recognition of the ways in which race interacts with other categories of social organization such as gender, class, and sexuality to produce different racialized experiences for members of the same racial and ethnic group. This claim by Holt and Higginbotham about the colonizing or totalizing effects of racialization and racism leads to several important questions, at least two of which are particularly significant for political science. First, is he right? Has the ordering and tropes of racial groups remained relatively constant over time, creating a fairly permanent and resistant social structure? And second, if he is even partially right, what are the implications for theoretical and empirical research in political science? Will such a social structure be the means through which an ordering of preferences, lived experience, and consciousness is formed and shaped for those of different racial and ethnic categories? While sociologists, historians, and economists may have more to say about the empirical validity of Holt's claims than political scientists, the latter certainly have a significant amount to contribute to the second set of investigations.

If Holt is right, and the evidence political scientists provide could well prove important, then political preference formation should not only be racialized but be fundamentally anchored in racial considerations. If Holt is right, we should observe racially distinguishable outcomes produced by the institutions of the state. If Holt is right, we should see individuals perceive self-interest in racial terms. If Holt is right, empirical democratic theorists and students of American political development should observe, as do political theorists such as Judith Shklar and Rogers Smith as well as historians such as Eric Arnesen, (white) "American" conceptualizations of citizenship being tied and created in opposition to the civic, economic, social, and public categories or spheres understood as blacks. As Shklar, Smith, Arneson, and Toni Morrison have argued, white American citizenship has been defined as being not black (Arnesen 1994; Morrison 1992; Shklar 1991, 1998). Clearly just observing (even many) sets of phenomena consistent with Holt's account is not sufficient; one also needs to show the patterns are not caused by factors outside of Holt's theory as well as demonstrate the causal mechanisms within Holt's theory. But this is work that political scientists should be well equipped to pursue.

Beyond the experience of African Americans, attention to racialized social structures should also inform our understanding of the political behavior of other racial and ethnic groups. For example, as intimated above, the idea of a racial order also helps to explain how long-standing racial and ethnic groups as well as new immigrants are integrated into the polity. The work of Claire Kim in political science and ethnic studies and that of Mary Waters in sociology both illuminate how the racial order strongly overwhelms ethnic identity. Waters (1999) uses the idea, first introduced by Merton, of a master status. A master status is one which trumps and, to use Holt's term, colonizes, other status identities. West Indian immigrants, for example, lose advantages gained from their ethnic backgrounds as they are racialized as African American. In contexts where they are constructed as being in close proximity to African Americans, they are consigned to the same segregated neighborhoods, face the same market discrimination (although at least in the labor market not to the same degree as native born African Americans), and otherwise have a subordinate status forced on them by the U.S. racial order (Waters 1999).

Kim, however, reminds us that racial orders are dynamic. They are moving, changing, adapting processes; thus she uses the term "racial ordering." She continues, "What is still missing in [the race and politics] literature is recognition of how all groups both native-born and immigrant —get constructed as 'races' and positioned in the racial order in a way that shapes each one's distinctive set of opportunities, constraints, and resources on an ongoing basis" (2000, 38). As the work of many young scholars of race and politics have demonstrated, racial orders give meaning to identities and through the process of racialization forge group identities that are themselves a source of political preferences and loyalties (Wong 2001; Rogers 2000).

For example, we already know that perceptions of racial interest powerfully shape individual preferences (Dawson 1994), but we are only learning the extent to which different racial and ethnic groups process, discuss, and engage in politics in significantly group-structured ways. The work of Sanders (1995) and Harris-Lacewell (1999) shows how group membership, internal norms of interaction, and perceptions of others' group affiliations strongly structure political discourse. Indeed, separate racial groups might have different meanings attached to the same political concepts and events. Different racial groups may very well also have different rules (or "grammars") for interpreting how political and social phenomena are processed and understood (Dawson 2001). When meanings and interpretations of politics are unstable across racial groups, the foundation for meaningful political communication is undermined.

Beyond largely empirical understandings of racialized politics, Iris Young (2000), assuming that racial groups exist within a hierarchical social structure, argues that we need a theory of the politics of groups that is relational, that takes into consideration the power disparities between groups. Such disparities in power and the attendant outcomes might explain many whites' resistance to changes in the racial status quo, since they perceive racial policies, thought to be truly egalitarian by blacks, as harming their (largely unspoken) racial group interests (Dawson 1997; Huddy and Feldman 2001; Voss 2001). Thus, the theoretical lens of a historicized racial order allows us to explain the claim made by Paul Peterson in his book *City Limits*—as well as a wealth of empirical findings documenting—of white resistance to racially egalitarian policies:

> . . . whites see even black allocation demands as redistributive in nature. What benefits blacks is perceived as damaging white interests—*and thus it does*. Token integration of community institutions is perceived by whites as the first step in an inevitable process of total racial change, and in what becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy whites stop using that community resource. The result is that minority group demands are often redistributive and therefore beyond the capacity of the local officials to grant. (1981, 159, my emphasis)

Such observations are extremely consistent with the hypotheses that racial orders foster individual perceptions of group and self-interest as well as group and individual identities. It is an example of the interaction between social structure and identity. In this case a racial order, one could hypothesize, helps to determine and solidify one's primary (for political purposes) group identity, one's perception of self-interest, and therefore, one's political preferences. No matter how much one might detest the normative implications of this process as personified in the Peterson quote, allowing the possibility that not just race but also racial ordering is at the center of one's incorporation into and understanding of politics will at the very least allow us to have a fresh perspective on much of American politics. Thus, if we are willing to accept even a part of the proposition that racialization and racial ordering produces distinctive world political views among racial and ethnic groups, then we should also be exploring to what degree this type of process also structures policy preferences, candidate positions, the character of American social movements, domestic political alliances, and electoral choice, to name a few areas demanding our investigation.

The possible existence of racial orders should have profound consequences for the conduct of empirical and theoretical research within political science (additional treatments of the importance of the concept of a racial order can be found in Bobo's and Dawson's essays in Sears et al. 2000 and Dawson 2001). Unfortunately that is not the case, and indeed research on race enjoys less status in this field than in any other discipline in the social sciences with the probable exception of economics. Often missing from the study of race as pursued in political science, is any commentary on the larger moral debates such as those contemplating what makes a good polity and how best to use our empirical and theoretical knowledge to move the country in the direction of expansive democracy. One consequence of not having the study of race more central in political science is the failure not only to fully contribute to these debates but also to examine some of the most interesting intellectual problems of our time. Fortunately, some are standing on the margins and engaging such questions.

Contributions in the area of race and politics have traditionally been made in three areas. The first and the dominant form of contribution has been in the analyses of racial politics. This area of research has primarily focused on white racial attitudes on one hand and the attitudes and political behaviors of various racial minorities on the other. The second area of significant contribution has been pursued by scholars interested in the effect that race has on public policy development and implementation. A major question of interrogation for these researchers has been the mechanisms through which concern with race has limited the ability of public policy to redress racial inequality. Examples of work in this area include research on the politics of school desegregation, racial redistricting, and the distribution of urban services. Third, and closely related to the second major strand of research, has been the study of race and state in the United States and other polities. One strand of this research has focused on the role of the politics of race in American political development. Recent work in this area includes the texts of Gwendolyn Mink (1995), Michael Brown (1999), and Rogers Smith (1997). To varying degrees, each work provides an important corrective to an area which has been largely understudied by leading scholars of American political development for the past two decades despite the centrality of race within American political, social, economic, and cultural history. We take two approaches in sketching possible avenues for channeling research in race and politics. First, we sketch some lessons that might be learned from other disciplines. Second, we make some suggestions about key areas for continued or new study in the field. In both cases our comments are meant to be taken as suggestive and not nearly exhaustive of all the exciting possibilities for research.

■ | What Other Disciplines Offer the Study of Race and Politics

Exciting avenues for addressing some of the theoretical and empirical problems within the study of the politics of race can be found by exploring the frontiers of racial research and theorizing in the other social sciences. The best work in the area of race and politics is often characterized not only by a strong combination of theoretical and empirical analyses but also by an attentiveness to work outside of the discipline. Racial politics are embedded within a social order, have a long history central to the histories of polities such as the United States and South Africa, often involve conflict over the distribution of material resources, and have complicated psychological roots. Cross-disciplinary awareness is fundamental to moving the research agenda forward. Below we explore several examples from psychology, sociology, economics, and gender studies and show their relevance for research in political science. The following examples are meant to be merely suggestive and not exhaustive of the possibilities either within or across disciplines.

Psychology

As Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon (1985) suggested, political science has as much to learn from psychology as from economics. One critical area of interest to political scientists is that of preference formation. What roles institutions, early socialization, political context, and political (or organizational) culture play in shaping preferences that have often been treated as exogenous is a hot topic within both political science and economics. One example of where studies in psychology can be useful is found in the work of neural social psychologist John Cacioppo on how the "affect system" affects racial prejudice. Cacioppo and his colleagues have been testing how the affective system, a neurophysiological system designed to "differentiate hostile from hospitable stimuli and to respond accordingly," operates on a different level than the human cognitive structure (Cacioppo and Berntson

2001, 96). The dual system leads to the phenomenon of "being of two minds at once" (102). Primates' affective systems are trained by stimuli at an early age to categorize associations between events and objects into likes and dislikes. Homogenous communities make it likely that outsiders or minorities become associated with negative stimuli since there is less of a range of stimuli in the environment. This might particularly be the case if, as Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) show, minorities in the United States are systematically and discriminatorily associated with crime as portrayed through dominant media and news sources. Thus it is quite possible that white Americans, for example, due to early childhood socialization by the media, hold egalitarian beliefs on the cognitive level but are also prone to act in a discriminatory fashion in a variety of other domains as a result of the social neurological conditioning of their affective system. The implications from this work for the fields of political science, public policy, and the law are numerous. From a pure research standpoint it suggests that the feud between Kinder and Sniderman about whether a new form of racism or principled conservatism best explains white ambivalence about racially egalitarian policies may be even more miscast than many of us believe. Indeed, if Cacioppo's research findings are replicated, then it is likely that we would have to entertain the proposition that under some conditions the *same individuals* act as egalitarians and under others as racists without being cognitively aware of their different behaviors.

The legal and policy ramifications are also significant. A prima facie case can be made, in contravention to recent appellate court decisions, for diversity in educational and other institutions as having a positive effect in and of its own right. Clearly, in terms of affective learning, racially and ethnically diverse living and learning experiences are important for young children. Similarly, if Cacioppo's findings hold, there would be pressure on various media sources, particularly television, to show more diverse groups on screen, rejecting stereotyping in entertainment and news and presenting instead more positive minority images. All of these implications are of importance to both policy and political science.

Cacioppo and his colleagues could be wrong. This program of research is still the subject of significant debate within the field of social psychology. Further, even if this program receives further empirical verification, those concerned with the normative debate over race in this country would have to be prepared to confront those who would misuse the research to claim that any attempts to set policy to address racial divisions are doomed to failure since these divisions are "biologically based." As in many other areas of racial inquiry, getting the research "right" does *not* end the obligations of scholars to society.

We have seen that there are alternative explanations for the discrepancy in egalitarian and tolerant attitudes on one hand and hostility to some policies on the other. In the end whether Cacioppo's research, that of Michael Neblo (2000), the already well established research programs in political science, or some other candidate proves to have the best explanation for the discrepancy between Kinder's and Sniderman's research is in one sense immaterial. For our purposes here, what is important is the possibility that by either drawing on the relevant research outside of political science or adopting new methodological approaches within the field, we can move beyond the largely moribund if still acrimonious debates of the past decade.

Economics

The critique of political scientists over reliance on economics is not meant to suggest that those of us in political science who study processes of racialization, categorization, and its political consequences do not have much to learn from economics research. The point, instead, is to express concern over the excessive reliance on economics as a source of methodological innovation and rigor to the exclusion of all other disciplines and forms of investigation. Economists have historically if quietly also made major contributions to studying race in the context of the American political economy. A series of studies a few decades ago probed the relationship between economic outcomes and government antidiscriminatory policies (Landes 1968 and Heckman and Payner 1989 are two examples of this type of work). More recently economists, some of whom have appointments in political science departments, have explored the political economy of race in ways that are important for political scientists to incorporate into their own research. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), for example, have recently researched the degree to which the homogeneity of local political jurisdictions affect the size and scope with which local electorates are willing to support through taxes the provision of public goods. Not surprisingly, they find that the more homogenous local U.S. communities are, the more likely they are to support both a broad range and generous level of support of public goods. These findings, while buttressing the hopes of local activists attempting to expand the arena of public goods, raise serious concerns both for those who are interested in using state policy to redress social inequalities and for normative political theorists concerned with widening the bonds of obligations between citizens.

Scholars based in business schools have also been conducting research of interest to students of race and politics. One key area is the degree to which the information technology revolution is contributing to the balkanization of American civil society (Alstyne and Brynjolfsson 1997). They model the conditions under which the expansion of multiple forms of electronic communication channels leads either to a more unified and diverse set of associations for members of a society or to more tightly knit and less diverse networks. The essential question they ask is whether the networks of cyberspace are more or less likely to lead to further balkanization of the polity. The implications for both normative and empirical studies of race are clear. Studies by researchers such as Harris-Lacewell (1999) and Sanders (1995) on racial attitudes demonstrate homogenous, tightly linked groups and networks are more likely to produce not only more extreme political views but also more-polarized political communities as well. Similarly, those concerned with democratic deliberation, the minimization of ethnic and other intergroup violence, and political and racial tolerance would all be concerned that the opening of cyberspace may very well lead to more, not less, balkanization of polities. All of these areas of concern are of great importance as we attempt to refashion an inclusive and egalitarian U.S. democratic praxis. Unfortunately, the political consequences of the information technology revolution on racial politics in arenas ranging from political mobilization, extremist politics, and democratic deliberation remains largely unexplored.

Sociology

Beyond psychology and economics many of the other social science disciplines also have the potential to inform and help improve the work of political scientists who study race and politics. Sociologists, for example, have long focused on the importance of groups, organizations, and networks as key analytical units. To the degree that we want to understand levels of analyses other than the individual, we might borrow from our colleagues and recapture a sociological imagination. For example, political theorists such as Young have found it useful to draw on social theorists and sociologists such as Giddens when theorizing about democracy, inclusion, social structure, and oppression. Social theorists and sociologists such as Paul Gilroy (2000) have begun to imagine a civil society and politics that are not framed by racial classifications. Political theorists, we suspect, would have much to say about the normative implications of Gilroy's conception of the good society as well as the likelihood of such polities coming into existence within the current political milieu. More traditionally, sociologists continue to pioneer the study of the intersection of race with other social defining characteristics such as class. Patillo-McCoy (1999) and Collins (1997), for example, conducted studies of the political implications and causes of the dynamics of class formation within the African American community. As with the work on racial attitudes, a healthy exchange between sociologists and political science in this field could substantially enrich the larger enterprise of studying of race and politics.

History

Historians such as Robin Kelley (1990, 1994) have taken concepts like infrapolitics from political science and then used them in historical investigations of black politics in ways that help us expand our conception of political action. Historians of race have also conducted numerous studies which suggest that both the scope of political action and the ideological range of political action within the United States is much greater than we have thought in the recent past (see Sanchez 1993; Kelley 1990; Foner 1980, 1984a, 1988 for just a few examples). Both Sanchez's examination of Chicano politics in the first half of the twentieth century as well as Kelley's examination of black political movements during the same period suggest a wider range of mass ideological influence than normally given credence within studies of the United States.

The work of Barbara Ransby (1996) and Evelyn Higginbotham (1992) has expanded our understanding of political leadership and the indigenous institutions used in movement formation. Similarly, historians like Barbara Savage (1999) have explored the use of cultural institutions like the media, in her case radio broadcasts, as a means of influencing public opinion on race during World War II. Greater attention to these works and others might produce a tighter grounding of public opinion work in both sociological and historical research about the nature and evolution of racial hierarchies within the United States and help improve the study of race and politics (Dawson 2000). Finally, theorists of deliberation and democracy will also find very rich materials in historical studies of the politics of race. One need only examine the Reconstruction period—arguably one of the most democratic eras in U.S. history—to begin such an investigation.

GENDER STUDIES

The work of scholars within gender studies has been very important for the study of the politics of race. Scholarship produced by black feminists, for example, suggests several research avenues of interest for those who study the politics of social cleavages and specifically the politics of race. Theorists such as critical legal theorist Kimberle Crenshaw and sociologist Patricia Hill Collins have for several years examined the implications of the intersections of different social orders such as race, gender, and class. Crenshaw (1990) argues that the intersection of race and gender creates a special legal position for black women, which cannot merely be explained by adding the benefits and liabilities of an individual's race and gender. Collins (1998), using a similar mode of analysis, argues that distinctive political and social identities and worldviews, found in particular among women of color, are the product of the intersections of race with other social cleavages. The work of these feminist theories has empirical implications that are testable by political scientists. Recent public opinion work shows that support for a black feminist political agenda is strongest among black women who feel positively linked to others on the basis of both race and gender. High levels of support for a black feminist political agenda are often evident among respondents who have such a dual linkage. Support lessens among those who feel linked solely on the basis of race and is even less evident among those who feel linked solely on the basis of gender (Dawson 2001). Finally, feminist perspectives on what gets classified as normal or objective as well as public and private could also serve as useful models for critiquing scholarship on the politics of race.

The argument made here is not that we need to import wholesale the studies of race found in allied disciplines but that *exchange* between political science and these disciplines can greatly improve our research agendas. If, for example, we tied studies of the influence of the media and racial segregation on racial attitudes to Cacioppo's findings, we begin to have a firmer grasp of why racial attitudes so strongly affect politics. If we add our understanding of the psychological origins of racial attitudes to the dynamics of the structural effects provided by phenomena such as cyberbalkanization and residential segregation, we begin perhaps to build a more fully specified model that combines individual-level psychological mechanisms with structural constraints. This statement is, of course, highly speculative and possibly wrong, but the basic point is that a more robust research agenda for the politics of race will draw on political and social theory, psychology, economics, and sociology as well as the other allied disciplines.

Finally, while we have focused on the benefits to be gained by an exchange of ideas and methods across social science disciplines, there is a new generation of scholars, often coming out of newly appointed graduate degree granting programs and departments like those in African American studies, ethnic studies, and women and gender, who have an interdisciplinary focus and intellectual commitment. These researchers have been trained to explore and engage questions, theories, and methods across not only social science disciplines but also fields in the humanities. Their breadth of knowledge is expansive with a seemingly unlimited possibility of intellectual exchange. The only possible drawback to a truly interdisciplinary approach may be limits in the depth of expertise. For many it takes great time commitment and investment in just one discipline to become knowledgeable of the literature, normative frameworks, and methodological approaches. The question, of course, is can this new generation of scholars flourish within these parameters for success. Only with time will we be able to assess if an academy structured around disciplinary specialization will make interdisciplinary scholarship cost prohibitive, especially as the tenure clock in many universities continues to tick at a faster pace.

▪ | Toward an Expanded Race and Politics Research Agenda

There are several areas in the research of race and politics that could benefit from more attention from political science. Luckily, some in the field have already started to create new paths of investigation and inquiry. Below we provide a brief exploration of some of the more interesting areas of research in the study of race and politics. Generally, we highlight one book or article to epitomize the type of innovative scholarship we have called for throughout this essay. In no way is the following meant to define the state of the field. Instead, this is a very limited attempt to highlight what research has already been initiated and what is possible.

The Intersection of Race with Other Social Cleavages

One promising way to study the politics of race and other social cleavages is to theoretically and empirically analyze the political consequences of the intersection of different social orders. Cathy Cohen's work (1999), as we already suggested, is one example of combining theoretical and empirical agendas through the political analyses of the intersection of race and sexuality. The work of sociologists and feminist theorists increasingly suggests that it is important for students of racial politics to pay attention to social difference and power disparities within subordinate racial groups (C. Cohen 1999; Patillo-McCoy 1999). Only with a more-complicated understanding of the multiple sites of power can we represent the complex nature of race and politics in the twenty-first century.

Conflict and Cooperation between Nonwhite Racial Groups

Another means of importance in the study of race and politics is the analysis of the conflict between subordinate groups. The Los Angeles riots sparked a wave of research that utilized approaches ranging from the historical to game theoretic on the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between racial minorities. Much of this work has largely been focused on what has been perceived as the relatively low level of cooperation and relatively high level of conflict between blacks and Korean Americans. One exemplary piece of scholarship from this mode is Claire Kim's *Bitter Fruit*. Kim explores both the areas of conflict and cooperation that existed between blacks and Koreans in Brooklyn during the Red Apple boycott. Unfortunately, while scholars are beginning to explore the areas of conflict and cooperation between blacks and Koreans and other minority groups like Latinos, there is even less work analyzing the political interactions between a wider range of racial groups. Thus, there is obviously much room and need for additional work in this realm. This is also an area ripe for the combination of ethnographic research, historical research, and statistical or formal modeling (Freer 1999).

Moving beyond the Black-White Paradigm

It is important for those who study race and politics to move beyond the traditional black-white paradigm and for researchers in the largely racially fragmented camps to start building a more-unified research agenda. There are questions of race important across racial and ethnic groups that must be addressed by many of us. For example, how are political parties being reshaped after being structured around the politics of black and white cleavages since before the Civil War? How will alliance formation change, and how will racial identities and perceptions of racial group issues shift as the racial order within the United States goes through its most massive restructuring since the immigration of central, eastern, and southern Europeans in the late nineteenth and early–twentieth centuries? Interestingly, research on these issues is often being pioneered by political scientists who have joint appointments in either ethnic studies or specific identity base programs and departments like African American studies and who are drawing on the rich research traditions of these fields. Pei-te Lien and her colleagues around the country are one such example of researchers pioneering the investigation of Asian American political behavior while critically drawing on, revising, and extending research that has it roots in turn in African American and Latino/a studies.[3]

Ideology and the Politics of Race

What role does ideology play in the politics of race? Parallel research by a number of researchers who have used the National Black Politics Study, 1993–1994, including Dawson (2001) and Harris-Lacewell (1999), find that ideology has been and continues to be a powerful influence in shaping individual opinion, black social movements, and black politics more generally. Scholars whose work is rooted in the study of other racial and ethnic groups will be well positioned to answer such questions as: How do racial and other ideologies shape the politics of race more generally? To what degree will ideological meanings shift across the multiple divides of the United States' new racial terrain?

3. See Chang's volume (2001) for an excellent set of essays that covers several issues within Asian American politics. The September 2001 issue of *PS* (a journal of the American Political Science Association) includes several short essays on the contours of minority politics from the standpoint of Asian American politics. Also we are seeing more conference panels dedicated to Asian American politics in addition to the panels on Latino/a and black politics. Still tremendously understudied and of low visibility is work on Native American politics.

Invigorating the Study of (White) Racial Attitudes

Too often when political scientists talk about race and politics, they are referring solely to the study of white racial attitudes. An enormously important and fruitful area of research, the problem has come from conflating research on white attitudes with the study of race and politics. Be that as it may, it remains one of the most critical areas of engagement. Most effort by political scientists has been focused on explaining the discrepancy between relatively tolerant and egalitarian attitudes of whites and the robust lack of white support for racially egalitarian public policies (see Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000 for a good presentation of the state of the art in this realm). Central to this strand of research has been the protracted and often vituperative debate between Sears, Kinder, and their colleagues on the one hand and Sniderman and his colleagues on the other (each of the main protagonists' most recent position is represented in Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). A powerful alternative to these dual explanations comes from outside of political science. Sociologist Larry Bobo and social psychologist Jim Sidanius both argue that group threat and conflict, in other words, perceptions of racial groups' interests, drive white racial policy preferences (their most current thinking is also represented in Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). Unfortunately their work remains to be fully engaged by political scientists. A consensus among neutral observers is that racial considerations play the major role in shaping white attitudes but that politics is not unimportant (Dawson 2000).

A new generation of researchers is incrementally taking the study of white racial attitudes into productive new areas. Neblo (2000), for example, uses methodological innovations to suggest that the reason that the three different explanations for white attitudes on racial targeted programs can best be explained by realizing that different segments of the white populace systematically behave as principled conservatives, symbolic racists, or racial partisans. One of the most fruitful areas of new research is the study of media effects in racial politics. Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) have persuasively demonstrated the effect that the "action news" format of local television news has in perpetuating devastating stereotypes that associate black and Latino men with crime. Gilens's work (1999) shows the effect that broadcast and print media have in both racializing and driving negative white attitudes toward means-tested social welfare programs. Oliver and Mendelberg (2000) show how certain types of segregated neighborhood environments reinforce white racial hostility. Their work is notable because it brings back into discussion the intersection between class and race in white racial attitude formation—a question that has long interested students of black racial attitudes.

On the other hand, an area that has been relatively ignored by political scientists has been the persistence of the pernicious racial stereotypes that seem all too prevalent in the U.S. populace. The leading work on stereotypes and how they affect racial politics has been conducted by sociologists (see Bobo and Kluegel 1997 for one excellent example). Racial stereotypes provide one possible candidate for the mechanisms which underlie the findings that those such as Oliver, Mendelberg, and Gilens describe (Bobo 1988, 2000). There is also comparatively little research comparing attitudes across racial groups. One of the more ambitious attempts to compare black and white racial attitudes can be found in *Divided by Color* (Kinder and Sanders 1996) though it still pays much more attention to white attitudes. The lack of comparison across groups is in large part due to the racial divide within the political science research community (Dawson and Wilson 1991; Dawson 2000).

Collecting Appropriate Data for Studying the United States' Complex Racial Terrain

For a number of years researchers interested in conducting public opinion or elections studies of people of color have labored under the handicap of using the American National Election Studies or the General Social Survey. Neither important study is designed to provide adequate coverage of minority communities or the survey instrumentation necessary for probing the political beliefs and behaviors of communities with their own significantly distinct political histories and outlooks.

This situation has begun to be remedied. There is a two-decade-old tradition of survey research that focuses on the political behavior, racial group consciousness, and political attitudes of African Americans that grows out of the research program of James Jackson of the University of Michigan (Gurin et al. 1989; K. Tate 1993; Dawson 1994a). This data collection agenda continues as Katherine Tate conducted a 1996 follow up to the 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Studies. Bobo and Dawson conducted a 2000 pre/postelections study that focused on the electoral politics of race. Dawson and Brown conducted the 1993–1994 National Black Politics Study which while not an election study, built on the Michigan studies although its focus on political ideology and the politics of black theology marked a radical departure from the Michigan tradition.

This set of studies (and a few similar data sets such as the 1995 *Washington Post*, Kaiser Family Foundation, Harvard University Racial Study) represents the preferred data collections for microlevel work on African American public opinion and political behavior. Some like the Michigan studies provide rich data on African Americans. Others like the *Post*, Kaiser, and Harvard racial study and the Bobo and Dawson 2000 election study provide rich opportunities for the comparative study of racial attitudes at the microlevel (the 1995 *Post* study is particularly valuable since it has very rich content and oversamples of blacks, Asian Americans and Latino/as). All represent substantial improvement over the standard practice of relying on the General Social Survey, or even worse, the American National Election Studies which while historically important and critical for studies in their domains, are ill suited for the study of the politics of race.

While the collection of data on African Americans has the most robust tradition, important work has also been done in collecting appropriate microlevel data for the study of the country's Latino/a population and more recently the Asian American population as well. The studies mentioned above conducted by Pei-te Lien and her colleagues, the Pilot National Asian American Political Surveys (PNAAPS), are providing rich data for the analyses of Asian American politics. According to Wong (2001), "PNAAPS is the first multi-city, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual survey of Asian Americans' political attitudes and behavior." This massive enterprise entailed using an interviewer pool that covered several different languages as well as innovative sample designs. Like black and Latino/a survey work, this study necessitated confronting tough methodological problems such as sample design. Like work in Latino politics (and increasingly black politics), this study demanded multilingual capability. Many of these issues were confronted systematically in the pioneering work of Rodolfo de la Garza, Angelo Falcon, F. Chris Garcia, and John A. Garcia in their Latino National Political Survey of 1989–1990. This study has laid the foundation for much of the modeling of Latino/a beliefs and behavior over the past decade.

Finally, new methodological approaches need to be developed given the increasing difficulties with survey work and the inherent limitations of the social survey as a research tool. For example, Melissa Harris-Lacewell (1999) has conducted a series of innovative experimental studies which focus on changes in black ideological discourse by conducting experiments in natural environments as well as collecting public opinion data in settings such as barber and beauty shops which are sites of much "black talk." Taeku Lee (1997) read several thousand letters to the president about racial conflict in the United States to get a feel for the dynamics of opinion formation on race during the Truman through Nixon administrations. He then used this data in conjunction with sophisticated statistical modeling to make a strong contribution in both the race and politics and public opinion fields. More innovative studies like those cited can only help continue the reinvigoration of the field.

The Dynamics of Immigration Patterns and the Politics of Race

Changing immigration patterns have profoundly restructured the contours of American politics and the politics of race. Party politics, the politics of urban areas, public opinion, and so on, are all being reshaped by this phenomenon. How do these changes shape the way we conduct the study of the politics of race and our previous paradigms, models, and findings? Scholars such as Garcia-Bedolla (1999), Wong (2001), and Jones-Correa (1998) are exploring the internal dynamics of political socialization and incorporation within and across immigrant communities. Both authors bring to our attention the dynamic process of immigrant political incorporation, the internal community-based discourse around politics, and the differences in both consciousness and political action evident when researchers take generation, class, gender, and region into account. These scholars and others like DeSipio and De La Garza (1998) also remind us that immigration patterns impact public opinion and institutional mobilization like that expected of political parties in past years.

Racial Politics, the New Economy, and the Information Technology Revolution

The information technology revolution and the new economy are critical areas within which to study the rapidly changing dynamics of the interaction of race, public policy, and distributive justice. How are these technologies distinctively affecting the development of different racial and ethnic communities? Are these new forums for interaction fostering new or unique political ideologies, replacing previous methods and tools of mobilization and exacerbating those involved in the deliberative process and those who are not? Can new interactive media and cyberspaces be seen as a new agora? Or as discussed, will the outcome of these technologies be "cyberbalkanization" and even more politically polarized communities? What are the political implications in terms of resources, mobilization, and racial conflict of the digital divide? What should be the state response to very large private corporations deciding which communities get wired for broadband access along racial lines even if the decision-making logic is claimed to be nonracial?

Do the new technologies, using Habermas's distinction, merely strengthen the ability of corporate and government elites to foster mass opinion, or do they provide a new mechanism by which critical public spheres can exercise their ability to regulate the state? Anthropologists are leading the way in showing how cybercommunities are leading to an unsettling of traditional racial identities as well as fostering what had previously been perceived as relatively marginal political ideologies such as libertarianism. In the field of political science, no one seems to be publicly pursuing research in this area. No doubt our research is not exhaustive and there are those currently engaged in such work. In the meantime, until such research receives a public viewing, we encourage those concerned with race and politics to consider the area of information technology as ripe with possibilities.

Seeing as a Racialized State

How do state policies such as the census and assigning goods based on racial criteria shape racial formation, conflict, and cooperation? How do state policies encourage/discourage racial mobilization and countermobilization? In turn how do racial conflict and politics shape the state itself? Studies of Brazil, the United States, and other polities by several pioneering political scientists are beginning to transform our understanding of the relationships between race, state, and civil society (Nobles 2000; Hanchard 1994). Other scholars such as Lieberman (1998), Mink (1995), R .M. Smith (1997), and M. K. Brown (1999) have pushed us to consider the ways in which issues of race have shaped state policy as well as the designation of citizen. Research that explores the construction and evolution of the state as a racialized entity with interests to preserve and advance will do much to invigorate the study of institutions and American political development in political science.

The work of Canon (1999) and Frymer (1999) continues the tradition of looking at national political institutions from the standpoint of race and politics. This is a critical tradition that should be embraced by political scientists. While there is a relatively robust literature on redistricting and race, the field of minority politics pioneered the study of race and political institutions. Hanes Walton Jr.'s entire corpus looks at institutions ranging from the political parties to the bureaucracy from the standpoint of black politics (see 1972 and 1988 for just two of many examples). Walters (1988) does the same for the study of the presidency.

Generally, Americans have most interaction with the local level of the federal system, and that is where the fiercest racial conflict occurs. There is a vast literature on local minority politics. Two strands can only suggest the richness of the literature. Dahl (1961), Pinderhughes (1987), and Hero (1992) all examine U.S. pluralism through the lens of ethnic and racial politics. Reed is perhaps the most prolific, insightful, and acerbic of the scholars who use local racial politics as a lens through which to examine American democracy (1999). Local courts have been examined both from the standpoint of race and crime (Rose and McClain 1990) and as a vehicle for bringing about egalitarian local social policy (Hochschild 1984). Many other topics such as political mobilization have been fruitfully explored through the lens of local racial politics.

Again, these are just a few of several research areas that could open up new territory for the study of race and politics. As we suggested earlier, the work mentioned is not exhaustive of what is currently being pursued in the field of race and politics. Instead the examples mentioned are illustrative of the many ways scholars are trying to expand our understanding of race and politics, its origins, its implications, and its solutions for overcoming fragmentation and stagnation within the field of politics and race as well as the discipline of political science.

■ | Conclusion

Strong contributions to the study of race and politics continue to be made. To reinvigorate the study of race and politics though, we need to broaden our horizons along several dimensions. One way forward is to reforge links between positive and normative theory on the one hand and empirical studies on the other. Another is by seriously thinking about ascription and social cleavages from the standpoint of social structure. Linked to this is the need to focus on the study of groups as groups and not merely as aggregations of individuals. The suggestion here is that the payoff from such analyses will yield a better understanding of the constraints that racial groups put on individual preference formation than can currently be found. Beyond political science, there is a wide range of work being pursued in the other social sciences which can greatly enrich the study of the politics of race in political science. Becoming more familiar with these literatures will enable us to ask new questions and bring new perspectives to old debates. Finally, we reiterate once again the importance of probing the intersections of race with other ascriptive social cleavages. Failure to do so increases the probability that research on race in political science will remain relatively parochial.

Morris P. Fiorina

Parties, Participation, and Representation in America: Old Theories Face New Realities[1]

Introduction

Theory and reality interact continuously. Reality shapes theories, but theories in turn shape understandings of reality. Theory generally trails reality in their ongoing interaction. Theorists construct new models and modify old ones on recognition that the political world has changed; consequently, revised understandings arise after new realities have arrived—and sometimes departed. This paper argues that important components of traditional democratic theory now lag the realities of contemporary American democracy. Thus, what we teach our students about parties and representation is outdated, a reflection of conditions that prevailed from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, not the realities they see around them.

My arguments takes off from several developments that many observers view as indicators of serious problems in American democracy. These include the near-half-century decline in the public's regard for government and politics, the similarly long-term decline in voting turnout and other forms of political participation, and the more general long-term decline in civic engagement and social capital that is currently the subject of much academic and popular discussion. While scholars have invested considerable time and energy describing and dissecting these developments, my interest here is different. According to two major lines of argument about how to improve American democracy, the condition of American democracy today should be judged superior to its condition at midcentury, but the aforementioned developments seem inconsistent with that judgment. This paper considers possible explanations for this gap between scholarly theory and popular perceptions, and argues that ordinary citizens are correct: empirical developments have left us teaching theories whose fit with reality has diminished.

1. I wish to thank Bonnie Honig, David Mayhew, Helen Milner, Margaret Weir, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

THE CONDITION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1: DECLINING TRUST AND RISING CYNICISM

By various time series compiled by various survey research organizations, cynicism about government is up, confidence and trust in leaders and institutions are down. Figure 1 provides some familiar illustrations. I will not belabor these well-known trends but briefly note that a number of caveats apply to them. First, while there is a common tendency to decry trends like these, plausible arguments to the contrary exist. For purposes of this discussion, however, a normative stance is not required. The simple empirical proposition that evaluations of government are lower now than four decades ago is the issue. Second, while there also is a natural tendency to assume that the more positive evaluations of government measured shortly after midcentury are the norm and the less positive contemporary levels are the aberration, that too is a questionable assumption. American history has had its ups and downs, and one suspects that trust in government might have been low at various other times—during the late-nineteenth-century period of industrial warfare, for example. Whether Americans in 1960 were historically typical or abnormally trusting can not be determined from this data, but again, the simple empirical decline from midcentury is the issue here..

Figure 1 | Trust and Faith in the National Government Are Down



Source: American National Election Studies.
Data on the 1958 and 1986 responses to the second question do not exist.

Third, confidence in leaders and institutions outside the political sphere has fallen as well (Lipset and Schneider 1983). As social scientists we need to keep this development in mind. Generalization is our stock in trade, and purely political explanations do not speak to the broader decline. Still, confidence in all leaders and all institutions has not fallen at the same rate or to the same levels, and confidence in some has recovered.[2] Thus, variation is present, so that arguments that apply principally to politics but somewhat to other spheres as well have some explanatory potential. The argument presented below has that characteristic.

A broad phenomenon like deteriorating evaluations of government obviously has many causes (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997, pt. 2; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2001). To some extent, leaders no doubt have earned the distrust of the citizenry: Vietnam and civil disorder in the late 1960s; Watergate, stagflation, and the Iranian hostage crisis in the 1970s; out-of-control deficits and Iran-Contra in the 1980s; Bill Clinton in the 1990s. Perhaps the negative evaluations held by Americans are no more than a natural reaction to a long litany of abuses of office and the seeming incompetence of officeholders. Other observers emphasize the economy—the end of the postwar expansion and the arrival of the inflationary era in the early 1970s shook confidence in the government's ability to maintain prosperity, and their confidence did recover a bit during the Reagan boom and again during the Clinton prosperity. Some scholars look beyond such objective events and trends to perceptions, in particular to perceptions shaped by the media, especially TV. With their characteristic negativity and pursuit of scandal, the media make Americans believe that government is less competent and leaders less trustworthy even though the reality may not have changed.[3] It is highly probable that all these and other developments contribute to the trends detailed in figure 1. The arguments offered below are intended as additions, not alternatives.

The Condition of American Democracy 2: The Decline of Political Participation

For several decades academic and popular commentators have bemoaned the decline of voting turnout in the United States. From a modern high in 1960, presidential turnout fell every election until 1992, when the Perot challenge generated a 5 percent surge (Figure 2). That rise was temporary, however, as turnout fell below the symbolically significant 50 percent mark in 1996 and rose only to a little below the 1992 level in 2000, despite what one overenthusiastic reporter (Von Drehle 2000, 1) characterized as "the largest voter mobilization effort in history." Congressional turnout also has declined over the past generation, although a bit more erratically (see fig-

2. Confidence in the executive branch fluctuates but does not show much, if any, trend. Similarly, confidence in the courts has not fallen. Confidence in the military has increased.

3. This is the "videomalaise" thesis, generally attributed to Robinson (1976). See also Sabato 1991.

ure 2). Numerous observers are at least partly sympathetic with Benjamin Barber's verdict on these trends: "In a country where voting is the primary expression of citizenship, the refusal to vote signals the bankruptcy of democracy" (1984, xiii).

Not everyone is so enamored of the value of voting, but other forms of participation have declined as well (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, ch. 3). Political participation takes time and energy, of course, and contemporary Americans are overworked according to some scholars (Schorr 1991). But the fall in participation appears to be less a consequence of competing demands and more a reflection of a fall in psychological engagement. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, ch. 3) report that despite a vastly more educated public and an explosion of information broadcast over the airwaves, contemporary Americans know at most as much as those of a generation ago. Why? In part because they don't care: popular interest in government and public affairs has declined by about 20 percent since the 1970s (Putnam 2000, 36).

Again, there are numerous disagreements about the description, explanation, and implications of these trends. McDonald and Popkin (2000), for example, criticize the way the Census Bureau calculates turnout, arguing that if measured properly, turnout does not show a steady decline since 1960 as much as a sharp drop in 1972 to a lower level that persists to this day. Some are more sanguine about the effects of lower turnout than those who share Barber's views. Numerous scholars have puzzled over the respective sizes of institutional, demographic, and psychological contributions to declining participation (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Teixeira 1992). Clearly, however, only a few curmudgeons regard the low

Figure 2 | Turnout in the United States Has Declined since 1960



Source: Federal Election Commission.

political participation levels that exist today as a healthy feature of democracy.[4]

Some observers have argued that political participation is not so much in decline as in a process of transformation. Specifically, people vote less, go to fewer political meetings, and forgo buttons and bumper stickers because they feel that their time and energy can be better spent in activities other than classic forms of electoral participation. Instead, they join and contribute to groups that influence communities and government, they volunteer their time, and they support nonprofit groups and organizations that increasingly take on public functions (Ladd 1999). That optimistic argument is challenged by the third development.

THE CONDITION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3: THE DECLINE IN CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

The associated concepts of civil society, civic engagement, and social capital have received an enormous amount of attention during the past decade. *Civic engagement* refers to the voluntary activities of people in their communities, workplaces, churches, and other social contexts. Such activities can be highly political, entirely nonpolitical, and anything in between. Civic engagement occurs in *civil society:* "those forms of communal and associational life which are organized neither by the self-interest of the market nor by the coercive potential of the state" (Wolfe 1997, 9). In classical political theory a strong civil society is a bulwark of democracy (Tocqueville 1966).

Within democracies civic engagement is thought to contribute to a healthier, more peaceful, more prosperous society by generating what James Coleman (1988) called *social capital,* an intangible resource analogous to physical or financial capital. Social capital consists in the first place of information networks that pass useful knowledge from one member of society to another. In the second place social capital consists of expectations and obligations that minimize conflicts and lubricate social relations. In the third place, social capital consists of norms that specify obligations and punish transgressions thereof.

In the eyes of its proponents, civic engagement generates social capital. Norms will be effective only if individuals recognize their existence. But individuals will not recognize their obligations if they do not know them. And such critical information will not be passed on if individuals do not communicate in the first place. Civic engagement brings people together; interacting enables them to communicate their preferences and expectations, and working together builds bonds of trust and mutual obligation. Thus, societies with high levels of civic engagement will be societies that can draw on extensive reserves of social capital.

4. George Will (1986) probably comes closest.

Contrary to what Ladd and others have argued, Putnam (2000) shows that civic engagement in the United States has declined. Political, civic, and religious participation, philanthropy, social contacts—all are down from earlier decades. While numerous critics have quarreled with various parts of these arguments, analyses, and data, Putnam's arguments strike a responsive chord in many lay people as well as scholars. In particular, they look back fondly on an era when presidential turnout exceeded 60 percent, when partisans enthusiastically pinned on campaign buttons, when every (i.e., all three) TV channel provided gavel-to-gavel coverage of the presidential nominating conventions, when people trusted their government and each other, and when government and society seemed in some general sense better.

The argument that civic engagement and social capital have declined partly incorporates the previous two arguments. Relative to Americans of midcentury, citizens today are not as closely connected with each other and because they interact less now, they trust each other and government less now, and this will lead to still lower participation in the future. Would a negative dynamic like this have been predicted by midcentury political scientists? On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that such a development would have surprised them.

■ | Improving American Democracy

By my reading there are two major strains of argument about how American democracy can be improved. The first underlies the long-standing populist tradition and the more recent participatory movement of the 1960s. In a nutshell, if democracy is government by the people, then American democracy can be improved by empowering citizens and opening up established structures and processes. The second argument has enjoyed more support within the academy than in the popular arena. First exposited around the turn of the century by Woodrow Wilson and others, it holds that U.S. institutions diminish the effectiveness of democratic government. The way to overcome these institutional impediments and make American democracy more effective is to strengthen parties (Ranney 1954). Let us consider these in turn.

IMPROVING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1: OPEN IT UP

The participatory argument received a very sympathetic hearing in the late–twentieth century, a hearing that translated into practice. For a long generation, reformers (joined by others seeking political advantage) have diligently stripped away the insulation around political institutions and processes, leaving them more open to popular participation and pressure.

TABLE 1. CHANGES IN AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE 1960

Presidential nominating process
Candidate-centered politics
Open meetings
Recorded votes
Expanded rules of standing
Enhanced judicial review
Open bureaucracy
Intervenors
Maximum feasible participation
Proliferation of local bodies
Advocacy explosion
Proliferation of polls
New technologies
Propositions

Table 1 lists some of the changes that have taken place since the 1950s, indeed, most of them since the mid-1960s, when confidence in government began to decline.

Some of the changes are widely recognized, but others are less so. Among the former, changes in the presidential nomination process are the best-known example. Until the mid-1960s stereotypical nomination politics consisted of party bosses choosing nominees in "smoke-filled rooms." Party leaders ignored Estes Kefauver's 1952 primary victories, and they were impressed by John Kennedy's critical 1960 primary victories only as demonstrations that he could carry Protestant states. As late as 1968 Hubert Humphrey won the Democratic nomination without entering a single primary. But Goldwater's "amateurs" upset the Republican establishment in 1964, and when McGovern's new politics activists did the same on the Democratic side in 1972, the new era was firmly in place (Ceaser 1979; Polsby 1983).

Meanwhile, the decline of local party organizations, the weakening of citizen party identifications, the advent of television campaigning, and other factors contributed to a broader change—the development of candidate-centered politics. The most notable (and most studied) example was in the congressional arena where the personal advantage of incumbency surged in the late 1960s (Mayhew 1974a; Gelman and King 1990). But more generally, the old order in which a single party organization or an encompassing interest group delivered the vote for a larger set of candidates associated with it was replaced by a new order in which each individual candidate built a personal organization and communicated directly with supporters. Two-step flows, opinion leaders, and related concepts from the voting literature of the 1940s and 1950s (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954) largely disappeared from the voting literature of the 1970s and 1980s, as the influence of intermediaries in the electoral process declined.

Changes in arenas other than the electoral are less widely recognized but also significant. The movement toward "government in the sunshine" resulted in changes in the internal processes of governing institutions. In Congress, for example, the early 1970s saw the opening of many committee meetings to the public, and a movement away from anonymous voting procedures in favor of putting everything on the record. Many scholars have pondered the consequences of congressional decentralization in the 1970s (e.g., Dodd and Schott 1979); fewer have reflected on the consequences of making the activities of its members so much more visible. Movement in this direction occurred all through American democracy as open meetings and agendas published in advance increasingly became the norm.

At roughly the same time it became easier to get one's day in court. The Supreme Court expanded doctrines of standing, enlarging the class of interests entitled to a hearing in the courts (R. Stewart 1975). Similarly, new congressional statutes expanded standing. Congress and the courts worked in tandem to open up the bureaucracy. Congress mandated new procedures that enabled interested constituencies to learn about agency proposals and participate in agency decision processes, and the courts reinforced these requirements and became increasingly aggressive about judicial review. Congress even subsidized nongovernmental intervenors in some cases. The end result of these changes is an administrative process that is far more visible and open to public participation than was the case in 1950.

At the local level, the watchwords of the Great Society were "maximum feasible participation" (Greenstone and Peterson 1973). Old structures were bypassed in favor of new ones that empowered new groups. Local bodies of all sorts proliferated (Burns 1994). And most of these were subject to the kind of open government requirements mentioned above. The days when many smaller cities and towns were run by mayors and councilors fronting for a few big business interests are long gone (Ehrenhalt 1991).

Changes such as these are on the supply side of politics—the people and processes that supply public policy outputs are more exposed to popular influence today than a generation ago. But there have been important changes on the demand side as well. Most obvious is the "advocacy explosion"—the proliferation of interest groups documented by Scholzman and Tierney (1986), J. L. Walker (1991), and others. In the 1950s a small number of large sectoral interest groups worked with party and institutional leaders. Today a plethora of smaller particularistic interest groups lobby everyone—often working indirectly through the grassroots—and help to finance the campaigns that grow ever more expensive.

Another demand-side change is the increasing information available to politicians. Not only do constituents have more information about what politicians do, politicians have much more information about what constituents think (Geer 1996). Younger scholars today may not appreciate how recently the widespread use of polling came to American politics. But John Brehm's (1993) striking tabulation (figure 3) shows the polling explosion—beginning, of course, in the 1960s.

Figure 3 | From Rare to Everyday: Media Coverage of Poll Results



Source: John Brehm, *The Phantom Respondents* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); 4.
Note: Figure shows the number of stories cited under "public opinion" in the *New York Times*. According to John Brehm the cited public opinion stories "by and large report poll results, and only rarely reflections on public opinion in the broader sense."

Polling is just the most prominent example of a set of new technologies that provide more direct links between politicians and voters. Letters and postcards were supplanted by long distance telephone, WATS by fax, and fax by e-mail and the Internet. A citizen who so desires may easily contact his or her representative in seconds, a far cry from the 1950s, when the time and effort to write a letter were required. Most attention to these developments has focused on the enhanced ability of members to reach constituents, but the new technologies are two way: elected officials find it easier to reach constituents, but the reverse holds as well.

Finally, to an increasing extent, citizens and groups now dispense with leaders and representative institutions altogether. The past generation has seen growth in the use of the procedures of direct democracy—the initiative, referendum, and recall.[5] Many decry this trend (e.g., Broder 2000), but the point here is simply that for better or for worse, it is another example of how popular pressure can increasingly make itself felt in the governmental arena.

The preceding list is partial, to be sure, but I think it sufficient to make the general point. During the past generation American political institutions and processes have become increasingly permeable to popular participation and increasingly subject to popular pressure. How ironic, then, that Americans so dislike what reformers have wrought. Americans liked their government better, trusted their leaders more, voted in higher numbers, and in general participated more in public life when party bosses chose nominees in smoke-filled rooms, when several dozen old men (mostly southerners) ran Congress, when it was difficult to get a hearing in court, when legislatures, agencies, and city councils made decisions behind closed doors, when big business, big labor, and big agriculture dominated the interest group universe, and when politicians didn't have the tools to figure out what constituents wanted—if they cared.

Perhaps there really is no puzzle here. Long ago Bismarck advised against watching laws and sausages being made. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) advance a modern version of that argument to explain why Americans hold Congress in lower esteem than the presidency and the Supreme Court: congressional operations are more visible, hence congressional politics more exposed and popular disapproval more severe. One can generalize their cross-sectional argument across time and suggest that since institutions and processes are now more visible across the board, approval and confidence in all drops—albeit from different levels—as voters increasingly see the lobbying, infighting, and bargaining and compromise that politics entails. This argument probably explains some of the irony noted above, but I doubt that it is the whole story. Before adding to it however, let us consider the second strain of argument about the improvement of American democracy.

Improving American Democracy 2: Strengthen the Parties

Another line of argument about democratic reform locates the deficiencies in American democracy in a different place. Especially within the acad-

5. After bottoming out in the 1960s, use of the initiative surged, although five states account for more than half of all initiatives. See "A Century of Citizen Lawmaking," http://www.iandrinstitute.org.

emy, critics have seen the problem less as one of limited participation in government than as one of control of government. Federalism, the separation of powers, checks and balances—the fundamental institutions of the United States operate to hinder coherent action and obscure responsibility for government action. Making the popular will (if it can be said to exist) known through participation is not enough; the popular will must be focused. What is needed is a means of imposing coherence on government action, of centralizing the authority that institutions decentralize. According to various scholars over the decades, that means strong or responsible political parties.

As noted above, the case for strong parties was advanced at the turn of the century. It has regularly been elaborated since, most prominently in the 1950 report of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." In the 1970s numerous articles and books decried the party decomposition then apparent (e.g., Burnham 1970, ch. 5; Broder 1971), and a Committee for Party Renewal even was established in the mid-1970s (Mileur 1991). In 1995 there was a palpable sense of excitement among American politics scholars when the House Republicans behaved much like the responsible party that we had read about in our textbooks.

Everett Ladd (1992) undoubtedly was correct in noting that support for strong parties to some degree reflects a preference for activist government. Wilson was arguing for a party that would enable a strong president to impose his leadership. The APSA committee did its work during the heyday of the New Deal public philosophy. And most recently, concerns over the state of the parties resurged during the energy crisis and stagflation of the 1970s, both of which seemed to require some major, coordinated government response.

Still, not only statists see the value of responsible parties. For many scholars the electoral accountability provided by cohesive parties was a more important consideration than the programmatic efficiency they would provide. Without the collective responsibility provided by parties, members of Congress could escape responsibility for the policies advocated by their activists and presidential candidates, and they had every reason to hang their presidents out to dry when the going got tough (Fiorina 1980). Ending this electoral irresponsibility—which reached its apogee with a more or less continuous state of divided government—was clearly a concern of modern supporters of strong parties.

Like advocates of participatory democracy, supporters of strong parties have gotten much of what they advocated over the course of the past three or four decades. The APSA report is far more often cited than read, but those who read it typically report a response of the following sort: "Gee, a lot of what those guys wanted actually has happened." Professors Baer and Bositis (1993) have done the profession a great service by carefully reading the report and judging the extent to which its numerous recommendations have been adopted. I hope they will forgive me for reducing their 40-page assessment into the crude tabulation in Table 2.

Table 2. APSA Report After 40 Years

Fate of Proposal	Democrats	Republicans	System
Full implementation	13	6	5
Partial implementation	7	5	5
De facto movement	8	9	5
No change	3	10	3
Negative movement	2	3	2

Source: Grossly adapted from Denise Baer and David Bositis, *Politics and Linkage in a Democratic Society* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993), Appendix.

Some of the APSA committee's recommendations applied to the internal processes of the parties, and others to the larger system. The recommendations range from minor (reducing the number of convention delegates) to major (making congressional committee chairs responsible to the parties). Some of the proposals never had a chance (abolition of the Electoral College), while some of the proposals were fairly easy to implement (party conferences). But even granting these problems in adding up successes and failures, on the whole the crude tabulation in table 2 strongly suggests that the committee was quite successful. The Democrats, fittingly, have adopted 28 of 33 proposals; the more conservative Republicans have gone along with 20 of the 33, and 15 of the 20 recommendations for the larger system have been implemented at least to some degree. Nelson Polsby (2000) has quipped that the committee "sought both to rewrite the U.S. Constitution and to reform human nature." Against odds like that they seem to have done rather well.

And therein lies a second irony! Some of the best political science minds of the 1930s and 1940s proposed a plan to improve American democracy. Whether as a direct result of the power of their case or not, much of that plan has been implemented. But the result is not what the APSA committee might have anticipated. Current generations of Americans blessed with today's more responsible parties like and trust their government much less and participate less in politics than their predecessors who were afflicted with the unreformed, less responsible parties of midcentury. Here again, a venerable set of arguments about how to improve American democracy seems inconsistent with the judgments of the people who live under it.

Explaining the Gaps between Theory and Reality

These broad inconsistencies between theories and data raise three logical possibilities. The first is that both general theories are individually valid, but when implemented together, they offset or produce some kind of negative interaction. An example might be the charge of some critics that the APSA report was schizophrenic: on the one hand it called for centralization, but on the other hand it doffed its hat in the direction of the participatory tradition by calling for more grassroots involvement. Perhaps the two simply are impossible to reconcile. Getting more popular involvement prevented party reforms from achieving the desired end of enhancing coherence and discipline. Thus, neither theory is invalid, but democratic theorists failed to work out how they would operate if implemented simultaneously.

Another possibility is that both theories are valid, even operating simultaneously, and would have contributed to a healthier democracy had not some overlooked or unanticipated third factor overriden the positive effects of both theories. Again, the media provide the obvious example of such an explanatory villain. Had television never been invented, perhaps Americans today would participate more and like and trust their government more than Americans of 1960, as suggested by both democratic reform traditions. I don't believe this, but it is a possibility.

A third possibility is that one theory is right and the other one wrong, and the harmful consequences of the wrong theory more than offset the beneficial consequences of the correct one. The arguments (e.g., Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, 1975) about the overload of democratic systems that were offered in the 1970s provide an example. According to such arguments the participatory movements of the 1960s delegitimated political authority and overwhelmed gatekeeper institutions. As a result, democracies were in crisis, overloaded with popular demands that exceeded their aggregative capacities. Thus, party theorists could be right, but the gains produced by party reforms were overwhelmed because the participatory theorists were so wrong.[6]

6. I have not been able to think of a symmetrical argument, where the participatory theorists are correct but the party theorists so wrong that the validity of the participatory argument is not apparent.

And there is a final possibility, namely, that both theories are faulty. That is the position I will argue in the rest of this paper. My contention is not that party and participatory theorists had it wrong from the beginning but rather that important implicit assumptions underlying both theories have been undermined by the evolution of American democracy. The consequence is that both theories are inaccurate now, whatever their merits fifty years ago.

The Problem with Party Theory

Party theory assumes fealty to a set of basic party principles. As Polsby (2000) notes, "Parties should make promises and stand by their promises and risk the loss of elections if they fail to deliver on their promises." While agreeing with that characterization I believe that most supporters of strong parties implicitly added the qualification "but not if the risk is too large or too long term." In other words, party theorists accept the idea of popular sovereignty and in consequence the notion that real-world parties are and will remain Downsian: they will appeal to the broad mass of the electorate in an attempt to win elections (A. Downs 1957). To be sure, parties have different constituencies and generally support somewhat different policies, but when important interests are at stake—namely, control of government, especially long-term control of government—they will rise above their principles in order to win. This reasoning underlies the standard model of party competition in which parties converge to the position of the median voter in the electorate. To political scientists of the 1950s—the era of "me too," "not a dime's worth of difference" politics—the Downsian assumption must have looked all too true.

A second subsidiary assumption also was widely held: the issues that would dominate American politics in the modern world were issues of foreign policy, the national economy, and the welfare state.[7] Given the United States's position as the undisputed leader of the free world, international engagement was a given. Only the means to consensually held foreign policy and national defense ends were in dispute. Similarly, except for a few "reactionaries," everyone recognized the necessity for some government role in maintaining economic stability and social welfare; the questions were how much and what instruments to use—issues that lent themselves to compromise. "Half a loaf is better than none" was the outlook of the members of Congress described by 1950s scholars. In particular, the committee on political parties worked during the one generation in American history when the kind of divisive social issues that reemerged in the 1960s were dormant. Such issues were an important part of American politics in earlier eras as political historians have shown, but the parties of

7. As Baer and Bositis note, the APSA report was relatively silent on the issue of race (1993, 205).

earlier eras generally attempted to suppress such issues and were capable of doing so (Kleppner 1979).

In sum, the general viewpoint of 1950s party scholars was that parties would differ but they still would position themselves well within the mainstream of public opinion. Moreover, their differences would not be so severe as to produce deadlock. Competition between two responsible parties would produce reasonably representative government.

Things seem different today. The new reality that is not yet sufficiently incorporated in our accounts is that between 1960 and 1990 the trade-offs parties made between policies and votes shifted in the direction of policies.[8] In 1964 worldly wise political scientists chuckled at the Goldwaterite slogan "I'd rather be right than president" but in the ensuing decades such sentiments became quite widespread—especially among Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s, then again among Republicans in the 1990s. Close observers (e.g., Sundquist 1981, 371) maintain that in Congress, at least, members coming into the institution in the 1970s were more policy oriented than those they replaced. The traditional party organizations selected candidates on the basis of party loyalty and service—and electability if the district was marginal—but as the traditional parties declined, a newer generation of candidates increasingly was recruited by or at least supported by social movements and interest groups. Even if they are not personally more policy committed, newer members are more dependent on activist constituencies who compose their personal organizations and fund their campaigns.

Party activists, of course, are a large part of the story. They always have had a point of view, and even in the 1950s their points of view on many issues were quite distinct from the mass public, as documented by McCloskey, Hoffman, and O'Hara (1960). But activists are far more distinct today. As figure 4 shows, the ideological distance between Democratic and Republican activists has grown steadily in the past three decades. More anecdotally, when asked about his priorities the incoming chair of the California Republican Party replied that "killing our babies is the issue of the century . . . cutting taxes or any other issue pales in comparison."[9] Whatever happened to "maximizing the number of Republicans elected," the response that state chairs like Ray Bliss no doubt would have offered in the mid-1960s?[10]

If I am correct in arguing that today's parties and candidates are more

8. I am referring here to general theories about parties and representation. The developers of specialized formal theories of electoral competition have been quite active in constructing models in which parties and candidates differentiate themselves. For a survey, see Fiorina 1999c.

9. John McCarthy quoted in Marinucci 2000.

10. Longtime state chair of Ohio, Bliss was named Republican national chairman after the Goldwater debacle. He was generally considered to be organizationally gifted.

Figure 4 | Party Activists Have Grown More Extreme



Source: ANES 1948–1996 Cumulative Data File.
Notes: Activists are defined as respondents who engaged in three or more campaign activities as coded in vcf0723. Learners are coded as partisans. The Liberal/Conservative Index (vcf0801) measures a respondent's relative thermometer ratings of "Liberals" and "Conservatives." It is calculated by subtracting the Liberal Thermometer score from 97 and averaging the result with the Conservative Thermometer score. Cases are weighted by vcf0009.

ideological and committed to specific policies, then the answer to why party reforms have not produced greater citizen happiness with government is apparent: citizens don't like principled parties—especially when party positions are far from the center of public opinion. A generation of research has shown that the mass public is generally moderate in its views and takes a nonideological, pragmatic approach to issues (Kinder and Sears 1985). Moreover, for most people politics is a peripheral concern. Why should they be positively disposed toward a public arena overrun by activists and candidates whose outlook is just the opposite?

The Problem with Participatory Theory

The problem with participatory arguments is related to that just proposed. Those who put their faith in expanded participation assume that the desire to participate is widely distributed; thus, opening government doors will lead to a more representative democracy. Unfortunately, the reverse appears to be true. Contrary to the presumptions of political theorists, participation is not a natural act; it is an unnatural act. Left to their own devices ordinary people generally will devote little by way of time and resources to politics. Participation today is the province of those who feel strongly about an issue or candidate, either because they have particularly extreme views or because they are directly affected in a way that others are not and this tends to make them hold particularly extreme views.

It is striking how little political scientists really know about political participation. Take as the state of the art Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's *Voice and Equality* (1995). This magesterial study greatly adds to the stock of knowledge about political participation, but it impresses as much for what it indicates about what we don't know, a remark in no way intended as critical. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady flip the standard question and ask, "Why *don't* people participate?" Their answer is threefold: because people can't—they don't have the resources, because people don't want to—they don't have the motivation, and because no one asked—they weren't mobilized. They propose a resource mobilization account of participation that enables them to bring virtually every known correlate of participation into a coherent empirical analysis.[11] As summary Tables 3 and 4 illustrate, however, the results are sobering.

TABLE 3. VERBA, SCHLOZMAN, AND BRADY EXPLANATION OF KINDS OF PARTICIPATION

	R^2
Time-based acts	.23
Voting	.38
Contributions	.13
Political Discussion	.42

Source: Adapted from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Table 12.7.
Independent variables: education, vocabulary, family income, job level, nonpolitical organization, religious attendance, civic skills, political interest, political information, political efficacy, partisan strength, citizenship.

If we were to analyze the vote choices of these same respondents, our models would produce R^2 and pseudo-R^2 in the .7 range—with a far smaller number of right-hand side variables. But elaborate models of participation yield R^2s that are much smaller (table 3). And when we turn to participation in specific issue domains and add still more right-hand side

11. This comment is not meant as criticism, only as a statement of fact. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's resource mobilization framework provides a broad theoretical umbrella that subsumes all the standard correlates of participation, as well as numerous nonstandard ones.

Table 4. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady Explanation of Focus of Participation

	R^2
Activity on basic human needs	.03
Activity on education	.09
Activity on abortion	.08

Source: Adapted from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Tables 14.2, 14.4. Independent variables: education, income, job variables, organization variables, church variables, political interest, self-interest (e.g., receipt of means-tested benefits/school age children), and abortion attitudes.

variables (mainly personal interest or impact), the models yield R^2s less than .1 (table 4). The simple facts are that many people who have the resources don't expend them, many people who have the motivation don't act on it, and many people who are asked refuse—and we are not very good at picking out the small minority who are different.

I think the missing explanatory variable is motivation. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady include motivation in two ways, one general and one specific. General motivations are tapped by the standard concepts of efficacy and duty, but their results suggest that most people who are efficacious and dutiful nevertheless are not going to sit through a three-hour city council meeting or spend their Saturday afternoon at a caucus. Specific motivations are tapped by measures of self-interest or personal impact, but their results indicate that people who appear to have a direct interest nevertheless are not motivated to pursue it. Having observed participators in recent years, I have concluded that the principle factor motivating them is that they care deeply about the subject of their participation, although why they do often escapes me. They are intense, and their intensity leads to their participation.

Social psychologists and political scientists long have understood that extremity is the handmaiden of intensity (Allport and Hartman 1925; Cantril 1946). Common discourse recognizes that close relationship by the absence of pairings like "rabid moderate" or "wishy-washy extremist." Intensely held views generally are extreme views—relative to the issue and the population—and these are the views that are most common among political participators.

Consider the abortion issue. As figure 5 suggests, Americans have relatively settled and generally qualified views on legal abortion. They favor it overwhelmingly in what are considered traumatic circumstances and express significant reservations when the reasons seem less dire. In particular,

Figure 5 | Popular Attitudes toward Legal Abortion since *Roe v. Wade* (1973)



Source: Calculated by the authors from the General Social Survey 1972–1998 Cumulative Data File.

Note: Respondents who answered "don't know" are included in the calculation.

anyone who has delved into public opinion on this subject knows that only tiny minorities would support forfeiting the life of a mother on the one hand or destroying a healthy eight-month fetus on the other. Yet the political debate is defined by those minorities. In the Democratic primaries Al Gore was attacked from the left because as a Tennessee congressman he suggested that a fetus might be more than a clump of tissue, and in the Republican primaries John McCain was attacked from the right because he favored legal abortion in cases of rape, incest, or birth defects. In fact, these two candidates bracketed the positions held by 80 percent of the American people (see figure 5). The abortion issue could have been compromised in a way acceptable to the great mass of the American people thirty years ago, but it has not because of the implacable views of those active in the politics of the issue.[12] Tellingly, in some European democracies, where participatory theories have never been so popular, the abortion issue was generally settled long ago with much less conflict than surrounds the issue in the United States.

Abortion is all too typical of the issues and the debate that the advo-

12. Some colleagues disagree, suggesting that the courts polarized the issue to begin with and have helped keep it polarized. I concede this point in part, but note that in *Webster* and *Casey*, the courts have moved toward compromises that Congress seems unable to achieve.

cacy explosion has brought to American politics. Fifty years ago pluralist scholars argued that interest groups exercised a moderating influence on politics. Group members had overlapping memberships that subjected them to cross-pressures and moderated their outlooks (Truman 1971 [1951]). That may have been true in 1950, but consider the myriad interest groups that have sprung up over the course of the past generation. Moderation certainly is not the first word that comes to mind. Many of them are single-issue groups devoted to advancing an all-or-nothing point of view on their particular concern. What contemporary scholar of interest groups argues that they are a moderating influence? In this case scholars have already reformulated a branch of democratic theory, but they have not as yet worked out the implications for larger arguments.

In sum, participatory arguments about improving American democracy have gone astray because they overlook an important feature of participation. Not only is the desire to participate not widely distributed, but even more importantly, it is not randomly distributed. The great expansion of participatory opportunities in the last generation has advantaged extremists of all stripes (Fiorina 1999a). The nonideological, pragmatic Americans mentioned above sit at home while extremists participate—whatever the issue: presidential politics, sex education, land use, leash laws, and so on. Another reason contemporary Americans do not like government or want to participate in political processes is because the people who populate the public arena are not like them.

Why Have Underlying Assumptions Become Less Accurate?

Why would today's party activists and elected officials weigh policy concerns more heavily vis-à-vis electoral considerations than their counterparts of earlier generations? I suggest a very simple hypothesis: the *personal* material rewards linked directly to political participation have greatly diminished. The material rewards allocated by government, of course, have *not* diminished. Insurance companies, teachers' unions, agribusiness, and myriad other interests stand to gain or lose huge amounts from government actions, as suggested by the large sums of money they contribute to campaigns and expend on lobbying. What I am arguing is that the personal material rewards to political activism are less today than for much of our history before the mid–twentieth century. Table 5 lists some of the reasons for the declining importance of material incentives.

Civil service, of course, is the oldest and most widely recognized means of removing material incentives from politics. Accounts of nineteenth-century politics attribute staggering patronage resources to the parties—tens of thousands of jobs in large states like Pennsylvania and New

TABLE 5. REMOVAL OF MATERIAL INCENTIVES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Civil service

Public-sector unionization

Conflict of interest laws

Universalistic policies/Entitlements

Changes in political culture

Media (junkyard dogs)

York.[13] And not only were the patronage recipients themselves subject to political mobilization, the party organizations appropriated portions of their paychecks and pressed them into service to mobilize others. But for more than a century both reformers and elected officials have extended protection from arbitrary control of public employment, for different reasons to be sure and with predictable consequences. If the toll collectors on the eastern state turnpikes today knew they would lose their jobs if the governor lost the next election, their levels of political participation no doubt would be much higher. But extension of civil service had been going on for three-quarters of a century when the shift toward a hypothesized more ideological basis for political participation began, so it may not play a major role in the current public discontent.

Public-sector unionization has much the same impact as civil service protection, although it is much more recent. True, public employees vote at higher rates than others, but the more relevant question is whether they participate at rates as high as they would if their jobs were subject to the decisions of political leaders.[14] Recently I had occasion to review tapes made twenty-five years ago when I conducted interviews in two congressional districts for an earlier project. In one interview a county chair in a state then undergoing unionization opined that this would kill off the patronage system in his state. He said that the parties had managed to work with civil service, but unionization would be the death knell for the patronage system. In retrospect, we can see that unionization would diminish the ability of parties and public officials to mobilize public-sector workers and their families. If the members of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, the National Education Association, and other public-sector unions depended not on their unions for economic gains but on the decisions of public officials in the country's 86,000 jurisdictions,

13. Keller cites estimates that in New York State one in every eight voters was a federal, state, or local officeholder (1977, 239).

14. On turnout of public employees, see Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 94–101.

their levels of political engagement no doubt would be higher than at present. This is a subject that deserves more systematic study.

Not only was politics a primary source of jobs at one time, but it was a primary means to personal advancement through what was charmingly referred to as "honest graft" (Riordan 1963, 4). Whom you knew in politics might be the key to a contract, a tip, or some other means of turning a profit. Thus, it paid—literally—to participate in politics and government, with predictable results, positive and negative. But modern politics is much "cleaner." Rather than a commonly held goal, in many cases conflict of interest is now a crime. And if you can't personally profit from participation, fewer people will participate.

Just as jobs are no longer bestowed at the pleasure of party and elected officials, neither are policy outputs. If your neighborhood's garbage collection or snow removal depends on its turnout rate, turnout will be higher ceteris paribus, than if such services are automatic, a matter of right. Scholars have long recognized the negative impact of government-provided social welfare on the urban machines. This is only a special case of a broader phenomenon. When people feel that public benefits depend directly on their personal actions or those of their close associates, they will be more engaged than when those benefits accrue as a matter of law or right. The modern movement toward universalism and entitlements is a movement that encourages free riding on the political engagement of others—with predictable consequences.

The decline of old-fashioned parties organized around material rewards is associated with a change in campaign style. Labor-intensive campaigns staffed by public-sector workers have given way to the modern hi-tech campaign staffed by professionals. The transformation has gone along with a sharp rise in the costs of campaigns, in large part driven by the costs of television. Corporations and other interest groups contribute for instrumental reasons now as they always have, but it is likely that the basis for individual campaign contributions has shifted. In the older party era, patronage workers often were dunned a portion of their salaries, recipients of contracts were assessed a portion of their contracts, favor recipients were asked to reciprocate, and so forth. Such "contributions" were the price of a job or other material government benefit. Today, many fewer people are subject to such material pressures. Instead, individuals voluntarily contribute to political campaigns on the basis of the causes they believe in. And, what evidence we have suggests that contributors, like those who participate in other ways, are more extreme in their views (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995).

Each of the aforementioned changes probably reflects gradual changes in the political culture, an admittedly amorphous but undoubtedly significant factor in diminishing the personal material rewards of political participation. As Mayhew notes, in what he calls "traditional party organization" (TPO) states, the parties rely on material rather than purposive incentives (1986, 20), to use Wilson's typology (1973).[15] In TPO states the public sector is viewed as a large employment bureau.[16] The cost of government is regarded as a benefit in part, since government spending provides jobs (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). And part of the exchange is the expectation that those benefited will participate in politics when the party calls on them. A younger, better-educated population that thinks of the public sector as something that should provide efficient services at minimum cost is in conflict with the older party culture, and this newer subculture is historically ascendant, of course.

Finally, changes in media values and practices help to drive out personal material rewards as a reason for political activity. Scandal is a staple of the "junkyard dog" media. The media ferret out and publicize instances of conflict of interest, honest graft, and favoritism. Even where old-time temptations still exist, the potential costs of succumbing to temptation may deter the potential sinner. Moreover, the media analyze motives and speculate on the presence of ulterior ones ("Never assume a good motive if a bad one is available"). The only participants who can demonstrate credibility are those who can show that their political stands harm their personal material interests.

If we remove material reasons for participation, why would people participate? Well, there is the altruistic desire to serve one's fellow human beings. I don't think it's overly cynical to suggest that this is not a major factor in explaining political participation, although for some people, it is indeed the explanation. At any rate I can see no obvious reason why this motivation should have become more or less common in recent decades.

A second incentive would be the desire for visibility and adulation, a "love of fame" as Hamilton puts it in *Federalist No.* 72. No doubt this is why some people go into politics, but again, there is no obvious reason why this motivation should be more or less important for political participation today. Indeed, with the growth of the entertainment industry, there probably are more avenues outside politics for publicity seekers and exhibitionists now than in earlier periods of history.

A third reason people participate is in response to what Wilson calls "solidary" incentives (1973, ch. 3). People want to belong to a group, to interact with others whom they like, to affirm symbols and allegiances, and so forth. Historians argue that such incentives have been extremely important stimuli for political participation in the American past (McGerr 1986). Clearly they are much less important today, but again, it seems unlikely that their erosion plays a major role in explaining popular disaffection now

15. Of course, material incentives also are important in states not categorized as TPO. Massachusetts is a good example.

16. I cannot back up this claim with survey data, but I grew up in Pennsylvania and have lived in New York and Massachusetts, and this is certainly my impression of attitudes prevailing in the older subcultures of those states.

because they had greatly diminished in importance at least a generation before the present discontent began.[17]

As the material incentives for political participation declined, it seems likely that ideological incentives took up most of the slack. More than in most of our history, participation today reflects a desire to impose one's view of a better world on the rest of society. Most people today participate because they really do want to save the whales, outlaw abortion, stop global warming, get government off our backs, or achieve some one of a plethora of other ends.[18] And while many people share such goals, the people who participate will be those who feel most intensely about them and whose points of view are most one sided. Again, the reemergence of social issues in the 1960s and afterward—racial, ethnic, religious, cultural—reinforces these trends. Because such issues deeply implicate values, the resulting preferences are intensely held.

In sum, the replacement of material incentives by purposive ones, combined with the growing importance of social issues has transformed political participation in the United States. People who went to meetings or worked in campaigns because their jobs depended on it were different from people who now do so out of ideological zeal. In particular, people who participated because it paid to do so probably were a reasonable cross-section of the electorate, certainly a more representative sample than self-selected participants activated by a cause. Moreover, with real economic benefits at stake, materially motivated participants naturally would be concerned to keep the benefits flowing; this gave them a strong incentive to represent the opinions of the electorate whose decisions controlled the flow. Theories of parties and representation implicitly based on such premises will generate different conclusions—positive and normative—than will theories based on today's realities: parties and participants more extreme in their viewpoints, more reluctant to compromise their positions, and more willing to sacrifice electoral victory for principles.

Consequences of Displacing Material by Ideological Incentives

If the preceding broad arguments are correct, then a number of conclusions about contemporary politics follow naturally. The most obvious is that politics has become more conflictual. If participants hold more ex-

17. As indicated in the subtitle of McGerr's work *The American North, 1865–1928* (1986). McGerr argues that the advertising approach began to replace the mobilization approach about the turn of the century.

18. True, many activists make their living running or working for such organizations. The fact remains, however, that they do not run or work for just any organization. Their ideological preferences point them toward certain issue areas.

treme positions, feel more intensely about their positions, and have little to lose materially by deepening and prolonging controversy, then conflict will be more common.[19] Indeed, in politics today prolonging and deepening controversy may advance one's cause by generating publicity and contributions. Of course, nostalgia always is a danger when thinking about long-term change. Certainly, politics in the 1960s was conflictual, to note the obvious objection. But that was a decade of abnormal politics, as suggested by the tag sometimes applied to it, "the time of troubles." Politics then was about war and race, about young Americans dying and African Americans being denied the most basic rights and privileges. Today, participants go to the mat over leaf blowers, leash laws, and salamanders.

Normal politics today is more conflictual also because of a second characteristic: it is more symbolic. The importance of positions vis-à-vis outcomes has increased. Participants struggle mightily over statements, labels, and gestures that are unlikely to have any real impact. This is a natural consequence of the increased importance of ideological incentives.[20] If I participate because of the rightness of my cause, then opposition is illegitimate. Society must be forced to recognize my cause whether anything tangible follows from that or not. The resurgence of social issues and the rise of what often is called identity politics have reinforced this tendency. Did it really matter whether George W. Bush chose a pro-choice or pro-life running mate? Whether students said a prayer before a high school football game? Whether gays are permitted to marry or whether their relationships receive some alternative but equivalent legal status? Whether Jews can string twine between telephone polls to create symbolic eruvs?[21] To the participants involved in debates like these the answer is a resounding yes! But to millions of uninvolved Americans observing the cross fire, the answer more likely is not really.

A third consequence of the displacement of material incentives by ideological ones is that politics becomes less relevant to the needs and concerns of the mass of Americans. One can understand the frustrations of old-line social democrats who complain that Democratic candidates today devote much energy to identity politics, gun control, abortion, and other issues of critical importance to their constituency groups, while failing to invest comparable energy in advocating a flattening of the income distribution, improving education, and making medical care available to all.[22]

19. As suggested by the classic quip attributed to Wallace Sayres, "the reason academic fights are so vicious is that there is so little at stake."

20. Jane Mansbridge makes this point in the specific case of the women's movement (1986, especially ch. 10).

21. An Eruv is an enclave where the strict restrictions on Sabbath behavior are loosened.

22. Ralph Nader's charge that the Democrats have become lackeys of "corporate America" seems to contradict the argument made in this paper. That is, Nader complains that the Democrats and Republicans differ insignificantly on economic

The preceding characteristics of contemporary politics reinforce the long-standing advantage of the status quo in American politics. A federal system with a separation of powers and a wide array of checks and balances makes it difficult to act, as the proponents of strong parties recognized. The changes in participation discussed above enhance that long-standing generalization. If participants take more extreme positions on issues and focus primarily on issues that do not engage the mass of the American people, they are unlikely to mobilize stable popular majorities that can overcome the usual inertia of the system.

That lack of success in turn suggests two tendencies that are concerns from a democratic theory standpoint. The first is that participants will attempt to escape from electoral politics. If you cannot mobilize majorities behind your point of view, then find a nonmajoritarian arena in which to fight. The courts are the obvious alternative. Develop a legal strategy that results in unelected judges imposing an outcome that elected officials would not (Melnick 1994). If you can criminalize or otherwise delegitimate the actions of your opponents (Ginsburg and Shefter 1990), so much the better. But the courts are not the only alternative. Persuade the president to act unilaterally (Moe and Howell 1999) or have legislators insert a "stealth rider" in a must-pass appropriations or omnibus bill. Such strategies are not at all new, of course, but modern developments make them relatively more attractive than mobilizing majorities and winning elections.

Finally, we come full circle. Not only do the characteristics of contemporary politics tempt elites to leave the electoral arena, they push ordinary people to do so too, indeed, to leave politics altogether. If politics has fallen into the hands of people who take it altogether more seriously than you do, who froth about issues that seem to you peripheral, who advocate policies that strike you as extreme, who demonize their opponents, and who reject reasonable compromises and if, as a consequence, nothing seems to happen very quickly other than judges tossing an occasional bombshell, then why in the world would you devote your valuable and limited time and energy to politics?

In recent decades turnout in U.S. elections has declined, and commentators were disappointed in 2000 when despite intense voter mobiliza-

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issues, a charge that, if true, appears to be at odds with my argument that the parties have become more polarized. An alternative interpretation is that many of today's Democratic activists and officeholders are not very concerned with traditional economic issues. By muting their positions on those issues, they can raise the corporate cash to win elections and attempt to implement social policies that they care intensely about. For example, late in the 2000 campaign, feminist and gay-lesbian groups attacked Nader for his supposed indifference to their issues (Marinucci and Simon 2000). For his part, Nader claimed that Gore and Bush differed only in how fast their knees hit the ground when the corporations called. Evidently, the two sides differed on the issues they viewed as important.

Figure 6 | Turnout Has Declined Primarily Among Less Partisan Americans (Presidential Elections)



Source: Calculated using the ANES 1948–1996 Cumulative Data File.
Notes: Apoliticals are coded as Independents. Cases are weighted by vcf0009.

tion efforts, turnout barely exceeded 50 percent. One of the features of the turnout decline that has not been adequately recognized is that it largely reflects the nonparticipation of moderates. As traced in figure 6, strong partisans report turnout rates as high as ever. Increased nonvoting among weak identifiers, independent leaners, and independents is the source of the turnout decline. On the one hand that observation is not new; we have long known that declining partisanship was a contributor to the turnout decline (e.g., Abramson and Aldrich 1982). But we have not thought about the implications, namely, as indicated in figure 7, a hollowing out of the electorate as moderates participate at lower rates than the extremes. Over the long term this development may encourage candidates to adopt narrow mobilization strategies—appeals to one's base, in preference to centrist strategies designed to win over the median voter (Fiorina 1999c). The fact that centrist pressures seem strongest at the presidential level, where turnout runs around 50 percent than in, say, off-year House elections, where turnout runs around 35 percent suggests that a strategic switch may be rational (to the candidates) somewhere in that range.

The reason that the Hibbing and Theiss-Morse explanation for the present discontent strikes me as incomplete is that it misplaces the blame for that discontent. Reminiscent of Jimmy Carter's "malaise" speech (Nelson 1999, 211–18), Hibbing and Theiss-Morse lay the blame for disaffection with government squarely on citizens themselves. We are distrusting

Figure 7 | Turnout Has Declined Primarily Among Moderates (Presidential Elections)



Source: Calculated using the ANES 1948–1996 Cumulative Data File.
Notes: Extremism of ideology is recoded from a respondent's scores on the Liberal and Conservative Feeling Thermometers (vcf0211 and vcf0212).
To maintain consistency with the NES coding prior to 1970, respondents who answered "Don't know" to either feeling thermometer are coded as 50 on that feeling thermometer. Using these recoded thermometers, a modified version of the Liberal/Conservative index is constructed following the procedure used to construct vcf0801.
Finally, the modified Liberal/Conservative Index is recoded into categories of ideological extremism. Codes 0–24 and 75–97 are recoded as Strong Ideologues, 25–48 and 50–74 as Weak Ideologues, and 49 as Moderates. Cases are weighted by vcf0009.

and cynical because at base we don't like fundamental features of democratic politics. We regard interest groups as wicked, we don't like conflict, and we don't like the bargaining and compromise necessary to settle conflicts. To Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, such attitudes betray naivete about democratic politics. Maybe so. But there is a difference between giving interest groups a fair hearing and allowing selfish and self-righteous groups to dominate the political debate. There is a difference between reasoned disagreement and adolescent temper tantrums and name-calling. And there is a difference between compromises among public officials who disagree in good faith and last-minute logrolls by gridlocked partisans at summits. I am not nearly as sure as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse that the American people should bear the entire blame for their discontent.

Academic and Practical Implications

If the preceding account is persuasive, the question remains, what can be done about it? I am not optimistic that much can be done about the developments described above. Americans are not about to legalize conflict of interest, outlaw public-sector unions, and bring back the spoils system—and they probably would not like the resulting politics any better. That purposive incentives have become more important motivators of political activity is a reality that is not likely to change. The first order of business is to update our theories of representation and electoral competition to take account of these new conditions so that we do not inadvertently lead people astray.

For example, the Supreme Court recently overturned the California blanket primary as an unconstitutional infringement on the party's freedom of association.[23] My impression is that most political scientists applauded the court's decision, but this approval partly reflects an outdated, positive view of the role of parties in a democracy. In reaching its decision, the Court ruled that the state interests claimed by blanket primary supporters were not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the First Amendment rights of the parties. Reading the opinion one cannot help but wonder whether the court's judgement about the balance was influenced by a generally positive view of parties' role in a democracy, a view promulgated by generations of political scientists.[24]

Imagine, for example, that the California plaintiffs had been the kind of corrupt old-style machines that provoked the Progressive movement. Would the Court have been equally solicitous of their associational rights? Perhaps not. The Court's judgment about whether an organization's rights of free expression outweigh the state's claim that it is furthering a compelling interest undoubtedly reflects in some part the justices' views of the value the organization contributes to society. If today's parties contribute less value to American democracy than the textbook portrait of midcentury depicts, we need to make that clear.[25]

As for practical rather than intellectual suggestions, the only one I can offer is analogous to the old hair-of-the-dog remedy for hangovers. Given that we cannot go backward, we need to go farther down the road the populist tradition marks out. If the expansion of participatory opportunities has generated unrepresentative participators, the obvious solution is to increase participation so as to make it more representative by diluting the extreme

23. *California Democratic Party v. Jones,* 530 U.S. 1 (2000).

24. The majority opinion even paraphrases Schattschneider's comment that democracy is "unimaginable without parties" (*Ibid.*, 6).

25. This is not a brief for the specific form of the California blanket primary. As Justice Scalia suggests, a nonpartisan blanket primary could deliver the same benefits, in theory, and it would pass constitutional muster.

voices that dominate contemporary politics. The problem is not that the doors to the public arena have been opened, but that they have not yet been opened so wide that people simply cannot avoid walking through them. Thus, while some contemporary theorists have the general idea right—more participation—their specific recommendations point in precisely the wrong direction. The answer is not, for example, strong democracy, where meetings and deliberation are expanded (Barber 1984). That sort of trend has helped to put us in the present situation. Barring a sudden transformation in human nature, or failing that, the sudden disappearance of TV, the Internet, and other forms of entertainment, the requirements of strong democracy will only decrease participation and make politics less representative.[26]

On the contrary, much more thin democracy is what we need. Given a world in which time is scarce and recreational opportunities are plentiful, the best hope is to proliferate very low cost participatory opportunities, so that majorities can easily weigh in against unrepresentative minorities.[27] For example, we should be open to the burgeoning discussion, however nonsensical it seems at times, about electronic town halls and digital democracy; there may be some promise amidst all the hype. Participatory theorists may decry proposals like these as still further departures from ideal democracy, but we do not live in an ideal world.

I conclude with two extended caveats. First, this essay obviously reflects a majoritarian point of view.[28] In *Federalist No. 10* Madison discounted the likelihood of minority tyranny because by definition minorities would be outweighed by majorities. The argument is persuasive when one considers minorities that are attempting to change the status quo. As an empirical matter, out-of-the-mainstream proposals advocated by various minorities typically are killed somewhere in the process. Thus, minorities often are frustrated. But Madison's argument is less persuasive when one considers minorities that are resisting changes in the status quo. The intricate system Madison and his colleagues devised advantages minorities who resist change; they need only control one veto point in the process. Thus, developments in the past half-century or so have reinforced the system's bias against change, increasing the costs of government and

26. The analogy is to Oscar Wilde's oft-quoted observation that the problem with socialism is that it requires too many evenings.

27. Lijphart's recent call (1997) for compulsory voting is relevant here, although politically infeasible. Compulsory voting is a way of making *nonparticipation* costly.

28. It should go without saying that I am in no way advocating muzzling minority points of view. The question is not whether minorities should have every opportunity to present their cases and persuade majorities. The question is whether procedural and institutional changes should give them influence disproportionate to their numbers.

delaying the decisions of government, and consequently frustrating majorities. In sum, contemporary politics typically frustrates *both* minorities and majorities.

Second, it is possible that nothing much can be done about the present condition because, practically speaking, we already live in the best of all possible worlds. That is, while my argument suggests that today's parties are more a part of the problem than the solution, it may still be the case that they are the best alternative available to a modern democracy, an argument that has been made many times. Various political scientists have made the case that political vacuums are no more long lived than natural ones. If parties do not organize politics, politics will be organized by narrower personal factions and special interest groups.[29] A politics dominated by today's narrow interest groups unconstrained by the larger encompassing forces that parties provide may be even less attractive than a politics dominated by polarized, policy-oriented parties. If Americans in large numbers cannot be induced to participate in politics at least at the level of voting, then the parties as presently constituted still may be the best available alternative, even if they are less a force for representative government than they have been in the past.

I hope that such a lesser-of-other-evils conclusion is simply the product of my limited imagination. The problem, of course, is that living with the least of various evils might not be stable. The ultimate result may be that feared by those who are troubled by the trends discussed in the first section of this paper—a turn away from a public sector that has lost the confidence and support of the citizenry and a turn away from public life that has taken on unattractive features. While we may be entering a new era in which citizens of democracies the world over claim to want less centralized, less intrusive government, there is no good evidence that they want government to do less rather than more (Clark 2000). But in the present context it is hard to see how public officials can consider the myriad demands of citizens without increasing the level of popular frustration as well.

29. On factional politics see, of course, Key 1949, esp. ch. 14. On parties versus interest groups, see Schattschneider 1942, esp. ch. 8.

AMY GUTMANN

Identity and Democracy: A Synthetic Perspective

The ever-growing attention to group identities and identity groups in normative political theory parallels their saliency in contemporary democratic politics. Groups of individuals bound together by a shared social identity such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, color, class, physical disability, or political ideology make political claims that range from exempting themselves from disproportionately burdensome laws to exercising sovereignty. A large literature has developed over the past three decades centering around the claims of identity groups in democratic politics, often beginning with the premise that individual identities are socially constructed (rather than essentialist) and then pursuing the political implications of social construction. The idea of the social construction of identity is so open ended, however, that it has no political implications, leaving us with the question of whether the use of identity in political analysis is at all meaningful (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).

What is identity group politics? Is it reducible to interest group politics? Are there any political implications of a shared group identity, for example, for exemption from otherwise valid laws or for group rights? Critics of identity group politics often contrast it to the free association of individuals. Free association is thought to enable people to develop their identities as they see fit, not as any group determines for them. Yet associational freedom permits group exclusivity, and exclusions based on ascriptive group identity perpetuate a negative identity group politics, which leaves many people—simply by virtue of their group identity—with less than equal freedom, opportunity, and civic standing. Should democratic governments therefore constrain civic associations not to discriminate against people on the basis of their group identities?

A growing and wide-ranging scholarship on group identity and associational freedom in nonideal democracies addresses this question. It suggests that "Who should decide what and how in democratic politics?" cannot be answered without taking more notice of the political role of group identities and civic associations in nonideal contexts than ideal theories of justice ever do (Rawls 1971, 1999b; Carens 2000). In every existing nonideal democracy, individuals identify themselves and are identified by others, especially for public purposes, with voluntary and involuntary groups defined by social markers such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, race, age, disability, and political ideology. Even if none of these group identities—nor all of them taken together—completely defines any individual, group identities both constrain and liberate individuals, depending on the identity, the individual, and the context (Appiah 1996, 97–99). Group identities also play a central role in democratic politics, for better and for worse, because most individuals can be politically influential only in groups and some groups are far more justice friendly than others.

The scholarship on identity and democracy is internally divided over whether voluntary or involuntary group identities generally operate for the better or the worse in democratic politics. The "school of culture" emphasizes the essential contribution that cultural groups make to the lives of individuals in providing a sense of secure belonging and a set of scripts that give meaning to individual lives. The school of culture therefore warns against treating the ideal of the free and equal person as if actual individuals could be conceived independently of any and all cultural contexts. By contrast, the "school of choice" emphasizes the value of individual freedom from involuntary groups, the freedom to criticize and revise culturally given identities, and a correlative right of free association. The school of choice therefore issues precisely the opposite warning from the school of culture: Do not treat cultural groups as if they were primordial, sovereign authorities over individuals who should be accorded the civic standing of free and equal persons in democratic societies.

In this essay, I propose a synthesis that avoids the temptation, on the one hand, to elevate cultural groups over the individual, and, on the other hand, to conceive of individuals free from socially given identities. I build this synthesis on the insights offered by the schools of culture and choice at their strongest, and I therefore criticize those claims that rest on a conception of democratic societies as mere aggregations of either comprehensive cultural groups or free and equal individuals. A synthetic perspective situates the humanist ideals of freedom, opportunity, and civic equality for all persons within nonideal democratic contexts and, by so doing, offers a perspective on identity politics that is absent from ideal theories of justice. In the context of a society still suffering from a legacy of racial and gender discrimination, for example, racial minorities and women often have no better political alternative than to engage in collective action with the aid of identity groups and the aim of achieving greater civic equality and justice. For members of subordinated groups to eschew all identity associations would be counterproductive to justice. Yet not all identity groups are justice friendly, and therefore a synthetic perspective needs to distinguish among different kinds of ascriptive identity politics. Without the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), for example, African Americans would be worse off than they are today, whereas without the Klu Klux Klan (KKK) they would be better off, yet both are ascriptively based associations. To tell African Americans that they should not identify as a group for the purposes of democratic politics is to tell them to ignore both history and contemporary reality; to tell them that they should only identify as an ascriptive group would be similarly misleading.

Many commentators on identity politics condemn it without qualification while many others uncritically applaud it. To understand and evaluate different kinds of identity groups and how they function in nonideal democratic contexts, I begin by recognizing the irreducible tension between individual freedom and the shaping of individual identities and democratic politics by groups. When we recognize this irreducible tension, we are in a better position to understand the relationship among group identities, democratic politics, and the ideals of individual freedom, opportunity, and civic equality. The first section asks what identity groups are, and what is the relationship between identity and interest group politics. Can identity group politics be reduced to interest group politics? Is interest group politics, as commentators suggest, "an inherent part of the governing process of a democracy" while identity group politics "is antithetical to the basic principle of one indivisible nation" (Connerly 1997)? The next two sections examine two opposing schools of thought on the role of group identity in democratic politics: the schools of culture and of choice. The final section develops the implications of a more synthetic perspective by revisiting the divisive issue of group rights and by raising the question of how missing identities might alter democratic landscapes.

■ | Identifying Identity Group and Interest Group Politics

An identity group, as the name suggests, is bound up with who people are, not merely with what they want. The distinctive and defining feature of an identity group is the identification of its members as a certain kind of person, and therefore its members' mutual identification with people of that kind, where the kind is a consequential social category (Fearon 1999). This mutual identification around a social category is independent of—yet also clearly compatible with—the pursuit of instrumental ends by the group. When a group of people who mutually identify around a social category act in politics on the basis of a group identity—whether for the sake of gaining recognition for the group or furthering the interests of the group—they are part of identity group politics.

Identities and therefore identity groups are socially constructed. To say this, however, is not to say much more than that genes and physiognomies do not determine our social identities. "People are limited by, but they are not prisoners of, their genes, their physiognomies, and their histories in settling on their own identities. And if powerful social forces motivate identity exploration—as they seem to do in our age—it is the constructivist face of identity that seems the more real" (Laitin 1998a, 21). Almost everything that informs our social identities—such as race, gender (as distinct from biological sex), ethnicity, and nationality—can be called social constructions. To say that racial, gender, ethnic, and national identities are social constructions is not to say that they are any easier to change than our genetic inheritance or physiognomy. Most African Americans, women, and deaf people cannot "pass" for white, men, or hearing individuals; they can reinterpret these ascriptive identities but they cannot give them up. For some people, ethnic identities that are connected to a native language may be somewhat easier to change, by a decision to speak a second language and give up certain customary ways of acting, but even an ethnic identity can be difficult to alter except by generational change.

Yet many people do change their ascriptive identities over time, sometimes quite deliberately and strategically. The social construction of identity is most evident when identities are "constructed and reconstructed as social opportunities change" (Laitin 1998a, 20). To account for such change, especially among ethnic minorities, political scientists propose a rational-choice theory about the social construction of identity. A rational-choice theory posits that people retain or change their social identities according to what best satisfies their interests, and what best satisfies their interests depends in turn on the payoffs people predict from the alternate identities that are available to them. According to rational-choice theory, in any given social context, people choose the available identity that they predict will best serve their interests. When identity change is possible, on this theory, it is interest driven. Even ascriptive identity, when it is not simply a social given, is one among many tools in the arsenal of interest-based politics. But this does not mean that identity politics is reducible to interest politics; what it means is that identities and interests interact, and the two kinds of politics work together. Both need to be understood for what each contributes to understanding politics.

A rational-choice theory that admits all kinds of actions as interest based (by positing interests that conform to all the revealed preferences of people) is a hollow shell into which all actions can be fit and said to conform to its premise: people act in ways that reveal (and therefore reflect) their interests. Actions reveal people's preferences, and their interests are said to be their revealed preferences. All political action can be placed within such a rational-choice framework before it is analyzed. Used as an unfalsifiable framework of analysis, a rational-choice theory cannot claim that identity politics is reducible to interest group politics in any substantively meaningful sense. If we stipulate that all human behavior is interest driven, then *everything* is reducible to interest group politics, but not in a way that informs our understanding of how democratic politics works. To say that human behavior is interest driven is to say nothing, for example, to understand actions that reflect group identification or moral commitment on the part of people and those that reflect nothing more than a self-welfare goal. The most plausible alternative to reducing all identity politics to interest politics does not deny that changes in identity are interest driven. Nor does it claim that identity politics conflicts with a politics based on interests. Rather it suggests that identities inform people's interests. Because identity often informs interest, identity cannot be *reduced* to interest. Interests do not always, or even generally, precede identity in a way that would permit an insightful observer to explain people's behavior by their prior interests, without knowing their identities.

How then is an identity group analytically different from an interest group? The ideal type of interest group organizes around a shared instrumental interest of individuals (Olson 1971). The ideal type of identity group organizes around mutual identification among its members. In political practice, most organized groups are both identity and interest groups. Members are drawn to the group because of their mutual identification and because they share an instrumental interest pursued by the group. David Truman subsumes identity and interest groups, and everything Madison called a "faction," into his definition of interest groups: "any group that . . . makes certain claims upon other groups . . . for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the[ir] shared attitudes" (1971, 33). More analytical definitions of identity and interest groups that are not so broad as to verge on being meaningless are preferable.

The defining features of identity and interest groups—the mutual identification of people with one another, on the one hand, and the seeking together of a shared instrumental goal, on the other—are often mutually reinforcing. Most identity groups pursue instrumental interests of their members and thereby encourage more people to see their identities as bound up with a group. Many interest groups encourage people to join by orienting themselves around some mutual identification that is broader than the specific interests that they are pursuing at any given time. Some interest group theorists call these solidary incentives (Cigler and Loomis 1995, 9). The greater the role that identity plays in attracting and retaining members, the more a group is an interest group. The greater the role that the pursuit of shared instrumental interests plays in attracting and retaining members, the more a group is an interest group. Most groups that act in democratic politics are a combination of both, and for two good reasons. First, people's identification with one another influences their sense of what they want, and people's sense of what they want influences with whom they identify. Second, individuals who identify with others are better able to organize politically, and organized groups can be far more politically effective than an equal number of unallied citizens (Moe 1980). This observation provides the single most salient answer to the question of why group identity matters so much in democratic politics. Group identification—whether it be around gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, nationality, age, disability, or ideology—provides no less "real" a set of reasons for people to organize politically than purely material incentives. As important, the two kinds of reasons—identity and interest—are often mutually reinforcing.

Once we recognize the reality of identity group politics and its interaction with interest group politics, along with its social construction, we avoid reification, which is the single most common charge of academic critics who suggest that analyzing identity politics as a real phenomenon entails approving of " 'groupness' itself" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 31). Quite the contrary, we are now in a better position to consider two serious challenges that identity politics presents in democratic politics. First, illiberal identity groups erect obstacles to the civic equality of some members, often women and disadvantaged minorities, who do not want to choose between their cultural group identity and their recognition as equal citizens. Must members of illiberal cultural groups be forced to choose? Second, voluntary groups claim the right to associate as their members see fit and therefore the right to exclude those they deem unfit for membership. Should civic associations that prejudicially exclude people associated with historically disadvantaged identity groups be permitted to discriminate even at the cost of civic equality, equal liberty or opportunity for those who are excluded? In examining how the schools of culture and choice address these challenges, I develop a more synthetic perspective on identity and democracy, which is consistent with furthering the ideals of civic equality, basic liberty, and opportunity for all persons, regardless of their group identities.

■ | The School of Culture: Questioning Claims about Comprehensiveness

A societal culture, or culture for short, as Will Kymlicka (1995b) describes it, typically consists of a common language, history, institutions of socialization, range of occupations, lifestyles, and customs.[1] As commonly understood by the school of culture, culture is not a "continuously contested,

1. See Kymlicka 1995a, 18. What Kymlicka calls a societal culture, Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit call a pervasive culture. A pervasive culture "defines or marks a variety of forms or styles of life, types of activity, occupation, pursuit, and relationship. With national groups we expect to find national cuisines, distinctive architectural styles, a common language, distinctive literary and artistic traditions, national music, customs, dress, ceremonies and holidays, etc. None of these is necessary." People who share—or come close to sharing—a pervasive culture and whose "identity is determined at least in part by their culture" are "serious candidates for the right to self-determination" in the account offered by Margalit and Raz (1994, 114).

imagined and reimagined melange" of disparate influences (Tully 1995, 11; Waldron 1995, 105–8). Rather it is a coherent set that both informs and limits what it is feasible for people to be and to imagine.[2] Culture provides a constraining context for meaningful choice, and an "anchor for self-identification and the safety of effortless, secure belonging" (Margalit and Raz 1994, 114).

The societal cultures of modern democratic societies not only inform and structure people's choices; they also shape people's desires and needs for social recognition. The "politics of recognition" refers to the modern need for individual identities to be politically recognized. People in modern society, Charles Taylor famously argues, following Rousseau and Hegel, "can flourish only to the extent that [they] are recognized. Each consciousness seeks recognition in another, and this is not a sign of a lack of virtue" (1994, 50). Axel Honneth, another theorist of culture, agrees with Taylor that people have basic rights to living freely, and freedom means not being imposed on by an external authority. Honneth also argues, without any obvious ambivalence, that people need to be politically recognized by government for their deepest particularity (1996, 1995, 255–56).

There is, as Taylor realizes, an unresolved anomaly in the politics of recognition. People want to be recognized not only as generically human but also as culturally distinctive, and this places seemingly impossible demands on democratic governments that contain more than a single distinctive culture within them. A democratic politics of recognition needs both to respect deep cultural differences—by way of some group rights—and also protect the basic rights of individuals that include free speech, press, religion, suffrage, political participation, equal protection, and due process (Taylor 1994, 59–60). The group rights must leave room for protecting basic individual rights, and vice versa. A defensible balance of respect for individual and group rights makes it possible for every person—whether associated with a majority or minority culture—to be treated as a civic equal.

Why, theorists of choice ask, are group rights needed at all? Why can't individual rights suffice for recognizing people as civic equals with various cultural identities? If everyone living within the territorial boundaries of a democracy identified equally with the dominant societal culture and was treated as a civic equal by it, then individual rights would suffice. Individual rights are problematic because of a contingent fact about every modern democratic society: not every person identifies equally or is treated as a civic equal by the dominant societal culture. The problem cannot be resolved by finding a neutral societal culture, because there is no such thing.

2. "Familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing in a culture, being part of it, determines the limits of the feasible" (Margalit and Raz 1994, 119).

A neutral societal culture would not even be desirable, were it possible. People reasonably—and passionately—want to be reciprocally recognized in their cultural particularity, not only as (culturally naked) human beings. They want to feel at home in their society, not like foreign visitors. The bias of a societal culture solves this problem but creates another: it disadvantages some people relative to others and unfairly so because the disadvantage accrues on the basis of ascriptive characteristics, not by virtue of anything the person has voluntarily done. The more systematic and severe the disadvantages that accrue to individuals whose identities are tied to a different culture, the less able democracies are to secure basic liberty, opportunity, and equal respect for all their citizens by a uniform set of individual rights.

How can a societal culture unfairly advantage or disadvantage different groups? Most democratic societies today contain subordinate identity groups whose members are identified with a different culture from the dominant one. Because the dominant culture is public, it affects the life chances of everyone who inhabits the society. Government conducts its business, public schools teach, and the mass media broadcast in the dominant language and in conformity with a culturally distinctive calendar. Family law conforms to the dominant culture. Established business enterprises and civic associations favor people who identify with the dominant culture. Distance from the dominant culture carries with it economic, educational, and social disadvantages, which originate not in voluntary choices but in inherited identities. At the same time, democracies publicly profess their commitment—deeply rooted in democratic thought (although persistently violated in practice)—that individuals should not be disadvantaged by unchosen attributes, such as an ascriptive group identity.

The problem is most acute with regard to what Kymlicka calls a "national minority," a group like the Québécois who have their own societal culture but who live within a larger democracy (1995b, 10–12). But the problem also applies to members of any ascriptive group who are disadvantaged by the societal culture of a democracy where they settled in order to live a minimally decent life rather than because they considered it the best of several good choices. Immigration cannot be considered voluntary settlement so as to impose disadvantages as if by the immigrants' consent. The distinctive political claim of the school of culture is that in the absence of any special measures, members of societal cultures will have unequal freedom and opportunity. To make matters worse, a democratic government's failure to consider special measures is also reasonably perceived as disrespectful of their identities. The school of culture therefore defends some special rights for members of otherwise disadvantaged cultural groups.

Group rights present a prospect and a problem for democracy. The prospect is that some group rights may be able to provide a legitimate means—in addition to individual rights and popular rule—to pursue justice for members of groups who are otherwise unfairly disadvantaged.

Group rights that exempt members of some groups from public policies that impose unfair burdens and special aid to overcome the unfair disadvantages illustrate this prospect. The problem is that other group rights may violate basic individual rights. Group rights that limit the basic rights of individuals in order to protect an endangered cultural practice or to defend absolute sovereignty for the cultural group illustrate this problem. The challenge is therefore to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate group rights (Levy 1997; Lukes 1997; Williams 1998).

The country that is the theoretical home of group rights offers a good example of the defensibility of special exemptions from laws that impose unfair burdens on members of an identity group (because of their group identity). Such special exemptions are meaningfully considered a kind of group right, since they apply to individuals only by virtue of their group identity.[3] In 1990, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police decided to exempt a group from a long-standing rule. They exempted Sikhs from wearing the wide-brimmed hat that has long been part of their required uniform. The exemption made it possible for Sikhs to join the Mounties without giving up their identity as Sikhs. One might consider this decision innocuous—the rule is far from earthshaking in its significance—but it is quite typical of many rules that have raised public controversies over group rights. The Mounties' decision met with six years of protests, beginning with a petition to parliament signed by 210,000 Canadians and demonstrations displaying antiturban badges and anti-Sikh slogans and ending with an appeal in 1996 to the Canadian Supreme Court, which refused to hear the challenge (Winsor 1996).

The Mounties' example illustrates two important but often neglected points: (1) no controversial claim about identity is needed to defend exempting members of a group even from some rules that reflect no intent to discriminate; and (2) some group rights can provide effective ways of respecting individual rights, which classical liberal defenders of individual rights have neglected but need not oppose. On a Lockean liberal argument, the government is not required to exempt minorities from facially neutral laws that unequally burden their religious beliefs, but neither is it prohibited from doing so as long as the exemption does not violate someone else's rights.[4] A crucial feature of this exemption is that it lifts unfair burdens (borne by members of a group through no fault of their own) and

3. Some liberals deny that these kinds of special exemptions are group rights because they want to reserve the idea of group rights for rights that have no liberal justification. But to define all group rights as illiberal and therefore unjustified obscures the substantive agreement that is possible in cases like that of the Sikh Mounties.

4. I examine competing interpretations of Locke's view on facially neutral laws and religious believers in Gutmann 2000, 127–64. For a contrasting view, see McConnell 2000, 90–110.

does not violate any individual rights. By contrast, other group rights—which liberals must oppose—violate basic individual rights. No democratic perspective that takes the interests of individuals seriously can defend cultural practices that violate basic individual rights, whether of members or nonmembers of a cultural group.[5] Because the moral value of the group derives from the way it supports the interests of individuals over time, maintaining a customary practice of the group at the expense of the basic liberties and opportunities of individuals is morally indefensible (Blake 2000).[6]

When a group demands the right of self-governance over its customary legal practices, and those practices include extensive discrimination in family law against the basic rights of some of its members (often women and children), its demands are suspect to the extent that the larger society would otherwise protect those rights. The group may still have extensive rights of self-government, but self-governing rights—like all rights—can and should be limited by competing rights. Even when groups cannot have extensive rights of self-government, they may be justifiably guaranteed representation within a legislature that would otherwise routinely pass discriminatory legislation against the group, which the courts would uphold or refuse to review. Guaranteed representation for a group is more problematic the less internally democratic the group is and the more its members must give up other freedoms for their votes to be counted as part of the group. Two critical points emerge that call for a far more nuanced view of group rights than is typically offered: (1) group rights of self-government and representation are not all or nothing, and (2) group rights should be assessed on the basis of how well they protect the basic interests—including the basic rights—of individuals compared to the available institutional alternatives.

Why do theorists of culture argue as if group rights of self-government are all or nothing? A starting premise of the school of culture is that societal cultures *partly* determine the identity of their members and provide a secure sense of belonging. The authority of a group to govern itself is thought to follow from the idea that the self-governing group represents the societal culture to which its members belong. But this idea presumes that

5. See, for example, a doctor's description of the practice of clitoridectomy on young girls, which is sometimes misrepresented as analogous to male circumcision, Dreifus 2000, F7.

6. The aesthetic value of cultural practices is a different issue, which I cannot address in this essay. Charles Taylor attributes to individuals an interest in their culture surviving over time, since people want to be assured that their descendants will share the same culture as they do. This raises the difficult question of what the basic interests (and therefore the basic rights) of individuals are and how they should be determined (Taylor 1994, 51–73); and for a sense of how heated the debate over culture can be, see David Bromwich, Michael Walzer, and Taylor in *Dissent* (1995, 89–106).

a single societal culture is comprehensive in constituting people's identities, which no major theorist of culture explicitly defends (because it is apparently indefensible). When a single culture is assumed to constitute the shared identity of members of a minority group, it is easy to conclude that any degree of government by the larger society—even when in defense of the basic rights of women, half the members of the minority group—constitutes imposition by a "foreign" power. This conclusion is doubly misleading because it assumes what it sets out to argue and its assumption is indefensible. The assumption is that a single societal culture so comprehensively constitutes the identities of individuals as to justify granting the group comprehensive sovereign authority to rule its "own" members even at the price of violating their basic rights.

Grant that some cultures are far more comprehensive than others in shaping people's lives, and it is still not credible to assume that one and only one societal culture exclusively encompasses the cultural identities of citizens of contemporary democracies.[7] When this assumption is applied to Native American women, for example, the effect is to force women (but not men) to choose between membership in their Native American tribe and equal democratic citizenship. Theorists of culture analogize intervention by a democratic government to vindicate the rights of Native American women with foreign intervention into the affairs of another country (Kymlicka 1995a, 167). Kymlicka recognizes that the Santa Clara Pueblo wrongly violated women's rights, but he defends its authority to do so on grounds that no country has any right to intervene in the affairs of another country in order to vindicate the rights of women.

The problem with this perspective is that it assumes without argument that the analogy with foreign countries supports the case for nonintervention. But should a national government be assumed to have such comprehensive sovereign authority that it may violate individual rights even if an established legal tribunal could prevent it from so doing without any violence? If not, then even when no established tribunal exists, political theorists should explore the case for establishing one. A nationalism—whether writ large or small—that unnecessarily authorizes the systematic violation of individual rights is not a nationalism worthy of defense. Theorists of culture like Kymlicka who agree that cultures derive their moral value from aiding individuals, not vice versa, have the resources to correct their own tendency to grant more sovereign authority to minority cultures than they would grant a similarly oppressive majority culture when peaceful ways of overcoming the oppression are available.

Other theorists of culture take a relativist view about what oppression entails; they argue that the cultural identity of people determines what

7. To consider the single societal culture of a pluralistic democracy to be the aggregate of all the cultures within it would simply further confuse matters and "prove" the case by a misleading definition.

counts as oppression. Many of the group rights that are prominently defended in contemporary politics—and also in political theory—threaten to perpetuate the subordination of half the world's population, namely women. The cultural relativist view is that the cultural identity of women comes attached to these practices, which are not identified as oppressive because this interpretation is itself identified as foreign to the indigenous practice. To try to obliterate the practices is viewed as tantamount to trying to obliterate these women, to do away with their cultural identities, with who they are. The relativizing move here allows a cultural identity to go morally imperial and lets it block any vindication of the basic rights of women. On this analysis, cultural identity precludes the vindication of women's equal rights with men, but this preclusion is as much of an imposed theoretical construct as any. A cultural identity is assumed—although never actually shown—to comprehend the entirety of a person's identity, and a cultural identity is allowed to become morally imperial and therefore to deny basic rights to women. Group rights to enforce child marriage, forced marriage, polygamy (or, more accurately, polygyny), clitoridectomy, discriminatory divorce, unequal schooling of girls and boys, and unequal property rights threaten the basic rights of women in a way that no argument from cultural identity alone has ever been able to overcome.[8] Is there any reason that the dominant members of cultural groups should be granted the right to restrict the basic rights of women?

A school within the school of culture explicitly defends a broad cultural right within liberal democracies to restrict the basic rights of women. Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal argue that, "Protecting cultures out of the human right to culture may take the form of an obligation [of liberal democratic governments] to support cultures that flout the rights of the individual in a liberal society" (1994, 491). This defense of the right to culture therefore goes so far as to claim that liberal democracies have an obligation to support cultures in their midst that flout the rights of women, among other individuals. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture in Israel, according to this argument, must be supported by the state in its totality, which includes flouting the rights of women in schooling, divorce law, and inheritance, and respecting Ultra-Orthodox men as the guardians of the authoritative rules of a publicly supported cultural community (493). One individual right is treated as independent of any particular culture and that is the right to exit a cultural community.[9] This is the right that undermines the rule of cultural relativism. If individual identities are so comprehen-

8. For an extended discussion, see Okin, Moller, et al. 1999, Nussbaum and Glover 1994, and Nussbaum 1997b.

9. The right of exit to a free market society is also the only right of individuals recognized by Chandran Kukathas who defends the right of minority groups—no matter how illiberal—to be left alone (1992, 105–39). For a critique of Kukathas on the right of exit, see Kymlicka, 1995a, 190, 234–35, n. 18.

sively tied to a particular culture, then theorists of culture cannot consistently defend even this minimalist right of individuals to exit an oppressive community. If individual identities are not so comprehensively tied to a particular culture, then far more than a right to exit is needed to protect the basic interests of individuals in living the lives of free and equal citizens in the context of a multicultural democratic society.

The failure of the "no more than a right to exit" argument offers a sobering reminder of the dangers of tying individual identity far too comprehensively to a single societal culture. Margalit and Halbertal begin by claiming that each particular culture creates a person's "personality identity." They then claim that "every person has an overriding interest in his personality identity—that is, in preserving his way of life and the traits that are central identity components for him and the other members of his cultural group" (505). If we accept this *overriding* interest of individuals, no theoretical room remains for an *individual right* to exit. Rights protect basic interests of individuals. An individual cannot have a basic interest in freeing herself from her personality identity *if her basic (and overriding) interest is defined as preserving her personality identity.* But this logic of course begs the crucial question: Is there any good reason to assume that the basic and overriding interest of all women lies in preserving their personality identity as defined by the other members of their cultural group?[10]

The basic tenets of the view that an individual's *overriding* interest lies in preserving the entirety of her personality identity, where that identity is given by her culture, are misleading. Many women (and men also, of course) reasonably think that they do not have a basic interest in preserving the cultural identity that has been imposed on them. They also reasonably doubt that a culture creates—rather than influences—the entirety of their "personality identity." Some women reasonably think that their particular cultural community unjustifiably subordinates them to men and discriminates against them by denying them basic liberties and opportunities available to men. They are thereby denied the equal civic and political standing that is due them. As long as *any* woman reasonably thinks this, the "right to culture" argument fails as a defense of the authority of a cultural community to preserve itself by denying women their basic liberty and opportunity rights and their status as civic equals. (The same argument applies to any person; the example of women is so striking because the violations of their

10. One might revise the perspective to say that a person has an overriding interest only in her personality identity as she defines it, not as defined by other members of her cultural group. This starting point would support many more culturally independent rights of individuals than the right to exit. Individuals would then have a right to resist having a cultural group impose laws and rules on them that violate their personality identities. But this is not the view of personality identity that Margalit and Halbertal defend. Their view does not permit any clear distinction between what is important to the individual and the group of which she is a member.

rights are at once so conspicuous and so commonly excused or even justified on cultural grounds.)

Why isn't the formal right of exit an adequate antidote to granting cultural groups the authority to treat their members in illiberal ways? Once theorists of culture defend a right to exit from cultural groups, they are implicitly acknowledging the value of individual consent and respect for persons. They then cannot consistently justify subordinating individuals in cultural groups that deprive them of the necessary conditions for making the right to exit effective. A formal right of exit can be an adequate antidote to illiberal ways in which truly voluntary associations treat their members. But groups that represent societal cultures—by the very premises of theorists of culture—are not voluntary associations. When quasi-comprehensive cultural groups violate rights with the support of democratic governments, they greatly reduce the basic liberties and opportunities that their members would otherwise have to live a life of their own choosing either inside or outside the community. An Ultra-Orthodox woman in Israel is not educated to support herself or her children outside of the Ultra-Orthodox community. She is not taught the legitimacy of questioning her tightly circumscribed place in the Ultra-Orthodox community. To claim that she has an overriding interest in preserving a culturally imposed personality identity is to claim that her overriding interest is to subordinate her life to a comprehensive set of laws over which she has no say in interpreting or altering.[11] This is not a claim that anyone can make authoritatively on her behalf.

There is thus a paradox in claiming the subordination of women is justified because their overriding interest lies in being subordinated. For anyone to know that this is the case, women, like men, must be given equal freedom to decide the kinds of lives they want to live within the range of the possible.[12] Denying them the freedom in the first place cannot validate the claim that they do not really want or need this freedom. No theoretical argument can justify the subordination of women within cultures that deny them any basic rights other than a formal right of exit. For women to have the effective right to assess whether they want to remain within a cultural group that subordinates them or to exit that group, a democratic society must secure them an effective right to exit, an education for equal citizenship in the larger society, and other basic rights as well. An effective right to exit means at minimum being able to exit and still support oneself and one's children. Securing women these rights means not ceding cultural groups within a democracy the authority to control schooling and family law so as to effectively deny women the same basic liberties and opportuni-

11. This premise is also another example of a general conflation of what a person's identity is and what that person ought to do. For a critique of this conflation, see Hardin 1995, 6–10.

12. John Stuart Mill was the first to point this out (1975, 451–56).

ties as men. Democratic states may need to tolerate some violations of basic rights when political intervention would make matters worse, but a pragmatic argument of this kind denies any obligation on the part of a democratic state to support cultural groups at the expense of violating the basic rights of individuals.

Taken at its strongest, the school of culture recognizes that there is no group right to subordinate individuals to a societal culture by violating their basic rights. At its weakest, it erects indefensible obstacles to vindicating the basic rights of members and nonmembers of cultural groups. Even if the societal culture of the Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community were self-contained for members of that community, its effects on nonmembers would still be morally and politically relevant. The politics of cultural minorities rarely can be isolated from a broader politics, which to extend the Israeli example, profoundly affects the liberty and opportunity of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and non-Orthodox Israeli Jews.

The politics of cultural identity groups also shapes the identities of future generations in ways that the school of culture assumes to be legitimate extensions of a group right to self-determination. Cultural groups within democratic societies are an intricately interdependent part of the larger society. They must be able to interact politically and often economically as well with people outside their groups, and people outside their groups with them. This interdependence, moreover, affects the liberty, opportunity, and civic standing of both outsiders and insiders to these groups since each depends on the other to ensure the equal protection of rights. If some members of cultural groups identify only with a single group, it is therefore not because the comprehensive conditions of their lives are independent of the larger society. (Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel depend heavily on support from the rest of society for their schools, police protection, and national security.) Members of cultural groups also influence the larger politics of democratic societies as much as many other citizens, sometimes even more so (as the Israeli example also illustrates.) Members of distinctive cultural groups are also often more dependent on the larger society to support their distinctive cultures. This is not an argument against the dependency of cultural groups or their influence on the larger society. Quite the contrary, it is an argument against a politics or political theory that posits the comprehensiveness of societal cultures and therefore depends on denying the interdependence of cultures and cultural communities within democratic societies.

■ | The School of Choice: Questioning the Conditions of Voluntariness

The basic premise of the school of choice is the freedom of individuals to identify and live as they like, not as anyone else determines. The mark of a free person is "living as one likes, associating on one's own terms, engaging in voluntary relationships of all sorts, finding or trying to find pleasure in them, and also finding in them opportunities for many kinds of experience" (Kateb 1998, 37–39). Free people tolerate "being regulated only with deep constitutional regret."[13] They need to be politically recognized not for their particular group identities but rather as bearers of equal rights.[14] Among these rights are those that protect equal citizenship and freedom of association (Kateb 1994, 1998).

The freedom of individuals is limited by socialization and social context, and the school of choice at its strongest recognizes this. Cultural identities are imposed by socialization. I did not choose to be a Jewish-American woman conceived in India and born in the United States to a German-Jewish refugee father and Jewish-American mother. This causally determined cultural identity (scientists may soon be able to add a detailed description of my genetic determination) is compatible with my freedom to identify as something more than a Jewish-American woman (with determinate genetic markers). I could also choose to identify as *other* than what I am identified as, but not without a far greater struggle than were I born *other.* Although I in fact identify as a Jewish-American woman, I also identify as more than that, and more than the aggregation of all my ascriptive identities put together. It is of course quite possible that my freedom to identify as something more than my ascriptive identities is causally determined by the interaction between genetic capacities and social context. But this kind of causal determination is compatible with the value that the school of choice places on freedom of association.

The value of free association depends not on whether human identity is independent of causality but rather on whether individuals are accorded the freedom within a democratic context to identify *as they themselves see fit, not as government—or a similarly powerful agent in society—determines for them.* This freedom in turn depends on whether individuals are free to enter and exit associations at their own will, rather than someone else's. Herein lie prospects and problems for the school of choice, and for anyone who values freedom of association as a legitimate source of identity formation and affirmation. Free association can create a democratic culture of voluntary associations that are appropriate sites for recognizing a wide range of group identities. Voluntary associations, precisely because they are voluntary, are places where a democratic *culture* of recognition as distinct from a *politics* of recognition can flourish. A democratic culture is com-

13. For his more general critique of a politics of recognition, see Kateb 1994, 511–37.

14. Axel Honneth, a theorist of culture, diverges from theorists of choice on this precise point. Although Honneth agrees that freedom means not being imposed on by an external authority, he argues that people need to be politically recognized by government for their deepest particularity (Honneth 1995, 255–56, 1996).

posed of many uncoordinated sites of recognition consisting of voluntary associations where people identify with one another in a multitude of ways.

An uncoordinated landscape of voluntary associations is also a realm of many misrecognitions. Associations that prejudicially exclude people on the basis of their race, gender, ethnicity, and other ascriptive characteristics are a source of negative identity politics. Negative identity politics poses a challenge to theorists of choice who claim that unregulated freedom of association liberates people from the social typecasting of their identities and lives. Unregulated civic associations in the United States simplistically stereotyped women and men; homosexuals and heterosexuals; Christians, Jews, and Muslims; African Americans and whites; and many more social categories of people. Before examining the challenge that this organized prejudice presents for the school of choice, we should also appreciate what theorists of choice view as the virtue in tolerating misrecognition. Any culture that is free to be changed by the (necessarily imperfect) people whose lives it shapes is also bound to mischaracterize and misunderstand people. Some degree of misrecognition—not every degree or the degree of the status quo—is a price worth paying for freedom of association and for the recognition that people are more than what public recognition in any society of human beings makes possible. This sometimes painful realization is perhaps the hardest won insight of human freedom and the school of thought that prizes freedom above all else.

Freedom of association still carries with it the prospect that all people can be publicly (but not authoritatively) recognized for some of their particularities if they so desire. To be publicly recognized in all of one's particularity, friendship and love would become public projects. This is the politics of recognition taken to its logical extreme. Love is not love that strives to make itself public in all its particularities; it is at best the public manifestation of love, which is a pale packaged imitation (as television talk shows all too vividly reveal). A civic society that strives without pathology to satisfy the desire for public recognition cannot aspire to create a public culture of authenticity. Only people themselves, acting freely through their associational choices, can recognize each other for who they are, and even then only imperfectly.

Yet some misrecognitions are troubling on the grounds of freedom itself; they reflect the failure of a democratic society to secure the conditions under which members of unjustly subordinated groups have as much effective freedom as their peers. The school of choice cannot avoid confronting the question of the social conditions under which some people are prevented from affirming their identities through their associational choices. Conditions of exit out of associations and entry into them are critical to assessing whether they support individual freedom. Let's begin with the issue of exit since it is the more straightforward. Voluntary associations can be so called only if people who choose to join them are not compelled to remain members (Barry 2001, 155–93). It is almost as simple as this:

Voluntary associations cannot prevent their members from leaving and still be considered voluntary or the basis of free affirmation of identity by individuals. Democratic governments therefore must guarantee that all people be effectively free to exit any association that they are permitted to enter.

Under what conditions do individuals have an effective right of exit?[15] This question is not easy to answer in some cases because the freedom to enter an association that demands great commitment over time is prima facie part of what freedom of association includes. This is especially evident when we consider the freedom of identity formation that civic associations at their best can protect. Religious associations, to take a central set of examples, may be attractive to many people precisely because they make quasi-comprehensive demands on their identity and therefore not only on their lives today but also into the future. But freedom of religious association includes the right of individuals to change their religious association at will. A democratic government therefore must protect individuals against those associations that effectively deprive their members of those conditions that make the right to exit effective. One of those conditions is economic independence, which is missing when the price of exiting a civic association is to be bereft of any property (*Hofer v. Hofer*, S.C.R. 958–92 [1970]). How high can barriers to exit be and still be legitimate? From the perspective of choice, barriers to exiting an association are more suspect to the extent that they resemble the barriers to exiting a society, which cannot be considered a voluntary association precisely because the barriers to exiting are so high (for most people). Although drawing precise lines between legitimate and illegitimate barriers to exit will be difficult, the school of choice supplies the grounds for saying that freedom of association is absolutely incompatible with preventing people who want to exit a group from so doing.

The school of choice also needs to address the issue of blocked entry. Although freedom of association entails the freedom of groups to prevent some people who want to join them from doing so, the right to exclude is not absolute. To insist that associations include everyone who wants to join would violate their members' freedom to associate as they so choose. But to insist on their unlimited freedom to exclude women and negatively stereotyped minorities on prejudicial grounds entails limiting the effective freedom of women and minorities, preventing them from associating and identifying as they wish.[16] If exclusions were more or less random, falling

15. See Rosenblum 1998a, 101ff; Kymlicka 1995a, 234, n. 18. My discussion of the school of choice refers more generally to Rosenblum's book, which is the most comprehensive statement to date of the relationship between identity, associational freedom, and democracy by a theorist of choice.

16. Of course they can form another group with people who want to associate with them, but this is their second-best scenario. The same also holds for the people who are excluding them: if forced to include, the excluders can leave the association and form a new one.

on everyone more or less equally, and having no other significant civic effects, then absolute freedom of association might not be problematic from a democratic perspective. Equal freedom and civic equality could still prevail. But the discriminatory policies of civic associations are problematic when they deprive individuals associated with historically disadvantaged identity groups of valuable civic opportunities through no fault of their own. Accompanying this problem is another, less-commonly noted one, which directly challenges the claim that unregulated freedom of association supports the free public affirmation of individual identity. Prejudicial exclusions of women and negatively stereotyped minorities from equal membership in civic associations are yet another public expression of the involuntary typecasting of identity to which the school of choice stands opposed.

The same perspective of choice that affirms the right of free association also opposes the involuntary typecasting of individual identities, for the same reasons and on the same grounds. Civic associations contribute to a negative identity politics when they exclude entire groups based on their ascriptive identities or relegate them to second-class membership. The question therefore arises: What limits may be placed by democratic governments on which civic associations not to exclude people on the basis of their race, gender, or other involuntary identities? Not all exclusions from all associations are equal from the perspective of choice. Legal imposition of membership on expressive associations—such as churches and advocacy groups—would undermine their expressive purpose. Membership impositions on intimate associations of family and friendship would undermine the very meaning of intimacy. A blanket imposition of liberal democratic norms on all associations would violate the most basic freedoms of expression and intimate association, and therefore are consistently opposed by theorists of choice.

Associations that provide public goods and are not primarily expressive or intimate do not need to discriminate to carry out their primary purposes. A strong case can be made for opening up their prejudicially blocked entries on grounds of freedom, opportunity, and civic equality. When pre-judicial exclusion contributes to treating women and disadvantaged minorities as second-class citizens on any of these grounds (freedom, opportunity, or civic equality), then nondiscrimination laws are in order (Rosenblum 1998b, 158–90). They can help equalize the effective freedom and opportunity of women and minorities, express their civic status as equals, and thereby also support their equal ability to identify as they wish through association.

When do exclusions from civic associations reinforce second-class citizenship? The school of choice is divided over particular cases because the idea of second-class citizenship is not self-interpreting and room remains for reasonable disagreement. All can agree that to require all associations to be nondiscriminatory would place unjustifiable limits on the freedom of individuals to express themselves and pursue their particular identities by free association. All can also agree that to exempt all civic associations would place an unjustifiable burden on members of groups who are systematically discriminated against in society, effectively eviscerating their equal freedom to identify as they see fit rather than as dominant groups in society typecast them. Second-class membership does not automatically entail second-class citizenship, but when the two are mutually reinforcing, the school of choice can defend opening up prejudicially blocked entries to civic associations through the enforcement of nondiscrimination laws.[17]

Toward a Humanist Synthesis: Revisiting Group Rights and Considering Missing Identities

Group rights divide the two schools of thought, but far less than either tends to recognize. The school of choice explicitly rejects group rights. But some group rights, as we have seen with the Sikh exemption from Mounties policy, support rather than impede the equal freedom and opportunity of individuals. Theorists of choice can defend group rights that at their moral foundation do not inhere in groups but rather inhere in individuals because of their group identity. Theorists of choice can therefore view some group exemptions as a way of fairly applying various individual rights, such as religious freedom. Theorists of culture can view the same exemptions as a way of respecting cultural differences, which cannot be understood purely on an individual level or as simply a manifestation of individual freedom. The two schools therefore can converge in political substance even if they continue to dispute in political theory what counts as a group right. When we leave the terminological dispute behind and instead synthesize the insights of the two schools, we can see that both perspectives, taken at their strongest, depend on valuing individual freedom in the context of cultural differences that are not themselves simply a matter of individual choice. We also see that both perspectives tend to neglect the critical role that democratic processes, institutions, and ideals play in selecting and mobilizing some group identities rather than others.

As long as people are free agents, cultures cannot be completely comprehensive in constituting their identities, and as long as societies socialize people in particular ways, they cannot be completely voluntaristic agents in creating their identities. Democratic processes and institutions add an important set of variables and values into any perspective that accepts the irreducible tension between individual and group. This synthesis raises a series of critical questions for further research, which are both empirical and normative in nature. What group identities get selected by democratic

17. As Nancy Rosenblum argues (1998a, 172–76).

citizens for political action, and why? What role do democratic processes and institutions play in making organization and mobilization of some group identities more or less likely? How do different democratic structures of governance affect the mobilization and effectiveness of subordinated minorities? Under different democratic conditions, what exemptions from facially neutral laws are permissible or even necessary? What identities are unfairly disadvantaged by different democratic processes and institutions, and how can group rights or exemptions help address different degrees and types of unfairness? What are the alternatives to group rights or exemptions?

Turning the normative tables, we also need to ask: When are group rights nothing more than an unjustifiable assertion of the power of a group over its members (or over outsiders to the group)? When is identity politics not even a second best in nonideal democracies because broad-based issue networks are more effective in moving in the direction of greater justice? Synthesizing the two sets of questions, we can ask: What broad-based issue networks are mobilized independently or in cooperation with identity groups, why, and to what effect for the liberty, opportunity, and civic equality of persons?

As these questions indicate, a synthetic perspective is not morally neutral and does not therefore claim to resolve all differences between the two schools of thought, which are partly attributable to conflicting weights given to the value of cultural belonging and individual freedom. A synthetic perspective defends the idea that individual freedom is always exercised within social constraints but those constraints are not a static given; the constraints can change over time with the exercise of individual freedom of association, and this freedom in turn depends on interaction with governmental processes and institutions to be fully effective. A synthetic perspective therefore not only criticizes some undefended moves of both schools from their starting premises, it also merges the remaining (moral and empirical) insights into a more nuanced and dynamic view of the relationship between group identity, democracy, and individual freedom and civic equality. More moderate members of both schools move in the direction of this synthesis. Taylor, for example, defends only those group rights which do not threaten the basic freedom and opportunity of individuals, and Rosenblum defends only those prejudicial exclusions from voluntary associations which do not threaten the civic equality of members of unfairly disadvantaged groups. Taken at their strongest, both schools converge in defending the basic freedom, opportunity, and civic equality of all persons (Kymlicka 1995b; Taylor 1994; Kateb 1998; Rosenblum 1998b). A synthetic perspective that draws on an ideal of realizing basic freedom, opportunity, and civic equality for all persons can be called humanist, because at its most fundamental level it treats all persons—regardless of their group identity—with equal concern.

The two schools of thought are at their weakest from a humanist perspective when they neglect these values. The school of culture is at its weakest therefore when it falls back on the authority of cultural groups over their members, as if a self-contained societal culture constitutes the identity of its members with a corresponding claim to sovereign nationhood. Even limited democratic governance by the larger society in defense of individual rights then becomes equivalent to foreign intervention into the affairs of a self-determining nation. The school of choice at its weakest neglects political rights of equal citizenship, which are among the basic rights of individuals that can only be exercised in groups. Equal rights of citizenship fail to be respected when more-powerful governments routinely intervene in the affairs of less-powerful governments without due regard for the equal political as well as civic rights of all persons. The basic rights of equal citizenship can be exercised by individuals only in self-governing groups, and the sovereignty of all self-governing groups (not only the least powerful) must be limited to make room for recognition of basic civil as well as political rights (Habermas 1998a, 129–53, 203–36, 239–64; Rawls 1971, 228–30, 1996, 334–71, 381–96).

When they avoid some characteristic missteps from their basic premises, both schools can agree that the purpose of rights—whether individual or group—is to protect the basic interests and respect the dignity of individuals as civic equals. Group rights can meaningfully refer to those rights which protect those basic interests of individuals which are (voluntarily or involuntarily) attached to a particular group identity. The interests ultimately to be served by group rights are therefore *individual* interests. A synthetic perspective avoids conflating the identity of a community with that of the individuals who are part of that community, but it also refuses to isolate individuals from their social contexts, to reduce their interests to self-welfare (as opposed to an interest in or commitment to the well-being of others), or to assume that facially neutral laws suffice to protect the basic rights and civic equality of individuals. Democratic governments therefore need to take into account particular group identities and exempt some citizens because of their group identities from some facially neutral policies. At the same time, they must not grant groups rights—or assume group rights themselves—that threaten the basic liberty, opportunity, or civic equality of persons.

Beyond the issue of group rights, other implications of a humanist synthesis are worth exploring in far greater detail than is possible here. What I call the challenge of missing identities follows from recognizing the dynamic interaction between individual freedom, group identity, and democratic institutions and ideals. In brief, the challenge is to consider the humanist group identities that are missing from democratic politics, or relatively underrepresented, whose addition would help move democracies in the direction of greater justice. If group identities change over time in the interaction between civil society and democratic politics, people committed to humanist values can ill afford to ignore the challenge of missing identities. The groundwork for the challenge is laid in the following provisional conclusions from our previous analysis:

- People are greater than any single culture can comprehend or any sovereign authority can represent.
- There is no principle or even presumption against cultural or group change (Clifford 1988, 338). Such changes do not necessarily entail moral loss (or even cultural loss, except by tautology). Overcoming the negative stereotyping of the group identities of women and unjustly subordinated minorities, for example, would be a moral gain from a humanist perspective, and possibly a cultural gain as well.
- Democratic governments may facilitate identity change over time for the better or worse. Citizens should be effectively free to interpret, revise, and reject the group identities into which they are socialized, partly through the procedural mechanisms of democratic governance.
- Absolute sovereignty claims of cultural groups in violation of basic rights along with prejudicial exclusions from powerful civic associations are among the injustices that call on the collective capacity of democratic citizens to vindicate their rights to equal liberty, opportunity, and civic equality.
- Because collective action in democratic politics is a condition for moving in the direction of greater justice, justice-friendly groups are indispensable, and one way of building them is on the basis of a shared humanist identity, which partially constitutes the self-conception of people who mutually identify with the cause of decreasing injustice and defending the basic rights of individuals.

The challenge of missing identities is neglected in ways that remind us of the missteps taken by the school of culture when it restricts identity change to what national sovereignty over subordinated individuals makes possible. The charge of discrimination against women brought by Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe and U.S. citizen, illustrates the challenge of missing identities. The Pueblo tribal council had refused to vindicate Martinez's right to equal protection under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), which says that "no Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws."[18] A 1939 law, approved by the tribe and U.S. federal government, excludes intermarrying women and their children but not intermarrying men and their children from the tribe and therefore from the rights to hold tribal property, vote in tribal elections, hold tribal office, and claim welfare benefits that are tied to tribal

18. *U.S. Code*, vol. 25, sec. 1302 (8).

membership. The Pueblo's quasi-sovereign status was the basis on which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the tribe had the authority to violate the equal protection of women. Only Justice Byron White, in dissent, disputed the connection between being a quasi-sovereign nation and having the authority to violate basic rights. Did Julia Martinez not have a basic right to be treated as a civic equal to her Pueblo male counterpart? No one arguing the *Martinez* case challenged her basic right to civic equality. What they challenged was her standing as a U.S. citizen to vindicate her basic right despite the legitimacy of the ICRA that explicitly grants her equal protection.

Why assume that the Pueblo has the sovereign authority to violate the equal rights of women? It cannot be because the Pueblo are in fact sovereign over their own laws, since they are not. As we argued above, it cannot be because societal cultures are self-contained and therefore have absolute sovereignty rights over their members. The factual premise of self-containment is faulty and, even if true, the conclusion of absolute sovereignty is a non-sequitur. The Martinez case vivifies the lack of self-containment of societal cultures. The 1939 General Allotment Act that codified unequal citizenship rights for Pueblo women and men, far from being indigenous to the Pueblo, required the approval of the U.S. government at the time and "seems to have been supported, if not influenced and encouraged, by the traditions of the United States" (Resnik 1989, 725). It is therefore fitting to ask: "Why is it seen as a matter of cultural survival when men guarantee exclusive access to Indian women as a requirement of tribal membership, but when an Indian woman attempts to claim that her family is an Indian family, to choose who to make a family with, it's called a threat to cultural survival" (MacKinnon 1987, 67)?

The challenge of changing identities is to search for ways in which democratic processes and institutions can aid unjustly subordinated individuals in vindicating their basic rights, rather than taking established identities for granted. Justice White's dissent in the *Martinez* case illustrates one way in which Pueblo women could have been aided in their just cause of changing unequal membership rules in an ascriptive group. White argued that the Court should require the tribal government itself to revise the membership rules in a way that respects the equal rights of women. In so doing, with the urging of many Pueblo women whose identities had already come into conflict with their tribal authorities, the Court would have contributed to changing identities in the direction of greater justice as had Congress when it passed the ICRA. Instead the Court helped to further entrench the dominant group identities that established the discriminatory law in the first place.

As the Martinez case illustrates, rather than taking group identities as static, a humanist synthesis attends to the dynamic interaction between political institutions and group identities. Taking the interaction between democracy and identity seriously means not assuming that the best way of defending our cherished values is to repress challenges to them, rather than to find ways of bringing those who disagree with us into a more equal and potentially constructive relationship (Hollinger 1995, 84–85). An illustrative case in point is the French government's policy of permitting Muslim men to immigrate with their multiple wives. Feminists have criticized the policy for being too permissive on the issue of polygamy and ignoring "the burdens that this practice imposes on women and the warnings disseminated by women from the relevant cultures" (Okin et al. 1999, 9–10). Polygyny (which permits men but not women to have multiple spouses) puts important values of gender equality at risk.

But it does not follow that a democratic government should close its borders to polygynous men and women from cultures where the practice is legal. A morally and politically relevant question is how alternative public policies are likely to affect the equal freedom of polygynous women and their female children over time. Prohibiting their entry into France would almost certainly have made matters considerably worse from the perspective of those Muslim women and their female children who want to find a way of moving toward a condition of more equal freedom. An immigration policy that admits polygynous Muslims and then gives women the effective freedom to exit from their marriages, providing a social support system for them and their children, takes the interplay of identity and democracy seriously by recognizing democracy's potential to change identities for the better.

The converse of the capacity of democratic politics to influence group identities over time is the capacity of group identities to influence democratic politics over time. Democratic society can benefit from the addition of some group identities that are now missing or relatively underrepresented. The presence of some missing identities would push democracy in the direction of greater justice. Many critics of identity politics are chagrined at the "the decline of species-centered discourse" (Hollinger 1995, 66). But a reversal of the decline of a certain discourse alone—however welcome—would not make nearly as much political difference as an increase in humanist group identities and associations in democratic politics. Democratic politics needs people who identify as humanists for political purposes and are therefore prepared to act collectively and consistently with humanist discourse. Many organizations already reflect the willingness and ability of individuals to rally around a humanist identity and cause, rather than a narrower identity politics.

Facing up to the challenge of missing identities requires a recognition of the dependency of democratic politics and justice on humanistic associations, and their dependency in turn on various kinds of mutual identification among people, not only around a group identity but also around a humanistic ideology. The NAACP, National Organization for Women (NOW), the American and International Red Cross, Doctors of the World, and the United Nations Association—to name just a few—support and reflect justice-friendly group identities. From the perspective of mobilizing more people to identify, organize, and act together within democratic politics in justice-friendly ways, one problem with most of these organizations is that they are what Robert Putnam calls "tertiary" rather than "secondary": most people participate only by credit card (Putnam 2000, 52). The vast majority of humanists never meet together for the sake of mobilizing, demonstrating, bargaining, lobbying, or campaigning for just causes.

There are important exceptions worth noting however. Members of the U.N. Association, a genuine federation, meet together to pursue humanistic causes. For humanists to have a greater impact in democratic politics, they need to create more secondary associations that succeed in bringing people together in politically effective ways. Humanists consistently oppose identity politics that exacerbates injustices against groups, but otherwise have no reason to be critical of people for publicly identifying and associating with others on particularistic grounds. Humanists themselves can be politically most effective when their mutual identification is strong and their organization for political purposes correspondingly more efficient and effective.

By attending to the matter of missing identities, we highlight a largely unrecognized bias of the identity politics of our time, which parallels the bias of the earlier pluralistic politics (Connolly 1969). Both critics and defenders of identity politics tend to neglect problems arising from the underrepresentation of some identities and interests in a democratic politics that is unavoidably driven by demands of identity and interest groups of many kinds. In democratic politics, people are most influential in groups. Theorists therefore need to think about the ways in which a politics that necessarily depends on groups can work to better secure liberty and opportunity for all individuals, not only for the more powerful groups or for the more powerful members of less powerful groups. The relationship between group identity and democratic politics, I have argued, is more complex than blanket critiques and defenses of identity politics suggest. I also have argued that despite their strikingly different starting premises, theorists of culture and choice can converge on consequential political conclusions if they avoid some characteristic missteps from their starting premises and develop a more synthetic perspective. I have presented the broad outlines of a humanist synthesis that integrates considerations of culture and choice and attends to the dynamic interplay between group identities and democratic politics. Political theorists ignore the potential for changing identities at the peril of assuming that individuals must endure existing injustices that are now protected by oppressive groups, discriminatory associations, and tyrannical governments. These injustices can be overcome only by collective human agency, not by cultural complacency or political inaction.

Randall Calvert

Identity, Expression, and Rational-Choice Theory

Introduction

Self-identification with social groups or moral principles, and the expression of identification through behavior, abound in politics. Political scientists discern identification and expressive action at every level of political interaction, ranging from the actions of individual voters to the policies of governments in international relations. Most prominently, identification with partisan, ideological, or social objects has served as the raw material for some of the classic analyses of electoral politics in democracies. Ethnic identification plays a central role in the study of democratic transitions and of the politics of developing nations generally.

Political scientists usually see identification and expression as cultural or psychological processes, either basic to human motivation or deriving immediately from some form of built-in human orientation toward social groups.[1] Such processes are often regarded as irreconcilable with rational-choice accounts of human behavior. Nevertheless, rational-choice theorists have attempted to bring their approach to bear on these phenomena, in order to take advantage of the theory's analytical tools and its portability across different political settings. In some cases, rational-choice theorists have been hostile to identity and expressive processes, seeking to explain them away as epiphenomenal or illusory.

Not all rational choice applications have taken this approach, however. Occasionally and with increasing frequency, some have attempted to bridge the theoretical gap between identity and expression, on the one hand, and strategic rational action, on the other, taking the phenomena seriously and contributing toward the examination of their effects or their

1. The foundational works in psychology on identity include Erikson 1968, Billig and Tajfel 1973, and Tajfel and Turner 1986. Invocations of the idea of group identification to explain phenomena in political science go back at least to Campbell et al. (1976 [1960], ch. 12).

foundations. My purpose in this survey is to summarize these efforts and to assess the contribution they have made toward our understanding of identity and expression. I do this by focusing on studies of three connected phenomena which either are or were viewed by political scientists as primarily identity-expressive and irrational: voting participation, partisanship and ideology, and ethnic politics and ethnic violence. These three areas have been the main locus of rational-choice work on identity and expression.[2] Moreover, this combination of topics provides, I believe, a compelling illustration of the breadth of applicability of these rational-choice models, their interconnections, and the real nature of their limitations.

Overview

Rational-choice efforts to address identity and expression fall into three categories, which first appeared in the following chronological order: (1) analyses in which choice phenomena replace identity and expressive phenomena, essentially denying their importance; (2) analyses that take identity and expressive motivations as given features of individual preference and examining their effects in rational-choice terms; and (3) analyses that construct more foundational rational-choice models of social interaction and use them to examine the nature and effects of identity and expressive phenomena that occur within social interaction. This survey concentrates purely on the latter two categories. However, it is helpful to begin by briefly tracing the development of all three approaches.

Early rational-choice analyses, concentrating on the politics of developed democracies, attempted to supplant the focus on identity and expression by describing them in entirely alternative terms. For example, Downs's "economic" analysis (1957) of democracy combined a purely instrumental, self-interest model of political action with the need for low-cost information, producing a theory in which partisanship and ideology served simply as rules of thumb carrying no inherent significance as phenomena of identification. Although appealing in some respects, this theory quickly became entangled in a paradox of its own making, the so-called paradox of not voting. Olson's logic of collective action (1965) emphasized selfish maximization and mutual monitoring, at the expense of sociological concepts of groups, roles, and norms, to account for collective action. But al-

2. However, this survey does not venture into the literature on laboratory experimentation, where both psychological and various choice theoretic approaches have been the basis for examinations of group-related phenomena. The experimental literature, where it has touched on rational-choice ideas, has been primarily concerned to debunk rational-choice theories; however, little experimental work has yet been undertaken applying rational-choice models to group identity phenomena in the sophisticated fashion treated in the empirical studies I survey here.

though Olson was surely correct about the existence of barriers to the representation of large-group interests in a democracy, there are nonetheless prominent examples of large-scale collective action for which by-product or selective-incentive explanations seem unsatisfying unless sociological phenomena are invoked. Moreover, survey and interview studies seem at times to portray group, partisan, and ideological attachments as being so unexamined, so ingrained or having so little policy content that neither an advantage-calculating nor even a rule-of-thumb explanation seems to do them justice.

Subsequent theorists of collective action discerned solidary and expressive basic motivations in the context of rational participation (Salisbury 1969; Moe 1980). Although this formulation seems merely to substitute the language of utility for psychological motivations, applications of this approach in the study of voting participation most clearly indicate what a rational-choice analysis can add to the recognition of such nonmaterial benefits. The next section examines several such studies in detail, explaining in what sense these models exhibit scientific progress in the sense of Lakatos (1978).

It also examines a recent attempt by Overbye (1995) to place voting participation in a broader context of interaction among rational actors, in which participation has communicative or reputational value in addition to its political effect. In other words, politically expressive behavior is motivated by instrumental considerations outside the political arena, so that the model is, potentially, a productive complement to direct psychological theories of expression. This complementarity yields the major overall argument of this survey: rational-choice models do not contradict the existence of identity and expression; far from being incompatible with traditional psychological and cultural approaches to identity, rational-choice models, properly formulated, can be a valuable addition to social science's tools for studying those phenomena.

Building on Overbye's social notion of rationally expressive behavior, the third section turns to the related but wider topics of partisanship and ideology. Expressive and classical instrumental explanations alike have invoked ideology and partisanship as criteria by which voters choose among candidates. Yet, unlike mere voting choices, partisanship and ideology are identification phenomena. I summarize two approaches to these topics—one a formal and mathematical model, the other a primarily historical and empirical study that explicates a clear rational-choice foundation—that, like Overbye, approach ideology and partisanship as explicitly group-related phenomena that may emerge from strategic interaction among rational actors.

The following section turns to the seemingly different politics of ethnic, as opposed to civic or partisan, identity. Voting participation and partisanship are phenomena of a stable and developed system of political institutions. Even ideology, insofar as it operates on or through a system of political choice among candidates or policies, is mostly found in this more institutionalized setting (even if the ideology aims at radical change in those institutions). On the other hand, the most dramatic manifestations of ethnic identity occur in settings of unstable or transitional political institutions. Rational-choice treatments of ethnic politics divide into the same two classes as the recent analyses of identity and expression in voting. Those in the first class take ethnic-related preferences or beliefs for granted and use standard game-theoretic methods to examine how strategic decision making leads to interesting phenomena of ethnic politics. Those in the second class begin with models of interaction among rational actors and derive a theory about the basic nature of ethnic identification. Here again, the literature I survey consists of a mixture of formal rational-choice models and informal analyses on a firm rational-choice basis.

The final section offers some overall conclusions about the use of rational-choice models for examining identity and expressive phenomena. It also offers some summary comments concerning the wide range of uses to which rational-choice theories may be productively put and the real limitations of such theories, which, I argue, are quite distinct from the limitations usually enunciated.

Expressive and Instrumental Voting

Butler and Stokes (1969) distinguished instrumental and expressive motivations for voting. As they noted, rational-choice theorists have also wrestled with this distinction. Downs (1957) originated the formal rational-choice approach in which voting was purely instrumental. This model implies that, if voting were the least bit costly, turnout would be approximately zero. Riker and Ordeshook (1968) formulated a generalization of Downs's model that included a noninstrumental benefit of simply participating in the election, independently of the voter's choice and of the election outcome, which they dubbed the "citizen duty" motivation. This section examines several models that have attempted to deal more generally with the idea of expressive voting using a rational-choice framework.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF EXPRESSIVE CHOICE

Fiorina looks beyond the simple notion of citizen duty, noting that "One may vote to express solidarity with one's class or peer group, to affirm a psychic allegiance to a party, or simply to enjoy the satisfaction of having performed one's civic duty" (1976, 393). Using a model including expressive motivations both independent of and dependent on the voting choice, Fiorina theoretically derives unanticipated effects and finds empirical evidence for them. For example, the model implies (in hypothesis 8) that a voter whose candidate evaluations differ from her party ID is more likely to defect from the party if she believes the election to be close than if she expects a wide election margin. Fiorina's data bear out this and other similar predictions. This indicates that the voter treats expression as an argument in the utility function, some of whose other arguments are instrumental. Fiorina also finds that "expressive factors probably dominate instrumental factors as an explanation of turnout" (410).

Fiorina's theoretical account of expressive voting is fully compatible with previous social-psychological accounts, although he eschews any discussion of internal mental processes (such as dissonance reduction or need for approval) that might underlie the expressive motive. On the other hand, Fiorina's formal approach adds a significant achievement to previous discussions of the expressive vote: his comparative statics analysis yields specific predictions not otherwise available and not previously anticipated. These results ought to hold true regardless of the mental mechanism underlying expressive motives. Of course, any assertion that a voter votes for candidate X because he is motivated to express his preferences for candidate X runs the distinct risk of being merely tautological. Fiorina's approach, however, is clearly progressive, in the sense of Lakatos (1978), generating "excess empirical content" in the form of the new, corroborated predictions. Fiorina's work, however, does not in any sense argue for the greater reality of a rational choice or social-psychological picture of human action. Rather, the gain is of a more modest, inductive nature: if voter behavior is partly expressive, then certain other, unanticipated properties of voter behavior follow from that. These properties may themselves have important political implications.

Rational Expressive Voting with Psychological Roots

Schuessler also addresses directly the possibility that voters may be rationally motivated by expressive in addition to instrumental concerns. Unlike Fiorina, he gives this expressive motivation an explicit psychological gloss in terms of identity: for expressive voters, "voting is a means to express political beliefs and preferences and, in doing so, to establish or reaffirm their own political identity" (2000, 88). The expressive value of an act, according to Schuessler, depends on who else also does it, how many do it, and who does not do it. This gives rise to an interdependence among the choices of expressively motivated voters that is closely analogous to equilibrium reasoning in game theory; to explain the dynamics of voter support of parties or candidates, Schuessler employs a Schelling-style (1978) diagrammatic analysis of the symmetric, n-player, two-strategy game played by voters for whom the expressive value of the vote depends solely on how many others vote the same way. The implications of this model depend, of course, on the particular shape of the payoff curves in those Schelling diagrams, that is, on the precise way in which expressive benefits depend on the numbers of people also engaging in the same expressive behavior and the numbers doing otherwise or doing nothing.[3]

Apart from the additional, specific assumptions he examines about the psychological motivations of voters, that is, the source and nature of the expressive benefits they experience, Schuessler's account is very much in the same vein as that of Fiorina (1976). The additional assumptions could provide additional scientific progress in the same sense. The rather loose theoretical basis of those additional assumptions gives little a priori reason to believe those new predictions will be borne out, but this is a matter to be resolved empirically.

SOCIALLY INSTRUMENTAL EXPRESSIVE VOTING

Fiorina (1976) and Schuessler (2000) posit basic preferences that are expressive in nature. Overbye (1995), in contrast, offers a mechanism *underlying* the expressive motivation of voters that is itself derived from a rational-choice approach—in fact, can even be derived from a so-called thin rational-choice account that posits instrumental, material self-interest at the root of all motivation. In effect, Overbye reformulates expressive voting into a species of instrumental voting. He suggests that

> voting may be regarded as a rational investment decision: not an investment in a particular electoral outcome, but in a type of reputation which the individual is interested in maintaining when carrying out his/her everyday activities. This solution not only solves the paradox [of participation], but may also provide a bridge between adherents of the public choice paradigm and scholars who advocate 'sociological' approaches to political behaviour. (1995, 369)

Overbye's approach "opens up the possibility of accounting for social phenomena such as 'group identity' . . . while staying firmly within a public choice (economic man) framework" (385).

An approach like Overbye's offers the potential for further scientific progress over Fiorina's and Schuessler's theories. In addition to positing an instrumental foundation for expressive benefits, Overbye also recommends a specific theoretical approach, namely the use of asymmetric-information games. Specifically, he suggests a game in which an agent (namely, whatever voter we are considering at the moment) has information not in the possession of her principals (namely, all the other players), such as the true utility function of the agent. Overbye is especially interested in a model in which each agent may have preferences that either do or do not incline

3. Additional assumptions about the effects of uncertainty and of negative campaigning on expressive value lead Schuessler to further predictions concerning how voting and turnout react to those factors. These assumptions are motivated by psychological claims.

him to be honest and cooperative in his general dealings with others.[4] In a game theoretic equilibrium, any action taken by the agent generally allows the principals to get a better idea of the agent's preferences; the agent therefore has an incentive to maintain a reputation of honesty and cooperation. For example, a merchant's willingness to vote for an extreme conservative party may be taken by potential working-class customers as an indicator that the merchant might try to cheat them in business dealings. For the posited behavior to constitute a game theoretic equilibrium, the parameters of the game (payoffs, discount factors, etc.) must obey certain conditions, generating specific predictions about empirical behavior. This is the potential source for excess empirical content.

Although Overbye suggests this asymmetric-information approach, equally useful would be a repeated-game approach in which reputable political behavior results in trust or in continued cooperation from one's fellow citizens in later, nonpolitical circumstances. Most of what Overbye says about the workings of his principal-agent formulation applies equally well to such a repeated-game model, with the intermediate goal of building reputation replaced by that of maintaining cooperation. As in Overbye's analysis, the requirements for equilibrium in a repeated game would place constraints on payoffs and discounting, generating predictions through the analysis of comparative statics.

Overbye's analysis aims, as does Fiorina's, at an improved explanation of the conditions under which citizens will vote, and also at an analysis of how they will vote, under various circumstances. The foundation of the expressive motivation in Overbye's analysis is the rather stylized story about reputation value; presumably, then, a more substantial account of the processes that generate this reputation value could provide a richer set of predictions linking those processes to voting behavior. For example, if (to take Overbye's motivating story literally) a reputation for honest or public-regarding behavior enabled a merchant to sell more goods at an increased price, then we might relate the characteristics of the market for those goods to the individual's voting behavior. But it is easy to imagine an analogous, more general account of social interaction in which one's voting behavior might have an impact on one's trustworthiness or reputation for good interactions and in which reputation engenders behavior in an agent's principals that benefits the agent.

Expression, in the world sketched by Overbye, occurs in the sending of a signal concerning one's true preferences or intentions. The sort of extended social model I have described would also generate a natural model

4. The honest, cooperative agent might have altruistic preferences, in which case the model is not one of pure self-interest; or, in a setting of repeated interaction, she might have a high discount factor or a poor ability to discern opportunities to cheat, in which case the model could work even with purely self-interested motives.

of group identification. To identify with a group would mean to share and express expectations with members of that group that prescribe how specified forms of other-regarding behavior will be rewarded—the values of the group. Individuals outside the group would not be expected to proffer or to reward such behavior in dealings with members of the in-group. In a given society, relations across groups might be uncooperative or cooperative, and the patterns of these underlying relations might determine the way electoral politics reflect group membership.

Ideology and Partisanship

In Butler and Stokes's account (1969), the voter's expressive motivation to go the polls and vote for a given *party* (in the British context) is due to the voter's psychological identification with that party. This is exactly the definition given by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1976 [1960], 121) for their conception of party identification, which determines a voter's long-term tendency (in the U.S. context) to choose candidates having one party label or the other. Elsewhere, political scientists have described voters' long-term tendencies in terms of ideology, a general way of making sense of the political world that tells the voter, based on minimal information, what position to favor on a given policy or what parties or candidates to favor in elections.[5] In some settings, ideology, like partisanship, can be seen as an identity-expressive phenomenon, in which members of a group share a common ideology thought compatible with the interests of the group. Typically such an ideology goes beyond merely specifying the group's interest, also providing a program of political action that all members of the group will support, even though alternative organized courses of action might equally well serve those interests. In short, as Bawn (1999a) has nicely put it, ideology provides a blueprint around which a group maintains a political coalition.

Rational-choice analysts have given considerable attention to specifying alternative models of partisanship and ideology. They have usually treated the phenomena as classically instrumental, information-economizing strategies; the first subsection below examines exemplars of such work. The second and third subsections turn to more recent research, which portrays the phenomena as being based in rational behavior in a context of repeated interaction in a group, contributing to the maintenance of political coalitions. These social interaction models of partisanship and ideology are closely analogous to Overbye's model of voting participation, as described above. In each, members of a group, playing a sequential game, use an equilibrium strategy profile in which they adhere

5. See, for example, Downs 1957 and Enelow and Hinich 1982.

to the prescriptions of a particular party or ideology in their voting. This game and this equilibrium involve all sorts of activity beyond voting in the current election, but as a by-product of its more general activities, the group produces coalition maintenance, which happens to be a collective good for them.

Ideology and Partisanship as Decision-Making Aids

In reaction to the view of party identification as a social-psychological phenomenon, Fiorina (1977) proposes a contrary, rational-choice viewpoint. He portrays party identification as a purely decision theoretic phenomenon, a "running total" of an individual voter's previous experiences under conditions in which politicians' party labels serve as consistent, if imperfect, guides to their likely actions in office. In Fiorina's description, this running total serves as a cue to voters about how to evaluate candidates. In the absence of any additional, specific information about a particular candidate, the record of that party's previous candidates provides a cue. (For related models of party ID as a decision-making aid in voting, see Jackson 1975 and Zechman 1979.)

In Downs's approach (1957), voters are unable (rationally unwilling, actually) to learn the implications of every policy position of every candidate, relying instead on ideology to summarize these implications cheaply if somewhat inaccurately. This approach is elaborated and clarified by Hinich and his coauthors (Hinich and Pollard 1981; Enelow and Hinich 1982), who portray ideology as the projection of multidimensional policy positions onto a one-dimensional ideological scale and explore the theoretical implications and empirical manifestations of this method of voting. Both the Fiorina-type models of party ID and the Hinich-type models of ideology carry numerous implications for patterns of voting behavior and of party and ideological change, which have been subjected with considerable success to statistical testing based on survey data, part of a lively literature on voter learning and the mutual effects of candidate preferences and party and ideological preferences.[6]

A Social Game Theoretic Model of Ideology

Recently, rational-choice analysts have returned to the question of the nature of partisanship and ideology, because the simple decision theoretic interpretations seem to miss a social component important to the genesis and effects of those phenomena. The game theoretic literature on electoral competition generated a corresponding theoretical anomaly: Myerson and Weber are the first to have pointed out the fact that any electoral system presents participants with an enormous coordination problem, a problem

6. See, for example, Shively 1979 and Franklin and Jackson 1983.

to which partisanship or ideology might be the solutions (1993, 112–13). Cox (1997) exploits this insight with enormously productive results concerning the nature of multiple-party electoral systems. These authors see the structure of party membership as the accomplishment of a coordination equilibrium, in which groups or individuals having varying but related interests manage to stick together as a coalition over a number of different issues and elections, and thus to achieve some of the goals they have in common. Aldrich (1995) employs the same view of party in his theoretical and empirical study of the development and nature of the U.S. party system.

But how are these coordination solutions realized in the electorate? Bawn (1999a) addresses this question by taking a somewhat broader game theoretic look at the problem of defining and maintaining a coalition in a setting where preferences vary both across voters and over time. Her model is central to the set of approaches I review in this paper, concerning both electoral and ethnic politics. In effect, she formalizes the repeated-game version of the model envisioned by Overbye (1995) as well as by the other authors to be examined subsequently. Bawn focuses on the phenomenon of ideology rather than party membership, but in fact everything that she, Aldrich, Cox, or Myerson and Weber say can be applied equally well to both phenomena. The common features of party and ideology to which all these models appeal is that voters are able to commonly categorize candidates in terms of the candidates' party labels or ideological affinities, and those labels or affinities in turn indicate the policies those candidates will pursue once in office.

Specifically, Bawn defines ideology as "an enduring system of beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political circumstances" (1999a, 305). Really, the term is "a catch-all to refer to all opinions and preferences that arise from anything other than a direct personal stake in the issue" (304). Both here and in her summary statement that "Ideologies create preferences by defining coalitions" (304), she uses the term *preferences* in a nonstandard way. But her general theoretical apparatus is identical to that used by the other instrumental-rationality theorists reviewed here: *basic* preferences concern the policy outcomes of elections; these basic preferences, together with information about candidates and about the expected behavior of other voters, produces a *derived* preference ordering over candidates, according to which the voter chooses. It is these derived preferences that are created by ideology in Bawn's model.

Bawn portrays a system of successive voting decisions, treated by voters as an indefinitely repeated game, and derives various contingent-strategy equilibria in which patterns of ideological, as opposed to self-interested, voting are maintained. In her "Game of Politics," in each period t, there is an opportunity to provide a benefit B to one of three players designated at random. One other randomly chosen player would bear a cost C_t to provide that benefit, drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, $2B$]. To participate in the decision, each player has to bear a participation cost $v < B$; a participant may vote for or against acquiring the benefit for the designated player. The benefit is provided only if it receives the support of a majority of the players casting votes. Bawn examines both stagewise equilibria and various repeated-game equilibria, of which the latter incorporate contingent strategies where a player supports benefits for another as long as the other player behaves analogously. The analysis illustrates how each equilibrium possesses or lacks properties such as efficiency, commitment (requiring some players to sometimes act against their short-term interest), individualism (whether the required action depends on properties of some predesignated group, such as net benefit to a fixed subset of players), hierarchy (unevenness of treatment within the implicit coalition), and exclusion (whether some players are excluded from ever receiving benefits). Bawn also goes on to examine a prior "Game of Ideologies" in which the players choose among different ideologies.

Thus the theory "proposes that all ideologies have interest at their core, but that interest is mediated by the social and political environment. What makes a system of beliefs 'enduring' is that *its members do better in the long run by following the ideology's prescriptions than they would by deviating, given the actions of others*" (306, Bawn's emphasis). The overall approach derives, as Bawn points out, partly from those of Calvert (1995a) on the theory of institutions as repeated-game equilibria and Kreps (1990a) on viewing culture in terms of coordination.

Bawn's model describes an ideology simply as the set of prescribed actions in an equilibrium strategy profile for the repeated game; it portrays no sets of principles, beliefs, or values resembling those on which a real-world ideology is usually based. Yet her ideologies are indeed intended to represent such real-world ideologies. One should think of the ideological principles of the real world as the description of the class of benefits or benefit-cost combinations in favor of which the subscriber is expected to vote. In any real-life context, identities are attached to the players, and the benefits result from certain government actions; an ideology describes who the beneficiaries are to be (labor, owners of property, the small family farmer) and what sort of benefit they are to be granted. An ideology that can be described clearly in such terms can be adhered to, and monitored, by its subscribers, in the required way, while a complex and ambiguous description will be more difficult to implement.

Considerations such as these bring us back to the coordination problem with which Myerson and Weber and Cox are concerned. Bawn's model conceptually subsumes theirs: her repeated game of voting has multiple cooperative equilibria, and no ideology is implemented unless a sufficient number of players share expectations about the prescribed strategies. The choice among these amounts to solving a coordination problem, and Bawn's "Game of Ideologies" simply represents one mechanism by which it might be solved. Which equilibrium the players eventually coordinate on determines which ideology they (or a subset of them) follow. In precisely the sense of Schelling (1960), this is the role of the principles, values, and statements of belief that define real-life ideologies: to create focal points in the game of choosing ideology.[7]

Bawn's conception of ideology is social in the sense that, unlike the information-economizing models of Fiorina and Hinich, it cannot be described as a solely individual-level phenomenon. Rather, ideology depends on the existence of shared understandings and expectations among members of a group. The model is easily extended to provide an even more broadly socially based conceptualization of ideology or partisan identification. Both the "Game of Politics" and the "Game of Ideologies" are entirely concerned with political choices. Ideology is enforced by political rewards and the threat of political repercussions. However, an alternative model incorporating broader forms of social interaction, where only a subset of iterations of the game involve political choices, would work in exactly the same way. In that case, the model would portray a social basis for ideology, with enforcement based on social rewards such as interpersonal cooperation and on threats of social repercussions such as noncooperation or shunning. This is the direct route to formalizing not only Overbye's suggestion that expressive voting is rooted in instrumentalism but also Harvey's suggestion (1998) about the basis for partisan attachments, to which I now turn.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN A GAME THEORETIC SOCIAL SETTING

Harvey's goal in *Votes without Leverage* (1998) is to explain the pattern of policy responsiveness toward women's concerns in the United States during the eventful middle half of the twentieth century. Immediately before and especially just after the suffrage amendment, women's organizations were a powerful lobbying group, and issues broadly identified as women's concerns received considerable attention in new federal programs. This ended abruptly in the late 1920s, and never resumed until the 1970s. Harvey argues that several common explanations for this pattern fail, either because they fail to explain other obvious related phenomena or because they call, inappropriately in her view, on special features of women to explain politics concerning women. Instead, Harvey advances a more parsimonious explanation via a theory of electoral coalitions involving rational choice and strategic politicians.

Harvey espouses a view of party that, like Bawn's model of ideology, is the product of both rational choice and social construction. Rational voters

7. This application of focal points is brought partially into the theory by Kreps (1990a).

participate in a broader social game of which politics is a part and in which the formation of parties and the manifestation of party voting are equilibrium phenomena. She motivates this in rational-choice terms, by connecting voting choices to other aspects of social exchange (1998, 33–38), in terms sufficiently general to be applied even to purely self-interested individuals. By voting as prescribed by the norms of one's group, one can enjoy the benefits of cooperative relations with members of the group in other, nonpolitical settings.[8] "When members of some group follow the cues of other group members in order to avail themselves of the resulting benefit of cheaply purchased social acceptance, we can say that they *identify* with that group" (35, Bawn's emphasis). Because partisan participation is rewarded or punished by social groups, Harvey reasons that the larger the number of group members engaging in a particular form of participation, the greater the individual benefit (through social exchange) to each of them. This conclusion matches that of Schuessler (2000), whose work Harvey cites, and she adopts the same analytical tool to generate propositions about the success of women's lobbying efforts: Schelling-style games (1978) that demonstrate a tipping point, a threshold level of adherence to a particular voting pattern, above which other voters want to join the pattern and below which the current participants begin to drop out.[9] The pattern in this case is a willingness of women generally to vote for or against candidates depending on whether they support or oppose the issues promoted by women's groups such as the League of Women Voters, at that time an active lobbying force, rather than voting based on other issues or on established party labels. This situation, Harvey points out, presents a coordination problem to be addressed by political entrepreneurs. Her full

8. Harvey addresses the objection that the use of the secret ballot would make group norms on voting choice impossible to monitor and hence unenforceable. One could, after all, simply lie if asked how one voted. "Lying bears risks, however; one may have a 'tell' that alerts others to the fact that one is lying, or one may simply be tripped up by objective evidence contradicting one's story. . . . Lying to a group, if one is caught, can have serious negative consequences" (1998, 37). In an instrumental-voter account such as Harvey's, moreover, the only reason to vote contrary to one's group's norm is if one is trying simultaneously to satisfy the conflicting norm of another group. Reporting one's vote differently to members of different groups sets up the conditions for discovery.

9. A rough spot in Harvey's argument here, as in Schuessler's, is that there is no inherent reason to believe mere numbers should *generate* solidary selective benefits. The level of such benefits will depend just as much, for example, on the density and importance of relationships with those other participants, and perhaps a larger group necessarily means more marginal relationships. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine circumstances where the larger-numbers benefit would work as posited here. When Laitin (1998a) applies the same technique to the analysis of language adoption, as described below, there is a more solid reason for supposing that the more fellow group members adopting the language, the higher the benefit to each individual of doing so.

substantive account is too detailed to present here, but in the end the political parties, for reasons made coherent by the theory, gain the upper hand over women's groups in mobilizing women voters, and women's policy concerns are submerged in the orthogonal issue concerns of the parties. This pattern changes only with the general weakening of the parties as a force for voter mobilization in the late 1960s.

Even this cursory account of Harvey's substantive analysis demonstrates, however, how her appeal to a game theoretic, social-interaction-based theory of partisanship was made necessary by the substantive problem she wanted to explain. A decision theoretic account of party voting could not explain the phenomena she observed. But, Harvey argues in effect, a group identification or other psychological account, based on the special attributes of women as a group and on social attitudes toward women, is also not a promising explanatory tactic. If followed in the study of other, similar political phenomena, this tactic would result in the accumulation of a collection of special-purpose accounts explaining the political fortunes of each social group in terms of the special properties of that group. While this approach might generate additional predictions about that group, it would have little to offer to predict the fortunes of any new, as yet unexamined group. Harvey's ambition is to assemble an explanatory apparatus that can be used not only to explain other aspects of the fortunes of women in politics and society but also to explain the fortunes of any group in politics.

CONCLUSION

The political importance of partisanship and ideology comes down to their effects on people's political choices. But whereas expressive theories of voting are primarily concerned with the participation decision—a fairly straightforward collective action problem—voting choice, aside from the participation problem, is a more complicated matter. Even in the myopic, single-election setting, if there are multiple candidates or if we look at the whole process of winnowing down to two candidates, voters face a serious problem of coordination. Current rational-choice theory is weak on how coordination is achieved, but it can at least clarify conditions under which it can occur and what the results can look like. Bawn's model of ideology does exactly this. Regarding Bawn's model as the formalization of Harvey's social exchange basis for partisanship, one gets some idea of the potential power of this approach for understanding historical phenomena of democratic politics.

With this demonstration in mind, I turn to the critical application of rational choice to the identity-expressive politics of ethnic conflict. Many of the same theoretical techniques, as well as some new ones, have been brought to this task; moreover, the above models of partisanship and ideology offer an excellent guide as to how to formalize some even broader, more powerful theoretical ideas put forward by rational-choice students of ethnic politics.

Ethnic Politics

Voting choice, voting participation, and partisanship all occur in an institutionalized political setting, in which stable rules define a game where voters make their decisions and ultimately affect the state of the world. The most critical setting for ethnic politics and ethnic conflict, however, is in unstable and transitional polities, where the political rules of the game are essentially up for grabs. M. Taylor's (1976) repeated interaction approach to cooperation in communities first provided a basic method for thinking about rational behavior in such contexts; subsequent work by Ullman-Margalit (1977), Hardin (1982), and especially Sugden (1986), explored further the notion of social norms as game theoretic equilibrium phenomena. Harvey's (1998) account of partisanship and Bawn's (1999a) game theoretic model of the role of electoral ideology exploit this approach and suggest how one might examine other forms of group-oriented political behavior in a less-structured political context, provided that there is sufficient social structure: individuals must be able to anticipate possible future interactions with relevant other individuals or to draw inferences for the present from a relevant history of interactions. Making one or both of these assumptions, rational-choice theorists have taken two approaches to the study of ethnic politics in unstable or transitional polities, corresponding to the approaches used in the models of electoral behavior surveyed above. In the first approach, analysts overlay strategic gaming on a fixed background of ethnic identities and cultural meanings. In the second, they suggest more foundational models of identity and expression based on principles of instrumental rationality and social interaction.

Rational Ethnic Violence in a Cultural Context

The analyses in the first category follow a common pattern: positing some initial, low level of ethnic identities and suspicions available for political exploitation, they attribute outbreaks of ethnic violence to self-reinforcing fears in a setting of uncertainty or inability to commit. Each study attributes ethnic violence to the stoking of ethnic suspicions by political leaders or other special political circumstances. Their accomplishment is to identify a partial alternative to the "ancient hatreds" hypothesis of ethnic violence. They argue that ethnic violence is not inevitable but occurs under specified and perhaps preventable circumstances.

Fearon (1998b) presents one such analysis, in which a majority and a minority group may either resort to violent conflict or peacefully enjoy some division of the gains from staying together.[10] The problem is whether they will succeed in arriving amicably at a sharing arrangement. The specific puzzle: Serbs and Croats in Krajina overwhelmingly opposed ethnic divisions as late as 1990; but when Croatia declared independence in 1991, the region immediately erupted into ethnic warfare with, Fearon says, broad participation in at least some localities. Does such a sudden change of feelings indicate the fragility of peace between neighboring ethnic groups?

Under normal conditions, the majority (who, in the most threatening case, control government as a unified team) should offer the minority at least enough benefits to make it not worthwhile to secede, including any cost of violent rebellion. Both sides can be better off staying together. But under certain circumstances, there is a problem of commitment that causes a prospective new minority *always* to pursue resistance and secession. The problem arises because, once a newly ascendant majority group has consolidated control over the state apparatus, it will be better able to resist a secession attempt and hence can keep the minority with a smaller offer. The rational strategy for the minority, then, is always to attempt secession before the majority has consolidated power, assuming that, as consolidation makes secession increasingly hard, the minority's share will keep getting smaller.

The special setting in which this sequence of events can happen is as follows: before the majority group gained control of the government, the two groups have been part of some larger jurisdiction in which their majority-minority status was reversed or in which neither had controlled the government. Moreover, following their secession from the previous jurisdiction, the new majority is for some reason unable or unwilling to commit to ceding a measure of governmental control to the minority.[11] This, Fearon says, was the situation in Krajina and in a few other areas, and it is only in those areas that Fearon says we should worry about inevitable, "explosive" ethnic wars erupting.[12]

Fearon's simple extensive-game model is imposed on a situation in which ethnic identities and competition are already clearly defined and in which they dominate the prospective politics of the new country. If alter-

10. If there were no such gains, he points out, the two groups should split up by mutual agreement. Of course, this assumes there is a geographic basis for such a split.

11. Fearon does not state this second condition as part of the circumstances for ethnic conflict, but it is a maintained feature of his model. Without this condition, the commitment problem could be solved constitutionally in the new government.

12. Of course, Fearon has presented only one mechanism by which ethnic conflict can occur; if one fears widespread recurrences of such conflict, one will probably not be comforted until other such mechanisms can be shown not to exist or can be subjected to analyses with similar results.

native coalitions of subgroups were possible or if the distribution of the gains were not so strictly constant sum, then there would be other ways out besides secession. So we might say that Fearon, rather than examining the game theory of ethnic identity, is studying the strategic rationality of its expression through secessionism and ethnic violence. In his account, such expression is the result of preferences and rational fears concerning the division of resources; but the existence of those preferences and the basis of those fears is taken as given.

Similarly, Bates, deFigueiredo, and Weingast (1998) present a model of strategic interaction in political transitions and ethnic politics, in a setting in which the intergroup rivalries and tensions (and the groups' behavior as unitary actors for purposes of analysis) are taken as given. They examine two illustrative cases: democratic transition in Zambia and ethnic warfare between Serbs and Croats, first in non-rational-choice terms involving deployment of symbols and exploitation of cultural attitudes (such as ethnic hatreds), and then in terms of strategic actions. In both cases, an election is the climactic event: the culmination of President Kenneth Kaunda's reelection campaign in Zambia (not primarily an episode of ethnic politics), and the electoral fortunes of the Slobodan Milosevic government in Serbian-controlled Yugoslavia. The strategic analysis of each case is based on one- and two-dimensional spatial models in which the location of a pivotal voter—the pivotal member of the Zambian urban lower class and the pivotal Serb, respectively—is at issue.

In both models there is uncertainty, whose resolution or exacerbation drives the observed political cataclysms. President Kaunda and his opponents in Zambia are uncertain about the location of the pivotal voter, and the pivotal Serbian voter is uncertain about true Croat intentions and hence about what level of ethnic solidarity she should support. Symbolic actions affect beliefs about these true values, causing an effective change in the location (or perceived location) of the pivot, bringing about the abrupt changes that were observed: the unexpected defeat of Kaunda at the polls despite his one-party rule and the relatively sudden outbreak of ethnic warfare in Croatia.

These models make no attempt to portray the underlying nature of ethnic attachments, symbols, or policy preferences. Rather, taking those cultural features for granted, they explore the strategic situation, which involves the deployment of symbols that play on existing cultural attitudes. Ethnic fears are taken as given, although at too low a level at the outset to provoke ethnic warfare; rather than expressing ethnic identity, the Serb-Croat conflict consisted of the rational actions of people whose initially mild fears were exploited by politicians, invoking cultural symbols strategically, with disastrously self-reinforcing effects.

In a related analysis applied to the Krajina conflict and to the Hutu-Tutsi conflagration in Rwanda, de Figueiredo and Weingast (1999) examine in more detail the theory of belief formation in the presence of incomplete information. When negotiations between the Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman governments break down, Serbs can observe that fact but cannot observe whether the failure is due to evil intentions on the part of Croats or to sabotage by Milosevic in an effort to stoke ethnic unrest and thus maintain his own political power. The algebra of Bayesian updating is such that, as long as both interpretations are thought possible, the failure of negotiations increases the Serbs' estimate of the probability that the Croats have evil intentions. Thus even if Serbs are fully rational and realize there is a good chance that Milosevic is corrupt, Milosevic can still be successful in strengthening his position, increasing Serb fears by sabotaging negotiations himself. In this model, rational learning by rational actors still leaves room for corrupt politicians to play the ethnic card. For their part, strategic corrupt politicians can be expected to appreciate and take advantage of this opportunity, yielding a conclusion rather more pessimistic than that of Fearon (1998b), especially if we imagine Tudjman following the same strategy on the other side.

This adverse arithmetic works, however, only if the danger posed by underestimating the evil intentions of (enough) Croats is thought by (enough) Serbs to be higher than the danger of underestimating Milosevic's corruption. Once again, then, we are looking at a model in which ethnic identities and suspicions are assumed preexisting, and the analysis deals only with the mechanism by which those identities and suspicions become expressed in ethnic violence perpetrated, not in reluctant obedience to a corrupt dictator but with apparent enthusiasm in certain quarters of the population. These rational-choice analyses differ only in degree from primordialist explanations of ethnic conflict: although the rational-choice models posit initially insufficient levels of competition and suspicion to motivate violence, the inexorable workings of politics stokes that competition and suspicion until a war results.

RATIONAL-CHOICE EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

Another set of studies takes on more fundamentally the task of replacing identity and expressive motivations as explanatory primitives with an underlying model of rational, ultimately instrumental choice. The approach to community and social norms developed by M. Taylor (1976), Ullman-Margalit (1977), Hardin (1982), and Sugden (1986) reaches its most extensive use thus far in analyzing ethnic identity and ethnic politics in the work of David Laitin and Russell Hardin.

THE CHOICE OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

Laitin's *Hegemony and Culture* (1986) is the first, among these rational choice social theories, to take on the idea of culture as distinct from mere social norms and to treat culture as an equilibrium phenomenon involving strategy and choice and analyze it from a rational-choice standpoint. In this study of the failure of Nigeria to erupt into Christian-against-Muslim religious warfare as a result of disagreements over the writing of their 1976 constitution, Laitin writes that culture has two faces. "Culture orders political priorities" due to shared values, while also "shared cultural identities facilitate collective action" due to the ease of communication (1986, 11). Culture involves deeply held shared values, but cultural identities and meanings can be and are strategically manipulated. One must address both faces of culture in order to understand the politics of culture or the role of culture in politics. This Laitin does in examining the development, in particular, of the Yoruba ethnic group a few decades earlier and how it wielded political power and, among other things, prevented any breakdown of Nigerian society along religious lines in the 1970s. An ethnicity had been created, not, to be sure, out of whole cloth but certainly in response to political expediencies. Once created, ethnicity provided a political resource that could be applied toward various political ends.

Laitin's later work takes on issues of individual identity more directly. *Identity in Formation* (Laitin 1998a) examines choices and attitudes of ethnic Russians and members of the local nationality in the fourteen former Soviet republics, via survey analyses, ethnographic work, "discourse analysis" of local newspaper discussions, and elite interviews. These choices involve language, residency, and citizenship; attitudes are those toward own and other ethnic groups and toward ethnicity in general.

For his definition of identity, Laitin adopts that of the psychoanalyst E. H. Erikson (1968). "Erikson sees 'identity formation [as] a process . . . by which the individual judges himself in the light of what he perceives to be the way in which others judge him in comparison to themselves and to a typology significant to them; while he judges their way of judging him in the light of how he perceives himself in comparison to them and to types that have become relevant to him' " (1998a, 20).[13] Laitin studies Russians who now find themselves a minority group in each former Soviet republic and who are faced with choices about whether to try to assimilate to the larger society or maintain a separate identity. Similar to Schuessler (2000) and Harvey (1998), Laitin diagrams a Schelling-style (1978) n-player 2-action symmetric game to analyze situations of identity choice. He concludes that "assimilation cascades" are most likely when assimilation offers economic advantage, does not unduly harm one's in-group status, and results in acceptance by the out-group (1998a, 28–29). Along with his empirical analysis, Laitin uses this approach to produce a number of specific and counterintuitive predictions concerning the future course of Russian assimilation into the dominant cultures of the former Soviet Republics.

13. Note the resemblance of this definition to the infinite-regress-resolving tools and mutual knowledge features central to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

For Laitin, the specifics of an ethnic culture are products of equilibrium among that culture's members. Laitin does not commit himself to a particular view of the nature of basic preference that causes people to value their culture's particular art, language, mythology, and so on, but indicates much of that value should be explained by the material advantages of easy communication and cooperation among members who share those cultural ideas. Certainly Laitin infers that ethnicity and culture become objective realities because they are equilibrium phenomena and that changing conditions, such as the abrupt political change in the former Soviet Union, can disrupt the equilibrium and force predictable changes at the individual level. Interested primarily in the choice of language, Laitin does not venture to explain the roles of more purely symbolic features of a culture; once in place, they may indeed facilitate communication, but why was the whole repertoire of mythologies and religious rituals created in the first place? Although this question is beyond the scope of Laitin's work, it does, as we will see, receive direct treatment in Hardin's.

In an important companion to the nonformal analyses of Laitin (1986, 1998a), Fearon and Laitin (1996) specify rigorously the form of a game and equilibrium that might characterize one aspect of interethnic cooperation (that is, peaceful coexistence) in the presence of real ethnic division. They point out that interethnic cooperation is, contrary to much commentary, the rule and interethnic conflict the exception across the world. So the puzzle is to find a model of ethnic interaction that could account for the simultaneous existence of both patterns of behavior. To this end, they employ a model of 2-player repeated prisoner's dilemma games with random matching among the members of two "ethnic groups." To represent the interaction patterns among ethnic communities, Fearon and Laitin assume that members of one group are unable to distinguish among individual members of the other (for purposes of cooperation or retaliation). Nevertheless, the authors find, cooperation can be maintained through various equilibria in which deviations from an interethnically cooperative path of play are enforced by each group against in-group members, regardless of which members of the out-group their deviations are committed against. Thus there are equilibria supporting both cooperation and conflict between the groups, and shifts in the game's parameters could bring about transitions from one type to the other.[14] Although the model presents an account of interethnic cooperation, as in Laitin's other studies, it is not intended to explain the origin of the emotional, symbolic, or ritualistic aspects of intraethnic relations, although clearly these may be part of the mechanisms by which intraethnic cooperation occurs.

14. Nothing in the model predicts the relative prevalence of ethnic cooperation and ethnic conflict under the conditions when both are possible; equilibrium conflict is always possible.

THE BASIS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY

Hardin's theoretical treatment of ethnicity in *One for All* (1995) focuses more directly on such symbolic features of ethnic cultures, as well as on the advantages that ethnic identity presents for material gain through cooperation and coordination. Methodologically, Hardin's explicit intention is to determine the maximum explanatory power that self-interest and rational choice could have:

> In this study, I propose to go as far as possible with a rational choice account of the reputedly primordial, moral, and irrational phenomena of ethnic and nationalist identification and action. . . . [I]f we can rely on the actors' knowledge to determine what it is rational for them to do, we may often find apparently group-oriented action intelligible without the mystification of primordialism and without strong claims of moralism either. . . . Throughout this book I use the term 'rational' to mean to have narrowly self-interested intentions. (1995, 16–17, 46)

For Hardin as for Laitin, the central feature of identification is the identifier's willingness to take action because of the group that, individually and at least myopically, is bad for the identifier. And for Hardin, as for Laitin, people do not merely *have* identity; they also accrue, obtain, or even choose it, and an important task for the theorist is to explain how they do so.

Hardin sees social interaction as consisting of a variety of cooperation and coordination problems occurring all the time among subsets of individuals, in which people interact most frequently with fellow members of certain ethnic or other groupings. This interaction offers opportunities for mutual gain through cooperation or exchange, such as those explored by Overbye, Bawn, and Laitin. Power in cooperative relationships depends, among other things, on the control of resources. Coordination offers opportunities to accomplish things as an organized group that smaller groups, less-organized groups, or individuals could never accomplish. Hardin does not explore the role of coordination in selecting among equilibria in repeated cooperation problems, although neither does he force a distinction between the two situations.[15] He does, however, see coordination as overall the more important of the two processes in understanding what lies behind ethnic identification. Power in coordination relationships involves the ability to direct the concerted behavior of numerous people, which need not (but may often) require resources.

Consistent with the cases Laitin explores, Hardin emphasizes the central role of politics, not as a result or as a medium but as a basic causative ingredient of ethnic conflict. When one group coordinates on a pattern of internally cooperative behavior, this coordination can be used as a political

15. However, the way that cooperation problems generate coordination problems was a major topic in Hardin's earlier book, *Collective Action* (1982, chs. 10–15).

resource to gain economic advantage for group members. By and large, this advantage would come at the expense of other groups in the same country or economy, so they have good reason to fear and oppose one another's political efforts on their group's behalf. Each group wants to control political positions ("positional goods," Hardin calls them) so it can control the allocation of material goods ("distributional goods") such as subsidies, resources, and language regulations. Cooperation within an ethnic group can be self-reinforcing, since the political achievement of benefits for the group can provide the group's political leaders with stronger selective incentives to dole out. These benefits also make the threat of exclusion from the group more persuasive as a means of enforcing cooperation.

Ethnic identification is an equilibrium that requires members to contribute to the group's collective action. Typically, it also requires that each member engage in symbolic expression indicating that he or she upholds the prescribed behaviors and requires that members follow prescribed ways of interacting with others to facilitate pairwise and small-group cooperation. In some cases, the ethnic identification equilibrium prescribes withholding of cooperation from, and even participation in hostilities against, members of other ethnic groups.

Standard accounts of ethnic relations emphasize the emotional, moral, and habitual aspects of ethnic identification, and Hardin confronts this issue directly. "Explanations of ethnic conflict often invoke emotions. Unfortunately, explaining ethnic conflict as emotional may not be explaining it at all or may be explaining only aspects of it given that it happens. The part we most need to explain is why the behavior happens, why such behavior is ethnically oriented. And we need to explain why one group falls into conflict with another" (1995, 56). Hardin thus distinguishes between the internal, mental processes by which particular instances of ethnically related behavior may be accompanied, and the underlying, long-run pressures to adopt or maintain ethnic identifications. Similarly, he disputes the claim made by Elster (1989b) and others that norms are distinguished from rational behavior in that normative behavior is not outcome oriented. Hardin argues at length that this distinction cannot be maintained, appealing to the information-economizing function of habits and to the tendency of people to treat behavioral rules consequentially at some times and habitually at others. Although, as Hardin admits, people may sometimes intentionally violate their private interests, the rational-choice incentives he describes are the major eventual influences on the course of ethnicity and ethnic politics. This is the major conclusion of both Hardin's theoretical and Laitin's empirical analyses.

Conclusion: The Political Basis of Ethnic Conflict

Laitin and Hardin, like Overbye and Harvey, ultimately attribute identity to the benefits from in-group cooperation in life generally and in politics in particular. Sometimes too, Hardin emphasizes, there is a benefit from organizing for political competition against another group. This motivation plays an important, implicit role in Harvey's account of partisanship as well. There is thus, in Hardin's and Harvey's accounts, an essential *political* component to ethnic and partisan conflict. Such conflict is not, at root, a result of psychological identifications and basic expressive motivations but rather a result of the opportunities available to an appropriately organized group to pursue benefits through political means. Ethnic conflict has primarily political rather than social-psychological roots. It is maintained, however, by social as well as political means.

■ | Discussion: A Complementary Approach to Identity and Expression

The rational-choice treatments of identity and expression surveyed perform two kinds of analysis. First, they derive predictions and explanations, not otherwise obvious, that follow from an initial *assumption* that identity and expression are basic motivations. This is the contribution of Fiorina and of Schuessler on voting participation and voting choice and of Fearon and of Bates, deFigueiredo, and Weingast on ethnic conflict. More fundamentally, however, the other rational-choice studies explore the connections between expression and instrumentality to derive and apply new theories of the basic nature—and thence of the emergence, maintenance, and change—of identity and expression.

This survey indicates that rational choice and identity-expression, although often seen as mutually exclusive analytical and theoretical alternatives, may in many instances be complementary and mutually clarifying approaches. Rational-choice models are especially good for clarifying the role of individual actions in patterns of group identity and expressive behavior and for generating hypotheses about that role. On the other hand, there are important questions about identity and expression that rational-choice theory, even extended in the ways surveyed in this paper, is unable to address. Those questions depend on other approaches to resolve multiple equilibrium puzzles, for example, and to clarify the values that guide social coordination. Moreover, rational-choice theories of identity and expression, at least thus far, have depended on strong common-knowledge conditions that, while useful tools for answering some questions, are completely inappropriate for others.

After reviewing the major themes and accomplishments of the rational-choice literature on identity and expression, this final section turns to the distinction between the supposed and the real limitations of those theories.

RATIONAL CHOICE IN THE NARROWLY POLITICAL VERSUS SOCIAL CONTEXT

The work of Overbye, Bawn, Harvey, Laitin, and Hardin exemplifies the deconstruction, as Hardin (1995, 18) puts it, of identity-expressive behavior in terms of instrumental rationality. Each of these authors portrays actions that appear symbolic or expressive when viewed as purely political phenomena as being instrumental in a wider social sense. Political actors are also social actors. They associate with other social actors in repeated encounters throughout their lives; they interact with members of specific social groups more often than with nonmembers of those groups. In these repeated interactions, certain behavior is prescribed by social norms: forms of everyday cooperation, as well as symbolic acts that indicate one's membership in the group and intention of adhering to its norms in the future. At a social level, we can see these actions as instrumental; certainly they have an impact on the individual's well being, and they are subject to change over time even if, at any given moment, the actors behave out of habit or simple principle rather than out of calculation. Stable patterns of social behavior, in short, resemble equilibria in repeated games. There is much to be gained by using that approach, among others, to analyze them.

PARTICIPATION AND PARTISANSHIP AS SOCIAL STRUCTURE

This is most simply illustrated in voting participation. A norm requiring members to participate in, and be minimally informed about, the electoral process may be reinforced by the implicit threat of reduced status and hence reduced cooperation from other group members. In that case, instrumental social behavior appears, from a purely political standpoint, to be expressive behavior. Similarly, in some social groups there is an expectation not just that members will vote but that they will vote for candidates of a certain party or candidates who adhere to certain ideological principles. In Bawn's model of ideology, for example, sanctions take the particular form of a conditional exchange of mutual political support. Extended as I suggested to the context of repeated social and not just political interaction, her model can produce political behavior that appears expressive or altruistic when viewed from a purely political perspective but may be purely instrumental when seen in its wider social perspective.

It bears emphasizing that this approach does not involve any comparison between so-called thick and thin rational choice (see, e.g., Ferejohn 1991). Rather, the difference between the purely political approach in which a voter cannot be seen as rationally, selfishly instrumental, and the broader social approach in which she can, is that the latter approach draws no artificial boundary around the narrow political setting in formulating an explanation of voter behavior. There is nothing about rational-choice theory, thick or thin, that should lead us to ignore nonpolitical consequences of the voting act. There is obviously nothing that should lead us to ignore the reactions of other participants in a game theoretic picture of life that, after all, includes nonpolitical as well as political actions and events.[16]

THE INSTRUMENTAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHNIC POLITICS

The main tenets of this whole view, as applied to ethnic politics, include the following: Ethnic identification is socially constructed, in the sense of mutual equilibrium expectations in a setting of multiple equilibria. Within the resulting constraints, identification or its intensity is partially subject to choice by the individual.[17] Expressing one's ethnic identification consists of (1) undertaking action that is individually costly but demanded by the group, usually (but not necessarily) a collective good for the group, or (2) producing symbolic expression that indicates one's identification.[18]

Ethnic identification and its forms of expression change over time and respond to the strategic manipulation of politicians and to changes in economic and demographic conditions. Thus, under the right conditions, ethnic violence can be perpetrated through the efforts of political leaders striving cynically to gain or hold office. And under the right conditions, ethnic conflict can be suppressed or eliminated by the action of politicians seeking to maintain democracy, peace, and economic development. Hence there is a politics of ethnicity central to the configuration of ethnic identities and the occurences of ethnic violence.

As with electoral politics, the acts contributing to ethnic politics and ethnic conflict depend in many respects on how people respond to incentives. Although these responses may not be instantaneous or perfect, they are constantly present; they are cumulative; under certain circumstances they may take the form of tipping phenonema; and they accumulate rapidly. To understand the danger of ethnic conflict and democratic failure

16. The same idea applies immediately to studies of political participation other than voting that appeal in broadly rational-choice terms to solidary and expressive benefits motivating collective action. Such analyses include Salisbury 1969, Wilson 1973, and Moe 1980, as well as more recent game theoretic work concentrating on information transmission and coordination among participants whose motivation includes some fundamentally noninstrumental component, such as Kuran's "internal payoffs" (1991, 18).

17. Individuals' *claims* about their motivations (whether in survey responses or natural communication) are poor evidence as to whether that motivation is expressive or instrumental. Any ethnic-identity equilibrium is likely to include the behavioral prescription that one should deny that ascriptive group members, especially including oneself, have any choice in the matter. In the settings modeled in this paper, an individual motivated by social-instrumental concerns might feel required to profess true attachment to the group, and hence claim expressive motivation. On the other hand, an expressively motivated individual might justify his or her actions in instrumental terms.

18. On the rational-choice theory of symbolic expression generally, see Chwe 2001.

and the opportunities of democratic consolidation and social toleration, we need to understand these individual choice effects.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTRUMENTAL AND EXPRESSIVE ACTION

Political scientists, especially those studying voting and elections, have traditionally partitioned political acts into two categories: instrumental and expressive. Attitudes and actions connected with ethnic politics are often posed as examples of inherently expressive action, not understandable in instrumental terms. In view of the approach outlined in this essay, it seems that we need instead to distinguish three such categories, obscuring the expressive-instrumental distinction. First, there is policy-oriented, instrumental action: the actions of the Downsian voter and of the ethnically tolerant citizen who seeks the benefits of ethnic peace. Second, there are the actions of the socially oblivious expressive voter: heedless of policy consequences *or* of community reputation, this voter casts her vote or acts out her ethnic heritage purely out of a compulsion to express her feelings or preferences or self-image. But, as with art, expression is not mere solipsism. Rather, it relates to the understandings of other individuals; it occurs and has meaning in a social context. This suggests a third category of political action: the actions of the socially influenced, instrumental actor who votes in accordance with the expectations of her social group or mistreats out-group members in the way expected by in-group members, *in response* (in social-psychological terms) to the expectations of the group or *in order* (in rational-choice terms) to continue to enjoy the benefits of membership in the group. Such instrumental expression elides the original distinction entirely.

Abilities and Disabilities of Rational Choice

The attempts surveyed here to model identity and expressive phenomena using rational-choice tools offer some important examples of what rational-choice theories can and cannot do. The theory is well adapted for some tasks often said to be beyond its purview, but it has limitations, probably inherent, that have seldom been noted by its critics. Rational choice's parsimony and portability, its ability to generate clear hypotheses from clear assumptions, and, of course, its full accounting of individual incentives makes it, at least at present, an indispensable part of the analytical arsenal of social science as a discipline. Yet it requires supplementation in order to give a full accounting of identity and expressive phenomena, as well as other features of social life.[19]

19. In view of a common misconception, I emphasize that it is not the object of rational-choice theorizing to show that human beings are rational maximizers of utility. Rationality is a simplifying assumption, and therefore is by definition false. It is nonsense to speak of "falsifying rational-choice theory." The assumption's justification must lie in its usefulness as compared with other available methods of theorizing. (One might, of course, falsify *a* rational-choice theory.)

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF RATIONAL ACTORS

Rational-choice theories rest on individual information and individual preferences. It is natural to suspect such theories of being inapplicable to inherently *social* processes, and many critics have expressed that suspicion.[20] However, the repeated-interaction models of game theory offer a representation of truly social phenomena that can be surprisingly nuanced, by focusing on the role of shared expectations. Moreover, the issue of other-regarding behavior is central to social theory, and seems, on the surface, to contradict the self-regarding nature of rational choice.[21] But every one of the rational-choice identity models cited—Overbye, Bawn, Hardin, Harvey, and Laitin—would generate considerable identity and expressive behavior (and could equally well generate other forms of cooperative behavior) even if the basic preferences of individuals were purely selfish and material. Of course, this does not prove that human motivation is selfish. It demonstrates, however, that the fact of other-regarding behavior is perfectly compatible with motivations that are selfish and material, but strategic. The point of modeling socially oriented behavior by the indirect mechanism of equilibrium cooperation in games, rather than by simply making the straightforward assumption of altruistic motivations, is to take advantage of the fact that the selfish-motivations approach generates cooperation under some conditions but not others and offers predictions about when cooperation is possible and when it must disappear. Simple altruism or identity expression hypotheses fail this basic test.

GENUINE LIMITATIONS ON RATIONAL-CHOICE THEORIES OF IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION

This is not to say that a more-sophisticated non-self-interest or expression model could not ultimately generate superior hypotheses. Several substantial criticisms of self-interest models use the methods of classical rational choice and the related tools of evolutionary game theory to show how motivations contrary to self-interest could emerge and persist in an evolutionary setting.[22] These evolutionary models provide powerful tools for ap-

20. Accordingly Granovetter (1985) and Sen (1978), among many others, have argued that rational-choice theories present an inherently "undersocialized" model of human behavior; Elster (1989b) distinguishes between the instrumental behavior of rational actors and the norm-driven behavior of people in societies; C. Taylor (1971) argues that some goods and some motivations are "irreducibly social" and cannot be viewed in terms of individual preferences and decisions.

21. Many critiques of rational-choice and self-interest theories have looked at some instance of systematically other-regarding behavior and drawn the incorrect implication that individual motivation must therefore be inherently other regarding. This syllogism is made especially clear, for example, by Monroe (1996) and by most of the authors represented in Mansbridge (1990).

22. See, for example, Hamilton 1963, 1964 on kinship altruism, Frank 1988 on nonselfish behaviors, Boyd and Richerson 1985 on the conditions for true group

propriate alternative accounts of selfless-seeming social behavior. It is not hard to imagine how a similar evolutionary account of group identity behavior, or perhaps even true expressive motivations, might be constructed. However, thus far such models (with the notable exception of kinship altruism models) only portray very broad, generalized tendencies toward altruism, revenge seeking, aggression, or other general traits. As such, they offer little insight into the many instances where people act unselfishly, refrain from seeking revenge, or behave passively. Important work remains to be done in specifying the boundaries of selfishly rational and unselfish or irrational behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. In the meantime, game theoretic models offer a basis for the sometimes-yes, sometimes-no answer to "Will humans cooperate?" and related questions.

By allowing the possibility of a wide variety of group-oriented behavior, as well as selfish behavior, game theoretic models reflect anthropology's theme of "biological unity but social diversity." However, game theory (and rational choice generally) does little to specify anything about the form or content of norms or culture. To put it another way, game theory shows how various equilibrium patterns of cooperation could be maintained but says little about which of several equilibria will emerge. It expresses well the general nature of coordination, but it says little about exactly how coordination will be achieved.[23] This is a fundamental limitation of game theory as an analytical tool for social theory. Even given a perfect game theoretic model of some social or political interaction, to know how individuals will behave would also require empirical study or additional theoretical structure. Overbye and Bawn only show that systematic participation and ideology could be maintained in a setting of recurring interaction. They offer little guidance as to what patterns of behavior *will* arise, given initial conditions. Hardin and especially Harvey and Laitin use this sort of thinking in combination with historical, ethnographic, survey, and other empirical techniques to analyze real instances of group identity and expressive behavior. Such a combination of techniques is ultimately indispensable. Game theory proposes how observed phenomena might fit together, and thereby offers some predictions about other phenomena to look for and about how exogenous changes can sometimes require some sort of behavioral shift (such as when a falling discount factor renders repeated-game cooperation *impossible*). *It seldom can offer any deterministic prediction of exactly what* society will look like following an exogenous or policy change.

Game theory models, and by extension rational-choice models of other types, have a second and more fundamental limitation: they assume

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selection for altruism, and Basu 1996 on the general difference between fitness and utility in the hawk-dove game.

23. For game theoretic treatments that nicely characterize this problem, see Fudenberg and Maskin 1986 on multiple equilibria in repeated games and games of asymmetric information and Crawford and Haller 1990 on coordination.

that, beyond perhaps some carefully specified and limited layer of incomplete information, all players are equally aware of what game they are playing. When a relevant social situation occurs, all participants unambiguously recognize it as an iteration or stage of a particular game, subject to a predetermined set of equilibrium expectations. Among the papers surveyed here, all the ones that use repeated-interaction reasoning to portray identity or expression, whether formally or informally, rely heavily on this assumption. Instances of voting choice or of intraethnic interaction are universally seen as such by all the participants, and all agree on what, if any, expression of identity is prescribed by existing norms.

In real life, however, any new political or social situation may be subject to a variety of interpretations fitting it into a variety of different equilibrium patterns. Every rational actor in every instance must ask herself: Of what repeated interaction is this new situation an iteration? In this sense, each such situation presents a *new* equilibrium selection, or coordination, problem for political actors to solve, not simply a new instance of a solved problem. Real political actors, faced with such situations, engage in argument, interpretation, and deliberation aimed at influencing the outcomes of those coordination problems.[24] This is the point at which political actors or social agitators can influence behavior. For example, ethnic violence can be created if it is successfully advertised by people who will benefit from it, such as ethnic political leaders or people who hope to gain some economic good through conflict. Or, ethnic conflict can be avoided if cooler heads prevail. And in either case, the outcome of the current situation affects future situations by providing a relevant precedent that may serve subsequently as a focal point or as rhetorical ammunition. This is an important mechanism by which group identity is created and ethnic conflict promoted or retarded.

Current choice theoretic tools are thus ill suited, at present, to deal with some very basic features of political life. Efforts at influencing interpretations are surely informed by strategic thinking, but seen in the context of solving new coordination problems, they occur outside any established equilibrium in the classic sense. Hermeneutical efforts such as discourse analysis seem to be the only tools presently available to address these processes, but as far as I am aware, these carry no systematic methods for the analysis of individual strategy.[25] Eventually, an effective analysis of identity and expression in politics will depend on our making some connection between, if not indeed a coherent synthesis of, rational choice and such interpretive methods.

24. For a discussion of the theoretical issues that arise, from a rational-choice standpoint, due to this ambiguity, see Calvert and Johnson 1999.

25. Indeed, the seminal approach of Habermas (1984) begins with a fundamental distinction between "communicative and strategic action." On the use of discourse analysis for general purposes of empirical political research, see, for example, Dryzek and Berejikian 1993.

THOMAS RISSE

Constructivism and International Institutions: Toward Conversations across Paradigms[1]

Introduction

Institutionalism as a theoretical approach can be differentiated from other approaches in international relations in terms of the substantive claim that institutions matter, that is, that they exert clearly identifiable and independent effects on political life. The various institutionalisms can then be distinguished according to which type of effects they ascribe to political and other institutions (see Hall and Taylor 1996; Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Keohane 1989). Institutions might constrain behavior, but they might also influence preferences or even constitute identities. Rationalist institutionalism follows a logic of consequentialism. In contrast, constructivist insights in the study of international institutions focus on a logic of appropriateness in terms of rule-guided behavior and the enactment of cultural scripts, on the one hand, and a logic of arguing emphasizing deliberative and communicative processes, on the other.

This essay emphasizes insights which social constructivism brings to the study of international institutions. Yet, rationalist and constructivist institutionalisms do not constitute either-or propositions but complement each other to a considerable extent. In this sense then, the essay is a plea for conversations across paradigms rather than continued trench warfare. It is also an appeal for problem- rather than paradigm-driven research on international institutions. There are enough empirical puzzles in the real world to be tackled to keep us busy for the years to come.

The essay starts with clarifying metatheoretical assumptions behind ra-

1. For critical and very helpful comments on the draft, I thank Tanja Börzel, Ron Jepperson, Ira Katznelson, Bob Keohane, Helen Milner, Kathryn Sikkink, and an anonymous reviewer.

tionalist and constructivist institutionalisms. I then concentrate on substantive issues in the life cycle of international institutions, in particular the emergence and change of international norms and institutions, on the one hand, and their impact on (domestic) political life in terms of rule compliance, on the other. I conclude with remarks on the complementarity as well as the remaining differences between rationalist and constructivist institutionalisms.

Institutionalism and International Relations: Theoretical Departures

RATIONALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

There is considerable confusion on what precisely is at stake in recent controversies between rational choice and social constructivism (for a thorough discussion see Fearon and Wendt 2002). First, neither rational choice nor constructivism represents a *substantive* theory of international relations on the same level as, say, realism, liberalism, Marxism, or the various institutionalisms. While most realists and Marxists subscribe to a rationalist ontology, neither liberal theorizing about domestic politics and international relations nor arguments about the impact of international institutions are confined to either rational choice or constructivism. Rational choice and constructivism are metatheoretical approaches to the study of social reality rather than substantive theories of international relations.

Second, some have argued that constructivists use interpretive or historical methods based on a postpositivist epistemology, while rational choice sticks to (neo-) positivism using formal modeling or large-*n* quantitative studies as their preferred methods. This claim is difficult to sustain. Rationalist and constructivist scholars use quantitative as well as qualitative methods (for large-*n* studies informed by a constructivist ontology see the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism, e.g., Boli and Thomas 1998, 1999; for formal modeling work using interpretive methods see Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, and Weingast 1998). The main controversies on methodological and epistemological questions are increasingly taking place within constructivism itself (see, e.g., Adler 1997; Price and Reus-Smit 1998; Hollis and Smith 1990; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Milliken 1999; Wiener 2001) as well as between the latter and various postmodern approaches (Walker 1993; Der Derian 1995; Albert 1994). Debates within constructivism center around the questions of to what extent conventional methodologies focusing on causal explanations are suitable to understand intersubjective meanings, what distinguishes causal from constitutive explanations, and to what degree we can strive for middle-range theories and generalizations across time and space. The debate between constructivism and postmodernist thinking concerns more fundamentally the possibility of making truth claims and of being able to adjudicate among competing claims. The following discussion brackets the debate on methodological and epistemological questions, because I want to concentrate on the substantive contribution of constructivist approaches to our understanding of international institutions.

Finally, it is misleading to claim that rational choice inherently assumes that humans are self-interested egoists striving to achieve material gains, while actors hold altruistic preferences informed by moral values and ideas in constructivist accounts. Rational actors can be power maximizers, need satisficers, or altruists. Many ideational accounts are compatible with an instrumentally rational logic of action. Principled and causal beliefs, even collective identities (see Calvert's contribution to this volume; also Fearon and Laitin 2000; Goldstein and Keohane 1993), can enter the utility functions of actors, affect cost-benefit calculations, and influence strategic interactions themselves.

So, what then is the difference between rational choice and constructivism (see also Fearon and Wendt 2002; Adler 2002)? First, rational choice is based on methodological individualism according to which "[t]he elementary unit of social life is the individual human action" (Elster 1989a, 13). In contrast, constructivists insist that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (culture in a broad sense). The fundamental insight of the structure-agency debate is not only that social structures and agents are mutually codetermined. The crucial point is that social constructivists insist on the mutual *constitutiveness* of (social) structures and agents (Adler 1997, 324–25; Wendt 1999, ch. 4). The social environment in which we find ourselves, defines ("constitutes") who we are, our identities as social beings. At the same time, human agency creates, reproduces, and changes culture through our daily practices. In sum, social constructivism occupies a—sometimes uneasy—ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism by claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents which cannot be collapsed into each other.

Second, it follows that constructivism points to the *constitutive* role of social structures including norms instead of just concentrating on the causal effects of the social environment on actors (Onuf 1989; Kratochwil 1989; Wendt 1999). Many social norms not only regulate behavior, they also constitute the identity of actors. The norm of sovereignty not only regulates the interactions of states in international affairs, it also defines what a state *is* in the first place. Human rights norms not only protect citizens from state intervention; they also (and increasingly) define what it means to be a civilized state in the modern international community. Constructivists concentrate on the social identities of actors in order to account for their interests (e.g., Wendt 1999, esp. ch. 7; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996a; R. Hall 1999; Conin 1999; Reus-Smit 1997; various contributions in Katzenstein 1996b). Constructivism insists that collective norms and understandings define the basic rules of the game in which they find themselves in their interactions (Wendt 1999, 25, 287; Kratochwil 1989, 26). This does not mean that constitutive norms cannot be violated or never change. But the argument implies that we cannot even describe the properties of social agents without reference to the social structure in which they are embedded. I will comment below on the consequences of this insight for the study of international institutions.

Another useful way to distinguish between rational choice and social constructivism concerns the emphasis on different logics of social action and interaction or on different rationalities.[2] Rational choice emphasizes instrumental rationality, while constructivism focusses on rule-guided behavior, on the one hand, and communicative rationality, on the other.

THREE RATIONALITIES: THE LOGICS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM, APPROPRIATENESS, AND ARGUING

A driver stops at a red light located in a dark forest at three o'clock at night. Three interpretations describe what happened. According to the first story, the driver notices the red light, looks around, and checks whether another vehicle is approaching or whether a police car is somewhere hidden behind the trees. Since she is risk-averse, she stops. According to the second account, the driver stops, because this is what one ought to do in front of a red light. A third story claims that the driver faces a conflictual situation. On the one hand, she would like to get home as soon as possible, because a sick child is waiting for her. On the other hand, she knows that running a red light violates a social rule and if everybody did that . . . As a result of this reasoning process, she stops.

Each story emphasizes a different logic of social action (see Risse 2000, 2–7, for the following). The first account follows a logic of consequentialism (March and Olsen 1989, 1998) which is the domain of rational choice. Agents enact given identities and interests and try to realize their preferences through strategic behavior. The goal of action is to maximize or to optimize one's interests and preferences.

The second account emphasizes a logic of appropriateness: "Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and

2. It has become common in U.S.-dominated political science to reserve the term *rationality* for rational choice. This has led some scholars to mistakenly assume that social constructivism somehow deals with the "irrational" aspects of political life. Instead, rationality should not be confined to strategic-instrumental behavior.

more general concepts of self and situations" (March and Olsen 1998, 951). Rule-guided behavior differs from strategic and instrumental behavior in that actors try to do the right thing rather than maximize, or optimize, their given preferences. The driver in the second story does not calculate her interests or preferences but simply stops at the red light, because this is what society expects from her in such a situation, as she learned twenty years ago during her driving lessons. The logic of appropriateness entails that actors try to figure out the appropriate rule in a given social situation. Normative rationality implies constitutive effects of social norms and institutions, since these rules not only regulate behavior, that is, have causal effects, but also define social identities ("good citizens stop at red lights"). Normative rationality also entails socialization effects. A Martian would drive right through, because he does not know the rule. Norm-guided behavior requires at least knowledge of the rule and some internalization of the knowledge.

Most of the controversy between rational choice and constructivism has focussed on the relationship between the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness, at least in North American international relations. This debate has overlooked that constructivism actually encompasses at least two modes of social interaction. In many social situations, actors regularly comply with norms which they have internalized and which they take for granted. In the second story, the driver did not even think about whether to stop at the red light. While strategic behavior is explicitly goal oriented and intentional, the "taken for grantedness" of norm-regulated behavior implies that enacting the norm does not need to be a conscious process. In this case, the social structure of norms exerts its effects on actors almost directly, since actors know what is expected of them and what constitutes appropriate behavior. The logic of appropriateness does not imply that actors approve of the social norms, only that they know about and have internalized them. This version of a logic of appropriateness, which is rather widespread in the constructivist literature, emphasizes structure over agency.

But March and Olsen (1989, 1998) also mention rule-guided behavior as a conscious process whereby actors have to figure out the situation in which they act, apply the appropriate norm, or choose among conflicting rules. In the third story, the driver is faced with two conflicting norms of appropriateness. One ought to stop at a red light, even at three at night. But parents also are supposed to look after a sick child. The internalization of norms does not help in this situation. Strategic calculation does not help, either, when actors are confronted with conflicting norms and preferences are unclear. The more the norms are conflicting or contested, the less the logic of the situation can be captured by the statement "good people do X" but by "what does 'good' mean in this situation?" or even "what is the right thing to do?" But how do actors adjudicate which norm applies? They reason (even if this deliberation takes place in one person's head, as in the third story). Social constructivism not only encompasses the logic of appropriateness, but also a logic of truth seeking or arguing. Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Argumentative rationality means that the participants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by the better argument and that relationships of power and social hierarchies recede in the background (Habermas 1981; Müller 1994; Checkel 2001; Risse 2000). Argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interactions; however, the goal is not to attain one's fixed preferences but to seek a reasoned consensus. As Keohane (2001, 10) put it, persuasion "involves changing people's choices of alternatives independently of their calculations about the strategies of other players". Actors' interests, preferences, and perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed but subject to discursive challenges. Where argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their given interests and preferences but to challenge and to justify the validity claims inherent in them—*and* are prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument. In other words, argumentative and discursive processes challenge the truth claims which are inherent in identities, interests, and norms.

What distinguishes the three logics of action identified here? While I took an agency-centered perspective to introduce the three logics, this should not be confused with methodological individualism identified with rational choice. The logic of appropriateness in particular makes no sense, unless we assume constitutive effects of social structures and norms on social agents. If taken to the extremes, this version of social constructivism becomes overly structuralist. Actors are reduced to social automatons enacting rules or overly socialized agents who deeply believe in the validity of social norms.

As a result, a constructivist account that takes the mutual constitutiveness of structures and agency seriously, encompasses not only rule-guided behavior but also a mode of social interaction that allows to challenge the norms and rules themselves, thereby "bringing agency back in." I suggest, therefore, that an emphasis on arguing represents a more agency centered version of constructivism. Challenging truth claims and the validity of norms and rules constitutes a possibility for actors to change these social structures through a reasoned consensus rather than simply reproducing them. Still, argumentative rationality presupposes intersubjectivity, that is, once again, the embeddedness of actors in a social environment.

While the emphasis on agency in the logic of arguing brings this mode of interaction closer to rational choice, it represents a different form of agency. Instrumentally rational actors know what they want and try to realize their interests and preferences in light of their knowledge of other actors' interests and preferences. Thus, they strategize, bargain, or signal in social interactions. They might recalculate their strategies in light of the other actors' responses, but the purpose of the action remains to optimize or maximize one's expected utilities. In arguing mode, however, actors' preferences, interests, and even identities are endogenized insofar as they are subject to challenges and counterchallenges. Actors following a logic of argumentative rationality engage in truth-seeking behavior and strive to achieve a reasoned consensus. In contrast to consequentialism, truth-seeking behavior brackets one's interests or preferences.

Of course, all three logics of social action represent ideal types. In reality, they often mix and it is hard to identify the dominant logic. In the story of the driver in front of the red light, for example, the observable behavior is consistent with each of the three accounts. More important, real actors often behave according to several logics of social action. In bargaining situations, for example, instrumentally rational actors routinely use arguments in order to convince *others* that their interests and preferences in fact can be justified in terms of the common good. But even strategic arguing or rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig 1997, 2000) requires that actors follow the rules of argumentative rationality. Instrumentally rational actors have to give reasons for the validity of their preferences if they want to persuade others. Of course, these reasons can then be challenged by other speakers in the public sphere. If speakers want to remain credible in such discussions, they must reply with another round of reasoning, while bargaining threats or promises are considered inappropriate. Thus, instrumentally rational speakers tend to entrap themselves in the logic of argumentative rationality, even if they had no intention to enter a true dialogue to begin with (Risse 1999).

There are also many social situations in which the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness mix. If we assume that social approval constitutes a basic desire of human beings, following rules of appropriate behavior enters the utility functions of instrumentally rational actors. At this point, the difference between the first and the second accounts of the driver's motives might become minute and rational choice could then model under which conditions the desire for social approval trumps more narrowly selfish interests, and vice versa. Of course, constructivists would point out that the desire for social approval as basic human interest is ultimately irreconcilable with methodological individualism, since it inherently constitutes human beings as *social animals* embedded in society. In other words, the logic of appropriateness would enter cost-benefit calculations of utility-maximizing actors by defining in the first place what constitutes costs and what constitutes benefits. Moreover, the imagery of human action adopted here is still one of a calculating machine whereas constructivists would emphasize the "taken for grantedness" of social rules and obligations. Ultimately, however, the difference between the two metatheoretical approaches is one of emphasis on a continuum of social action rather than a sharp and easily discernible distinction.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Let me now turn to the constructivist approach to the study of international institutions. Before proceeding, we need to define some crucial terms. There are at least as many definitions of (international) institutions as there are theoretical perspectives. In the following, I use the term *international institution* in the sense of *relatively stable collections of communicative practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations of international life.* This definition follows and amends March and Olsen (1998, 308) which goes beyond the widespread understanding of international institutions as patterned rules structures (e.g., Keohane 1989, 3) by including communicative practices, while leaving the question of rule-consistent behavior outside the definition.

Following the conventions in institutionalist research, *international regimes* would then be those institutional arrangements that meet the explicit-rules test. One should not restrict the concept of international regimes to agreements among *states,* but include "private" international regimes (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999). Finally, international *organizations*—both interstate and nongovernmental—are international institutions with a "street address," that is, with specific role assignments to individuals and groups and with the capacity to act independently (Rittberger 1994).

The original regime definition distinguished between principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures with increasing degrees of specificity from the first to the last (Krasner 1983, 2). In the meantime, norms and rules are used almost interchangeably in the literature. There is general agreement that norms are "standards of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity" (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54). In other words, there is an inherent intersubjective quality to norms: "We only know what is appropriate by reference to the judgements of a community or a society" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 252; see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). If norms are standards of appropriate behavior in the sense of "Good people do X," rules specify these norms and apply them to particular situations as "specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action" (Krasner 1983, 2). They usually take the form of "Do X in order to get Y" (Fearon 1997). Social norms and rules are shared by a collectivity, while principled beliefs can be held by individuals. Of course, this immediately raises the question of when a norm becomes a norm rather than individual beliefs about right or wrong. Communicative practices are key to the definition of when principled beliefs become collectively shared norms.

I now proceed by specifying further how constructivism approaches the study of international institutions in contrast to rational choice. Following a logic of consequentialism, *neoliberal institutionalism* or rationalist regime analysis has convincingly shown against various versions of realism that "cooperation under anarchy" is possible and that narrowly self-interested actors can achieve stable and enduring cooperation and overcome collective action dilemmas (Keohane 1984, 1989; Oye 1986a; Zürn 1992; see Martin and Simmons 1998). The main point was to establish that we do not have to assume altruistic interests or the presence of a hegemonic power with vastly superior resources to explain international cooperation. Rationalist institutionalism employs a rather "thin" understanding of institutional effects. They are mostly confined to influencing the *behavior* and policies (preferences over strategies) of actors, while the underlying interests (preferences over outcomes) or identities remain outside and are exogenized. The principal imagery in this understanding of international institutions is one of constraining behavior by affecting cost-benefit calculations of actors and their strategies.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, rationalist institutionalism came under attack from the emerging constructivist thinking in international relations. This literature originated intellectually from the so-called Grotian tradition and notions of an international society of states as a social context in which governments operate (see, e.g., the English school in international relations theory, Bull 1977). These scholars shared the institutionalist mantra that international cooperation matters but disagreed with rational choice on metatheoretical assumptions. As Ruggie and Kratochwil pointed out, the "emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality. It follows that we *know* regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behavior. Hence, the ontology of regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity" (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764). In other words, they argued that the logic of appropriateness is inescapable when theorizing about international institutions.

Constructivist institutionalism then adopts a "thick" understanding of international institutions as social structures deeply embedding actors such as states. International institutions matter not only in terms of constraining and regulating actors' behavior and strategies. They also constitute these actors in the sense that they define their identities and interests. Corporate actors such as nation-states do not even exist outside social structures and institutions such as sovereignty. Institutions provide the social norms and rules enabling social interaction in the international realm in the first place. An emerging empirical literature inspired by constructivist reasoning focusses on such constitutive institutions in international life. Constructivists emphasize, for example, the mutually constitutive relationship between states as agents and sovereignty as a constitutive norm of the international system: "States define the meaning of sovereignty through their engagement in practices of mutual recognition, practices that define both themselves and each other. At the same time, the mutual recognition of claims of sovereignty is an important element in the definition of the state itself" (Biersteker 2002, 57; Biersteker and Weber 1996). Hall adds to this a study of the transformation of collective identities from territorially based to nation-based sovereignty as constitutive principles of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century international system (R. Hall 1999). Following Wendt's famous dictum that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1992), constructivist institutionalists have looked at broad institutional arrangements that are based on a collective identity of its members, in particular security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998; Cronin 1999; also Reus-Smit 1997). This and other work does not focus on specific international regimes but on constitutive norms and arrangements in international life providing actors such as states with a knowledge structure of appropriate behavior which enables their interactions in the first place.

Constructivist institutionalism has so far interpreted the logic of appropriateness in two ways to provide an account of how international norms acquire their "taken for grantedness." The first account emphasizes socialization processes. Actors including corporate actors and organizations become acquainted with new international norms through processes of social learning as a result of which they acquire new interests and identities. When they accept the validity of the norms and their policy prescriptions as binding, they have internalized them in a socialization process (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902; Checkel 1999). In the more extreme versions of this argument, actors have to actively endorse the new norms and to believe in the validity of its prescriptive status to make the norm binding.

In contrast, sociological institutionalism as understood by Meyer and his colleagues (e.g., Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1987; Meyer et al. 1997) emphasizes institutions as providing cultural scripts and downplays the autonomy of individual actors. Nation-states are seen as "embedded in a world polity and culture, and the common cultural contents and trends of these states are sought" (Jepperson 2000, 4). Actors follow these scripts and take them for granted as social facts, because they know about them, not necessarily because they believe in them. If socialization plays a role at all, it is about acquiring social knowledge rather than about endorsing the validity of social norms.

What does the logic of arguing add to these understandings of international institutions? First, arguing and persuasion provide micromechanisms for socialization and social learning, irrespective of whether this learning is about acquiring new social knowledge and skills or about getting socialized in the validity of an international norm. Second, an emphasis on arguing sheds light on processes of norm change. Third, a focus on deliberative processes improves our understandings of institutional effects. Institutions do not just reduce transaction costs or provide rules of appropriate behavior. They also serve as discourse arenas enabling deliberative processes geared toward problem solving. They do so by establishing relationships of trust among actors which are deemed crucial for processes of communicative persuasion and consensus seeking. In Habermasian terms, institutions provide a "common lifeworld," a common set of references and of experiences to which actors can relate in their communicative interactions.

Toward Conversations between Rationalist and Constructivist Institutionalisms

International institutions as constraining actors' behavior, as constituting interests and identities, or as discourse arenas for problem solving—are these three images incompatible and mutually exclusive? Here, we need to distinguish the analytical from the empirical level. Analytically speaking, strategic-instrumental behavior, rule following out of a logic of appropriateness, and arguing in terms of challenging truth claims need to be kept separate, since they emphasize different logics of action and interaction. On the empirical level, however, things start to blur. Actors in the real world regularly apply the different logics in their behavior. We also find many institutionalist arguments in the literature which combine elements of the three social logics. This holds true for historical institutionalism (and its varieties; see contribution by Pierson and Skocpol) and for actor-centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997). The question then becomes *which* social logic of interaction is likely to prevail in which situation and under what conditions. Following March and Olsen, a clear logic should dominate an unclear one (1998, 952–53). The more uncertain actors' preferences are, the more we would expect movement from the logic of consequentialism to arguing and rule-guided behavior. Moreover, one logic of action might incorporate another under certain circumstances. Strategic constructions or rhetorical action, for example, follow an instrumentally rational logic, but are embedded in and validated by the logics of appropriateness and of arguing. Finally, the different logics might follow each other sequentially. For example, tough distributional bargaining is only possible if a prior consensus has been established through a reasoning process concerning the definition of the situation and rules of fairness ("common knowledge" assumption in noncooperative game theory).

The institutionalist literature has evolved to the point where similar empirical anomalies are theorized by different institutional theories which should lead to conversations across metatheoretical commitments. Let me discuss three examples. First, both rationalist and sociological versions of institutionalism theorize about path-dependent processes. Pierson explains why particular institutional solutions are often unpredictable and why political institutions are locked in despite growing inefficiency. Increasing return processes are self-reinforcing, because "the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time" and the "costs of exit . . . rise" (Pierson 2000a, 252). Pierson's starting point is rational, utility-maximizing actors, but institutional structures increasingly affect and narrow down their range of choices, irrespective of the efficiency of institutional solutions. Thus, he criticizes functionalist accounts of institution building and the assumption that institutions are created to serve some particular purpose. Even if they did originally, they might survive for quite some time because of positive feedback loops and self-reinforcing processes.

It remains unclear, how far away this argument is from the "taken for grantedness" of social norms emphasized by sociological institutionalism. As DiMaggio and Powell put it, "sociologists concur with rational-choice scholars that technical interdependence and physical sunk costs are partly responsible for institutional inertia. But these are not the only, or the most important, factors. Institutionalized arrangements are reproduced because individuals often cannot even conceive of appropriate alternatives . . ." (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, 10–11). This sociological account of path-dependent processes emphasizes that institutions embody cultural understandings and scripts which actors reproduce in their daily practices and thereby transmit to other actors. Both accounts of path-dependent processes emphasize "inefficient histories" (March and Olsen 1998, 957–58) in the sense that institutions survive irrespective of whether they serve some useful and functional purpose. The two accounts differ, however, with regard to the causal mechanisms by which path-dependent processes are kept moving. Sociological institutionalism emphasizes cultural understandings and the "taken for grantedness" of social norms, while the more rationalist version of historical institutionalism focuses on sunk costs and, thus, implies that institutional solutions affect the cost-benefit calculations of actors. We need a conversation between the two interpretations in order to figure out more precisely where they differ. Moreover, we also need empirical indicators which differentiate between the two accounts. Last but not least, both accounts emphasize continuity and, if taken to the extremes, institutional determinism at the expense of institutional change and conflict.

The second example concerns the difference between the "taken for grantedness" of social norms or the enactment of cultural scripts, on the one hand, and arguments about "bounded rationality" (Simon 1982; review in Odell forthcoming), on the other. "People act not on the basis of objective reality but on the basis of perceived reality and of assumed cause-and-effect relationships operating in the world they perceive" (Scharpf 1997, 19). Scharpf's actor-centered institutionalism takes care of cognitions including orientations toward socially appropriate behavior. If we add to this that meaning structures may be shared intersubjectively and that people may deliberate about the appropriate course of action under given circumstances, we enter the logics of appropriateness and of arguing and, thus, of social constructivism, as discussed above. If the "boundedness" of bounded rationality has to do with collectively shared meaning structures, that is, is a property of social structure in which actors are embedded, a conversation with constructivism should be possible. Unfortunately, as Odell points out, most empirical work on the international political economy pays some lip service to bounded rationality and incomplete information but then proceeds with limiting utility functions to narrowly defined selfish interests under complete information (Odell forthcoming). At the same time, constructivists who take the mutual constitutiveness of structure and agency seriously, need to theorize choice situations, unless their actors become so structurally determined that they do nothing but enact social scripts and cultural norms (on this point, see Finnemore 1996b; Checkel 1998). At the end of the day, the difference between constructivists, emphasizing social structure and the inherent intersubjective quality of norms, and rationalists, accepting the inherent boundedness of rationality, might be overstated *if* the latter agree that the limitations on unrestricted rationality stem not only from limited capacities of individuals to process information but also from their embeddedness in a society and social culture.

The last example concerns the controversy about causal versus constitutive effects of political institutions. Rationalist institutionalism starts with the constraining effects of institutions on actors' choices and focuses on the regulatory impact of institutions. Institutions can also effect actors' strategies or policies to achieve certain goals (preferences over strategies, see Calvert's contribution).[3] We enter the realm of constitutive effects, the more we assume that institutions influence actors' interests (preferences over outcomes) and identities. It is here where many authors see the main dividing line between rationalist institutionalism, on the one hand, and historical, sociological, or constructivist institutionalism, on the other (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 8; DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, 9). If this is true, a nice division of labor between the two institutionalisms could emerge. Constructivists would be in charge of explaining actors' preferences, while rationalist approaches would explain how agents act on the basis of these preferences. Introducing the logic of arguing already makes clear that things are not that simple and that there is an alternative to the rational choice logic of agency. Arguing assumes a mode of interaction where preferences are no longer fixed but subject to challenges and coun-

3. It is often very difficult to decide which preferences over strategies are in contrast to more deep seated interests (preferences over outcomes). Ultimate desires such as survival, welfare, or love do not get us very far in explaining the strategies or behavior that actors might choose to achieve them. See Powell's contribution in this volume on this point.

terchallenges and where the action orientation is no longer to attain one's own interests but to reach a reasoned consensus. More important, the logic of appropriateness implies that social institutions not only constitute actors' identities and interests but also affect their behavior enacting these identities.

Yet, it is hard empirically to differentiate between the regulatory and the constitutive effects of social norms. As Tannenwald points out, most social norms both regulate and constitute (1999, 437). Human rights, for example, regulate the behavior of governments toward their citizens, but they also define what it means to be a member in good standing of international society rather than a pariah state. But how do we know constitutive effects when we see them? Constructivist scholarship has not developed far toward an accepted methodology of how to discern constitutive effects of social norms. In particular, there is sometimes a tendency to overestimate the constitutive effects of norms. If everything constitutes, nothing does. Does the rule to drive on the right side of the street in the United States and in continental Europe "constitute" actors, or does it simply regulate traffic? Moreover, measuring rule-consistent behavior as such does not get us far, because it does not differentiate between regulatory and constitutive effects. Krasner's argument (1999) about sovereignty as "organized hypocrisy" is based on a strong "decoupling" of states' paying lip service to sovereignty as constitutive for the international system and of their behavior violating the norm. This implies that we need to take a closer look at communicative practices in order to discern whether social norms constitute actors or merely regulate their behavior. The more actors refer to the norms when defining and describing who they are and the more outsiders to the community also describe it in those terms, the more these self-descriptions are shared by the wider community to which the actors refer and the more we have probably found constitutive norms.

In sum, rationalist and constructivist approaches do not seem to be that far apart. There is ample room for conversations across theoretical and seemingly insurmountable paradigmatic boundaries. This becomes even more obvious when we look at empirical contributions to the study of international institutions.

Explaining the Emergence of International Institutions

The starting puzzle of rationalist institutionalism in international relations has been to explain why and under what conditions instrumentally rational actors (mostly states) holding egoistic and at least partly conflicting preferences nevertheless cooperate (overviews in Martin and Simmons 1998; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, ch. 3). International regime analysis took off in the United States and elsewhere during the early 1980s and quickly became a major field of application for noncooperative game theory specifying the conditions under which coordination and collaboration were possible to produce public goods or to avoid mutually undesired outcomes (e.g., Oye 1986a; Stein 1990; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997; Zürn 1992).

In the meantime, constructivist institutionalism emerged and has developed into a "clear reflective research program" (Keohane 1989, 173). We can now distinguish two accounts from sociological or constructivist institutionalism on the emergence of international institutions. The first emphasizes preexisting social structures, be they domestic or international, and uses an imagery of institutional imitation and diffusion, while the second is more agency centered and uses an imagery of entrepreneurship and persuasion.

On the more structuralist side, the Stanford school of sociological institutionalism has probably done most to advance an empirical research program that systematically shows the emergence of an international social structure or world culture which has deeply affected national practices from science and education to social security (survey in Jepperson 2000). Why is it that elementary school curricula around the world feature mathematics even in countries that lack teachers with the adequate knowledge? Meyer and his colleagues view this and other phenomena as an ongoing process of modernity and rationalization whereby Western cultural standards diffuse on a worldwide scale and serve as scripts to be downloaded in domestic institutions (Thomas et al. 1987; Boli and Thomas 1998; Meyer et al. 1997). The dispersal of these cultural values works through mimetic imitation and through incorporation of environmental structures, that is, the incremental and unintended adaptation by which organizations map environmental features into their own structures (see DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). This account strictly employs the logic of appropriateness whereby it is irrelevant whether the rules actually serve some functional or useful purpose ("inefficient history"; see March and Olsen 1998, 314–15). Less structuralist, Finnemore explored in more detail how international organizations such as the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the International Red Cross, and the World Bank serve as agents of norm change shaping state interests and preferences in various issue areas of international relations (Finnemore 1996a).

This and other work shows that new international institutions are rarely created from scratch but are usually embedded in or evolve from previous institutional arrangements. Price demonstrated, for example, that the norm against the use of chemical weapons emerged out of a particular and rather restrictive provision of the 1899 Hague Declaration, which was later broadened in various international agreements (Price 1997). New norms and new institutional arrangements need to resonate with preexisting rules and arrangements in order to survive. The evolution and embeddedness of new norms from and in existing institutions must not relate to the international system; they can also refer to domestic rules and institutions. Klotz showed, for example, that the international norm against apartheid originated from U.S. civil rights struggles leading to the domestic institutionalization of the norm of racial equality (Klotz 1995). Tannenwald's argument about the (informal) norm of no first use of nuclear weapons parallels Price's claim about the chemical weapons taboo, but the origins of the norm can be found in the U.S. domestic context and were internationalized later (Tannenwald 1999). Risse-Kappen argued that the transatlantic security community with distinctive rules of consultation represents an externalization of the domestic norms of mutual respect which characterize liberal democracies and, thus, the domestic structures of the members of the community (Risse-Kappen 1995).

This research mostly uses a backward-looking design whereby newly emerging norms are traced back to their origins in preexisting institutions (Scharpf 1997, 26). Post hoc historical accounts of the origins of new norms are fairly common in this literature. While rationalist institutionalism brackets actors' preferences and, thus, leaves the origins of mixed-motive games unexplained, constructivists' emphasis on the endogeneity of interests has often produced narratives with little generalizability. Constructivist work has only started to develop testable propositions about under which conditions new norms and institutions emerge out of which preexisting arrangements. To do so, we need to bring agency back into the picture.

Agency-centered work from a constructivist perspective typically focuses on "moral entrepreneurship" (Nadelmann 1990), in particular norm-promoting agents such as domestic public interest groups, epistemic communities, or transnational advocacy networks. Epistemic communities are networks of actors with an authoritative claim to knowledge and a normative agenda (Haas 1992). The literature on epistemic communities emphasizes cognitive processes such as learning (Adler and Haas 1992). Haas and others argue that such knowledge-based communities are the more influential, the higher the uncertainty about cause-and-effect relationships in the particular issue area among policymakers, the higher the consensus among the scientists involved, and the more scientific advice is institutionalized in the policymaking process.

Transnational advocacy networks are those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998). While epistemic communities are knowledge based, the primary characteristic of advocacy networks are shared principled beliefs. Typical examples include global networks in the human rights areas, women's rights groups, or networks and International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) in the environmental sector. Keck and Sikkink argued that advocacy networks effect norm creation processes in various stages of international policymaking, such as issue creation and agenda setting, and that they influence discursive positions of states and international organizations, institutional procedures, and policy change (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 25). Empirical research in such diverse issue areas as human rights, environment, and international security (see, e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Price 1998; Princen and Finger 1994; overview in Risse 2002) has singled out the agenda setting phase as particularly conducive for the impact of advocacy networks but also prenegotiations when national governments try to figure out their position in multilateral negotiations. Nonstate actors are less likely to influence actual negotiating processes, unless they are directly represented at the bargaining table, as is increasingly the case in many international governance institutions (O'Brien et al. 2000). This research has identified the following conditions under which transnational networks are likely to have an impact on international norm creation:

- Network characteristics such as density, material resources, and organizational capacities but also ideational resources such as moral authority combined with legitimate claims to knowledge

- Characteristics of the campaign targets, such as their vulnerability to both material and normative pressures

- Characteristics of the institutional environment (both domestic and international) in which the advocacy networks operate and which determine both their access to political actors and their ability to form winning coalitions

While these conditions determine which norm-promoting agents are successful or fail, empirical work in this area often suffers from a selection bias. We know mostly about cases in which advocacy networks and epistemic communities were able to influence state preferences and international negotiations. We know far less about failed campaigns.

Most recently, agency-centered constructivism has started developing complex models of international norm creation and institutional change combining all three logics of social action specified above. Take the norm life cycle model developed by Finnemore and Sikkink. During the phase of norm emergence, norm entrepreneurs typically link the rules they advocate to preexisting consensual norms or challenge the existing rules of *appropriateness* (1998, 254–65). By framing and reframing issues, however, they engage in strategic constructions and, thus, act according to the logic of *consequentialism.* The successful use of these strategic constructions largely depends on their ability to change the views and sometimes even interests of their targets or of some third-party audiences. Since transnational advocacy networks usually do not command material resources, their strategic constructions need to be persuasive. In other words, the logic of *arguing* enters the scene here. The ultimate success of strategic constructions depends on their persuasiveness with an audience and, thus, the "power of the better arguments." Once a sufficient number of (materially and ideationally) powerful actors have become convinced of the validity of the new norm, it reaches prescriptive status in international society and, thus, defines the new logic of appropriateness. At this point, a "norm cascade" sets in. This model provides an example of combining the three logics of action proposed by rational choice and constructivism in a time sequence. The logic of consequentialism prevails when norm entrepreneurs challenge an existing logic of appropriateness. Yet, they must make a persuasive case in order to convince others of the validity of the promoted norms. Here, the logic of arguing takes over. Once the tipping point of a norms cascade is reached, we (re-) enter the realm of rule-guided behavior. This example represents a sequential mode of combining the three logics of action.

Another example of combining the different logics of social action in a theoretically sophisticated way is Oran R. Young's work (1994, 1997) on "institutional bargaining." Young is as concerned as constructivists about insufficient attention to the supply side of international institution building. His starting point is boundedly rational actors who are uncertain about the strategies available to them and their interaction partners as well as about how possible bargaining outcomes satisfy their preferences. Under these conditions, "integrative bargaining" geared toward common problem solving rather than distributing fixed payoffs is necessary to achieve a cooperative solution (O. R. Young 1994, 126–27). Young then discusses several factors promoting integrative bargaining such as the availability of equitable solutions or the presence of entrepreneurial, structural, or intellectual leadership (on the latter, see O. R. Young 1991). Young's work represents an example of how a clear logic dominates an unclear one (March and Olsen 1998, 952). Under conditions of uncertainty, rule-guided behavior and communicative rationality prevail over the logic of consequentialism.

In sum then, we can observe an emerging convergence in the study of norm creation and international institutionalization processes toward complex models that combine the various logics of social action. Yet, the challenge ahead for constructivist work on the emergence of international institutions is to specify more clearly the conditions under which new principled ideas and new knowledge become consensual by "catching fire" among a variety of actors. Why is it that some strategic constructions, or "issue frames," work and are persuasive, while others don't? "Cultural fit," or norms resonance, is too broad a concept to provide analytical leverage. So far, constructivist institutionalism has not made much progress compared to the social movement literature which also failed to provide testable hypotheses on the conditions of successful framing (e.g., McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). If one wants to avoid the rationalist fallback position that new ideas resonate, because they fit with some given instrumental interests of actors, constructivist scholarship needs to make progress on the persuasiveness of arguments. To put it in terms of the logic of arguing: What counts for a better argument? Properties of the speaker, for example, her credibility, legitimate authority, or knowledge, as the literature on epistemic communities claims (Adler and Haas 1992)? Properties of the argument itself, for example, universal claims to general human values versus appeals to narrowminded self-interests? Yet, ethnic identity constructions and appeals to ethnic nationalism and hatred have been successful enough during the twentieth century to challenge this liberal optimism, unless the scope conditions are specified.

Exploring Compliance with International Norms: An Emerging Research Area

Most work on international institutions has focused on explaining the emergence of new international norms and regimes. Institutions and norms were found to matter when states and other actors cooperated to create them and changed their communicative practices accordingly. The question of rule-consistent behavior, of rule compliance and regime effectiveness has been side-stepped for quite a while. There might have been an implicit rationalist and functionalist bias here: If governments go through tough and sometimes costly bargaining processes to establish international institutions in the first place, why would they ignore the agreed-on norms and rules afterwards?

Before I discuss the emerging literature on compliance, some definitional clarifications are in order (see Börzel and Risse 2002; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). One should distinguish among the implementation of, compliance with, and effectiveness of international norms and rules. *Effectiveness* concerns the impact of a given international institution in terms of problem solving or achieving its policy objectives. *Implementation* means the process of putting international rules into legal and administrative practice, that is, incorporating them into domestic law, providing administrative infrastructure and resources necessary to put the rule into practice, and instituting effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, both internationally and domestically. *Compliance*, as understood here, incorporates the implementation process but does not necessarily imply effectiveness in terms of problem solving. Compliance means rule-consistent behavior, that is, a "state of conformity or identity between an actor's behavior and a specified rule" (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002, 3).

Irrespective of the particular theoretical approach, most authors agree on the starting condition for compliance problems. The more inconvenient the international rules, that is, the higher the material and ideational costs required for ensuring rule-consistent behavior, the greater the compliance problems are likely to become. In other words, some degree of misfit between the international rules, on the one hand, and the domestic policies, problem-solving approaches, institutions, or collective identities, on the other hand, determines the degree of compliance problems in the first place (see, e.g., Breitmeier and Wolf 1995, 347–48; Börzel 2001; Underdal 1998, 12; Cortell and Davis 2000; Checkel 1997, 2001). The two institutionalisms differ as to how they conceptualize "misfit" and what hypotheses they develop to explain compliance with inconvenient rules.

Rationalist institutionalism faces a puzzle concerning compliance. Assuming perfect information, rational actors who behave strategically and anticipate the consequences of their action should not face compliance problems in the first place. If they decide to cooperate to solve some collective action problems or coordinate behavior, the costs of complying with inconvenient rules should have entered their utility functions to begin with. This is why neorealists argued that powerful states would only agree to those norms and rules with which they can comply rather effortlessly (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996). This includes setting up international or domestic monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure rule compliance of smaller states and to take care of free riders. Under conditions of complete information, compliance problems for powerful states might arise in cases of "incomplete contracting," that is, if the international rules are less clear or the international monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are less stringent (Abbott et al. 2000; Raustiala and Slaughter 2002). This leads to the hypothesis in the legalization literature that compliance with inconvenient international norms is likely to be higher, the more specific the rules and the more effective the monitoring mechanisms are (Abbott et al. 2000; Legro 1996).

If we relax the assumption of complete information, even powerful states are likely to face compliance problems. Under conditions of bounded rationality, compliance problems might occur because of "involuntary defection." The managed compliance perspective argues, for example, that states are generally willing to abide by the rules but lack action capacities and resources of the administrative and political system (Chayes and Chayes Handler 1995). International institutions are supposed to prevent involuntary defection through technical and financial support and capacity building. But involuntary defection might also occur, because national governments are unable to foresee the domestic consequences of international arrangements (Zürn 1997). Domestic—private or public—actors may try to override or subvert an international agreement against their own government (cf. the nonratification of the comprehensive test ban agreement by the U.S. Senate). Two accounts can be distinguished. The first refers to domestic institutional features such as the number of veto players in a given polity (Tsebelis 1995), or the autonomy of the national government vis-à-vis society. The second focuses on domestic societal interests. International institutions lead to a redistribution of power capacities among the relevant actors in a political, social, or economic system (Milner 1988; Rogowski 1989). The more domestic actors are empowered by international norms and rule structures and the more this differential empowerment changes domestic winning coalitions, the more we would expect increasing compliance and institutional change. In sum, rationalist institutionalism emphasizes enforcement, legalization, capacity building, and the redistribution of domestic resources as the main remedies for dealing with compliance problems.

Constructivist or sociological institutionalism focuses on quite different processes, since it conceptualizes the compliance problem differently. However, noncompliance with international norms and rules should be as puzzling for constructivists as it is for rationalists, once the logic of appropriateness kicks in. Cultural isomorphism predicts a "compliance pull" of international norms (Franck 1990), the more these norms have acquired consensual status as standards of appropriate and legitimate behavior in international society. In other words, once the "norm cascade" sets in and a critical mass of states subscribes to the new rules (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), compliance should improve. Judging from the empirical record, however, there does not seem to be a straight line from collective identification with international institutions to rule-consistent behavior. When states ratify international treaties, they do not automatically implement the rules, let alone comply with them, as a strict understanding of the logic of appropriateness would suggest (Liese 2001).

Constructivists offer the following accounts for the compliance puzzle. First, sociologists point to decoupling whereby behavior does not conform to institutional norms and rules in which actors are embedded. According to Meyer and Rowen, "decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations" (1991, 58). In other words, we need to distinguish between the prescriptive status of an international norm and rule-consistent behavior. Even fully implemented international rules might not lead to the desired behavioral change of the rule targets. Even if every elementary school curriculum around the world contains mathematics and calculus, this by no means implies that elementary school instructors actually teach mathematics everywhere. A study on international human rights regimes found little correlation between increasing ratification of international treaties and improvement of human rights (Keith 1999). In the case of the European Union, transposition of its law into domestic legislation is extremely high at roughly the 95 percent level on average, but if we move further down the road of implementation, compliance varies (Börzel and Risse 2002).

Decoupling does not seem to be a universal condition; it varies tremendously. Unfortunately, sociological institutionalism of the Stanford school variety is of limited help in accounting for this variation. This school is so much concerned with demonstrating the structural homogeneity of corporate actors including states in the contemporary world system that it has little to offer about the degrees of decoupling. However, emphasis on decoupling challenges the neofunctionalist version of rationalist institutionalism which often brackets rule-consistent behavior assuming that legal implementation suffices to ensure the latter.

Constructivists have also used the "cultural misfit" proposition mentioned above to specifically account for variation in norm implementation and rule compliance and the differential diffusion of norms into domestic practices. According to the "resonance hypothesis," new international norms are more likely to be implemented domestically and ultimately complied with, the more they are compatible with preexisting domestic norms or collective understandings and identities embedded in a social and political culture (Ulbert 1997; Checkel 1997; Cortell and Davis 2000). The greater the misfit between international rules and regulations and domestic rules and procedures, the more difficult rule compliance becomes. The resonance hypothesis has generated quite substantial empirical research across various issue areas of international life including citizenship norms, environmental rules, and international trade (overview in Cortell and Davis 2000).

But it is also problematic, for three reasons. First, change agents and norm entrepreneurs are in the business of strategic constructions. In other words, they deliberately make international norms and rules "resonate" with preexisting domestic norms and collective understandings. Second, if resonance with domestic norms explains the emergence of new international norms (see above), observed noncompliance cannot result from "cultural misfit" but must be explained differently. Finally, a complete match between the international norms and the domestic culture is not particularly interesting, since it should result in automatic compliance. In other words, a certain degree of cultural misfit or incompatibility is necessary to ascribe causal weight to international norms. I suggest, therefore, to treat the "cultural misfit" proposition as the starting condition for compliance problems from a constructivist perspective (see also Börzel 2001). While rationalist institutionalists would conceptualize the problem of inconvenient rules as one of raising (material and ideational) costs, constructivists would emphasize the lack of resonance with domestic norms and collective understandings including identities.

Thus, cultural misfit can only be a starting point for dealing with compliance questions from a constructivist perspective. It might account for differential rates of decoupling, but it does not offer a positive explanation for compliance despite inconvenient rules. Once again, we need to leave overly structuralist accounts and bring agency back in. Agency-centered constructivism would emphasize the logic of arguing and see compliance with international norms and rules as a fundamentally intersubjective and interpretative process (see Kratochwil 1989). No matter how robust and how precise international regulations are, there is always room for interpretation. As a result, persuasion rather than enforcement or capacity building becomes the dominant mechanism to ensure rule compliance (Checkel 2001). But what makes a norm persuasive? At this point, constructivist institutionalists and legal scholars emphasizing the legitimacy of a rule have much in common (Franck 1990; Koh 1997; Hurd 1999; Joerges and Neyer 1997). As legal scholars point out, the perceived legitimacy of a norm increases compliance. Legitimacy is not a given or simply the result of a particular procedure of rule generation but is linked to democratic participation and deliberation in the negotiating process leading to the norm in the first place. The more those concerned by a norm participate in the process of norm generation and the more they perceive the rules as fair and just, the greater the likelihood of rule-consistent behavior (Dworkin 1986; Franck 1995; for an empirical evaluation, see Zürn and Joerges forthcoming).

Legal scholars also emphasize processes of norm interpretation by which actors deliberate about the meaning of certain rules. Even the most specific rules need to be interpreted and applied to concrete circumstances. Actors often disagree about the meaning of a rule and how to apply it. The logic of arguing kicks in again, even if actors—governments accused of norm violation and their accusers alike—behave instrumentally and strategically (Schimmelfennig 1997). Such argumentative processes resemble court proceedings even if they are carried out in front of a public international audience rather than specific courts or (international) commissions monitoring compliance (for evidence in the human rights area, see Risse 1999). The point is that accusers and defendants have to accept a common legal basis and to give reasons for their opinions if they want to persuade an audience. We can extrapolate from this that compliance with international rules should increase, the more discourse arenas exist allowing for such processes of legal internalization. These can be domestic or international courts but also international organizations or commissions monitoring compliance with international treaties. Thus, constructivists agree with rationalists that international monitoring mechanisms are important for improving rule compliance, but for different reasons. The emphasis is on discourse arenas enabling argumentative processes rather than simply the provision of information about rule compliance.

Rule compliance and implementation then constitute a socialization process during which actors—governmental, transnational, and societal—gradually became acquainted with international norms as a result of which they assume their "taken for grantedness" and become habitualized practices. The emphasis is on the constitutive effects of international norms in shaping the interests and identities of actors. These scholars then focus on learning processes, on institutional emulation, and arguing. Checkel specifies several conditions under which social learning understood as the change of preferences and the socialization into new rules occur (Checkel

2001). These conditions refer mostly to the institutional environment in which learning processes take place (dense interactions among participants, insulation from political pressures, shared professional background) but also to external factors (crises or policy failures).

Empirical work on socialization from a constructivist perspective has just begun. As a result, there is not yet sufficient empirical evidence to evaluate the propositions about arguing stated above. Moreover, there is a tendency among scholars focusing on socialization to overemphasize norm internalization. Socialization was meant to provide a microfoundation for processes of norm diffusion which sociological institutionalism of the Stanford school variety has bracketed (on this point, see Checkel 1999). Yet, we do not need to assume that each individual actor has to deeply internalize an international norm and to believe in its validity in order to comply with it. Institutionalized practices, organizational routines, and standard operating procedures can do the trick independently of individual convictions. In these cases, socialization simply means getting acquainted with the rules and the ensuing role expectations and acquiring the knowledge to enact them.

More recently, scholars have developed complex models of rule compliance which integrate the three logics of social action. In the human rights area, for example, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) have developed a five-stage "spiral model" to specify the conditions under which international human rights norms are implemented and complied with in the domestic practices of mainly third world states. This model specifies the dominant actors to move the process from one phase to the next as well as the dominant mode of interaction. It builds on the "boomerang pattern" of interaction suggested by Keck and Sikkink where domestic nongovernmental organizations bypass their state and search out international allies in transnational advocacy networks to bring pressure to bear on their government in order to enforce compliance with international law (1998, 12–14). During early phases of the spiral model, transnational advocacy networks are the dominant actors moving the process further; interactions between these networks and norm-violating governments largely follow instrumental rationality. When later stages are reached, the domestic opposition gradually takes over and the social logic changes from instrumental to argumentative rationality and processes of persuasion. The more human rights norms achieve prescriptive status in the domestic context, the more the logic of appropriateness and institutionalization/habitualization processes dominate.

Theory-guided empirical work on compliance with international norms and institutions has not yet moved much beyond the stage of plausibility probes. The recent move toward integrative models suggests, however, that movements across the boundaries of the two institutionalisms are necessary and possible: For example, constructivist work has identified shaming as a powerful mechanism by which states can be brought into compliance with international norms (e.g., Klotz 1995; Liese 2001). However, shaming involves all three logics of social interaction. It is part of an argumentative process by which governments or a wider audience are meant to be persuaded to change their preferences. Its success then depends on the logic of arguing. But the shaming agents such as INGOs or other norm-promoting agents use it as strategic constructions to blame a rule-violating government. Thus, they follow a logic of consequentialism. At the same time, those being shamed must accept the underlying norm as a legitimate standard of appropriateness for shaming to be successful. Thus, shaming connotes a process in which all three logics of action are at play and arguing and instrumental rationality as a strategic construction are embedded in the logic of appropriateness. In contrast, the spiral model of human rights change adopts a sequential view of how the different logics relate to each other.

Finally, some of the pathways to compliance identified by rationalist as compared to constructivist-sociological institutionalism can be treated as functionally equivalent. A high degree of legitimacy of international norms or their internalization into the domestic political systems might compensate for a lack of enforcement mechanisms. In the absence of societal reform coalitions whose resources could have been strengthened by international norms, norm entrepreneurs might introduce discursive processes of persuasion in order to increase compliance.

In sum, work on compliance suggests fruitful combinations of the various logics of social action identified by the two institutionalisms. Sometimes, the pathways and mechanisms suggested are mutually exclusive. Persuasion and enforcement through sanctions hardly go together. Yet, managed compliance through capacity building and increasing the legitimacy of international norms through a more participatory and deliberative process of norm creation can well be combined. Norm entrepreneurship using strategic constructions to shame states into compliance closely resembles a mechanism by which international institutions provide ideational resources to societal reform coalitions to further their goals.

So What?

The survey of the recent literature documents that both rationalist and constructivist-sociological approaches to the study of international institutions are by now well-established research programs in the field of international relations and have yielded significant theoretical and empirical insights. Both approaches have gone well beyond the rather trivial insight that "institutions matter" and have developed testable propositions on the conditions under which international norms and rule structures emerge and gain their prescriptive status, and domestic compliance with these norms and rules is to be expected. Moreover, rationalist and constructivist institutionalisms have begun to specify the causal mechanisms that lead to institutional change and explain norm compliance, such as two-level games, the differential empowerment of domestic actors, moral and political entrepreneurship, persuasion, learning, other socialization processes, and so on.

Yet, as I tried to show, rationalism and constructivism identify different logics of social action. Rational-choice approaches emphasize a logic of instrumental rationality and of consequentialism and are self-consciously agency centered. In contrast, constructivism can be divided in more structuralist accounts focusing on the logic of appropriateness and rule following and on more agency-centered concepts concentrating on argumentative rationality and persuasion. On a metatheoretical level, these three logics are quite distinct and, I claim, cannot be collapsed into each other. Yet, the "games real actors play" (Scharpf 1997) consist of various combinations of the different logics which actors have at their disposal. Problem-driven scholars who strive to explain some puzzles in the real world better make sure that their theories are open enough to allow for incorporating different logics of action.

Thus, at the beginning of the new century, scholars are beginning to leave their paradigmatic trenches and start talking across metatheoretical divides. In fact, the most-interesting institutionalist work is no longer to be found among the metatheoretical purists, be they rationalists or constructivists. Rather, as I tried to show, innovative work today combines the different logics of social action and demonstrates how different causal pathways using bargaining, arguing, or rule-following mechanisms complement each other in various ways. I find this the most-promising avenue for future institutionalist work in international relations. Scholars increasingly accept the notion that social reality cannot be reduced to one single logic of action and that, therefore, an approach such as rational choice which emphasizes the logic of consequentialism simply will not do. Some of these conceptualizations (such as the norm "life cycle") follow a sequential rationale and specify which logic dominates in which phase of norm creation or implementation. The different logics of action might also be embedded into each other. Strategic constructions or framing processes follow the logic of consequentialism but are embedded in collective understandings of appropriateness and require arguing geared toward a reasoned consensus in order to be successful. Last but not least, some theoretical concepts such as path dependence or bounded rationality are currently used by both metatheoretical camps which should again inspire conversations across paradigms.

While work across metatheoretical boundaries is only beginning, it has dramatic consequences for our practical knowledge of international politics. First, an understanding of international negotiations that incorporates both arguing and bargaining can lead to improved diplomatic processes in many international negotiations, providing tools to overcome deadlock situations. Second, if we conceive of world politics as an international society of states based on collective understandings of what constitutes appropriate behavior, we will come to different policy prescriptions than if we conceived it as balance of power politics. It makes a big difference in the contemporary discussions about humanitarian interventions, for example, whether we consider a country's "supreme national interest" as solely concerned with immediate survival as a state or whether we extend this view toward the preservation of a community of states bound by basic rules of appropriate behavior. Such a broader view of the national interest does not solve the complicated trade-offs, but it alters the frame of reference. Third, the sociological institutionalist emphasis on decoupling between the prescriptive status of norms and rule-consistent behavior should alert us that implementation of international norms in domestic law is a necessary but not sufficient step toward rule compliance. Last but not least, if we view international institutions as discourse arenas, this should have important consequences for institutional design, particularly in light of the emerging public-private partnerships in international governance (Reinicke 1998; O'Brien et al. 2000). These examples suggest that the debates between rationalists and constructivists are not just controversies in the intellectual ivory tower but have implications for the conduct of world politics.